AR 1 — Arbeits­recht 1 (Eng­li­sche Ver­si­on)

Table of con­tents

1 Scope of Labor Law and Basic Con­cepts

1.1 The Sub­ject Mat­ter Regu­la­ted by Labor Law

Labor law does not encom­pass all types of human work; for exam­p­le, it does not regu­la­te the work of self-employ­ed pro­fes­sio­nals such as lawy­ers. Ins­tead, labor law pri­ma­ri­ly governs the situa­ti­on in which the majo­ri­ty of eco­no­mic­al­ly acti­ve indi­vi­du­als (appro­xi­m­ate­ly 90%) in our socie­ty earn their liveli­hood: by working as employees in the ser­vice of ano­ther, the employ­er. An employ­er can be a natu­ral per­son (busi­ness owner), but more com­mon­ly, it is a legal enti­ty under pri­va­te law (such as a cor­po­ra­ti­on or limi­t­ed lia­bi­li­ty com­pa­ny), public law (fede­ral, sta­te, or muni­ci­pal govern­ment), or a part­ner­ship (gene­ral or limi­t­ed). Two fun­da­men­tal aspects cha­rac­te­ri­ze this situa­ti­on:

The employ­er reta­ins the aut­ho­ri­ty to defi­ne, within cer­tain limits, the con­tent, pur­po­se, natu­re, man­ner of work, and working hours, and can issue ins­truc­tions for the­se pur­po­ses. This is due, in part, to the fact that in a nor­mal­ly orga­ni­zed, spe­cia­li­zed eco­no­mic enter­pri­se, an individual’s work is meaningful only in the con­text of other con­tri­bu­ti­ons, and thus someone must coor­di­na­te the inte­gra­ti­on of indi­vi­du­al work into the over­all work pro­cess through direc­ti­ves.

The imme­dia­te results of the work bene­fit the employ­er. The­r­e­fo­re, the work per­for­med by the employee is for the bene­fit of ano­ther; it is ser­vice to someone else. The employ­er bears the respon­si­bi­li­ty and the eco­no­mic risk for pro­duc­tion and sales, ensu­ring that the work is eco­no­mic­al­ly effec­ti­ve. Sin­ce the employee can­not con­trol the work pro­cess in which they are inte­gra­ted and does not have a direct influence on the eco­no­mic suc­cess of their work, it is not jus­ti­fia­ble for the employee to bear the eco­no­mic risk direct­ly. This situa­ti­on is pre­va­lent in all count­ries with indus­tri­al modes of pro­duc­tion, regard­less of their eco­no­mic and social order. It is not crea­ted by the legal sys­tem but is rather a pre-exis­ting con­di­ti­on shaped by it.

In the Fede­ral Repu­blic of Ger­ma­ny, labor law also encoun­ters living con­di­ti­ons influen­ced by the legal and social sys­tem. The­r­e­fo­re, the sub­ject mat­ter to be regu­la­ted by labor law is not enti­re­ly inde­pen­dent of the legal order; it is par­ti­al­ly “legal­ly gene­ra­ted.” The inte­gra­ti­on of labor law in the new fede­ral sta­tes of Ger­ma­ny was pos­si­ble only with con­cur­rent adapt­a­ti­on of other legal and eco­no­mic con­di­ti­ons.

The legal and eco­no­mic sys­tem of the Fede­ral Repu­blic is cha­rac­te­ri­zed by the prin­ci­ples of a mar­ket eco­no­my and pri­va­te owner­ship of the means of pro­duc­tion.

Under the prin­ci­ple of a mar­ket eco­no­my, eco­no­mic pro­ces­ses (the natu­re and quan­ti­ty of pro­duc­tion and pri­ces) are deter­mi­ned by mar­ket rules, par­ti­cu­lar­ly by sup­p­ly and demand. The con­trast to this is a plan­ned eco­no­my (cen­tral eco­no­mic plan­ning), in which the sta­te sets the decisi­ve para­me­ters, par­ti­cu­lar­ly the natu­re and quan­ti­ty of pro­duc­tion, as well as the pri­ces, eit­her direct­ly or signi­fi­cant­ly influen­ces them through appr­oval requi­re­ments.

In a mar­ket eco­no­my, the wages and sala­ries of employees are also con­side­red cos­ts (“human as a cost fac­tor”). Who works under what con­di­ti­ons and for whom is sub­ject to the pri­va­te decis­i­ons of the par­ties invol­ved (free­dom to con­tract and struc­tu­re). Demand for and sup­p­ly of labor thus deter­mi­ne the com­pen­sa­ti­on that can be paid or obtai­ned. On the other hand, the sta­te has no direct influence over who works in a spe­ci­fic com­pa­ny and what they earn the­re. To assess this situa­ti­on fair­ly, it must be taken into account that it is essen­ti­al for an indi­vi­du­al employee to find a job to make a living, and for this pur­po­se, the­re are typi­cal­ly only a few employ­ers in the imme­dia­te vici­ni­ty. In con­trast, the employ­er can deci­de not to employ indi­vi­du­al employees, but usual­ly has a much wider sel­ec­tion of poten­ti­al can­di­da­tes.

The indi­vi­du­al employee is eco­no­mic­al­ly and soci­al­ly wea­k­er; the­r­e­fo­re, when estab­li­shing the employ­ment rela­ti­onship, the employ­er typi­cal­ly has a bar­gai­ning advan­ta­ge. If left sole­ly to the play of sup­p­ly and demand, it would be dif­fi­cult for the indi­vi­du­al employee to achie­ve reasonable working con­di­ti­ons, as the employ­er, for various reasons, is inte­res­ted in kee­ping labor cos­ts as low as pos­si­ble, par­ti­cu­lar­ly for com­pe­ti­ti­ve reasons.

Pri­va­te owner­ship of the means of pro­duc­tion results in the situa­ti­on whe­re indi­vi­du­als who want to work but requi­re phy­si­cal tools (spaces, machi­nery, mate­ri­als, vehic­les) depend on ano­ther, who has con­trol over the­se means and makes them available. Con­se­quent­ly, the employ­er, as the owner of the means of pro­duc­tion, has the power to cal­cu­la­te the employee’s wages and sala­ries in a way that enables them to earn a pro­fit from the value crea­ti­on con­tri­bu­ted by the employees. Sin­ce the means of pro­duc­tion requi­re capi­tal investment—partially with their own funds, but to a lar­ge ext­ent, with bor­ro­wed funds pro­vi­ded by banks—and sin­ce a por­ti­on of the pro­fit is reinves­ted in capi­tal, this forms the essen­ti­al cha­rac­te­ristic of the capi­ta­list eco­no­mic sys­tem.

The con­flic­ting inte­rests that need to be balan­ced are the focus of labor law:

  • The employ­er aims to pro­du­ce as chea­p­ly as pos­si­ble, pre­fer­ring lower wages, while employees seek hig­her wages.
  • Employ­ers do not wish to pay wages wit­hout work, whe­re­as employees expect com­pen­sa­ti­on even when they can­not work.
  • Employ­ers desi­re the fle­xi­bi­li­ty to redu­ce or replace per­son­nel, while employees seek job secu­ri­ty.
  • Employees are con­cer­ned with safe equip­ment and faci­li­ties to pre­vent acci­dents, whe­re­as employ­ers may resist safe­ty regu­la­ti­ons that increase pro­duc­tion cos­ts or com­ple­xi­ties.
  • Employ­ers seek broad aut­ho­ri­ty to issue direc­ti­ves, espe­ci­al­ly on the company’s eco­no­mic aspects, while employees are inte­res­ted in limi­ting direc­ti­ve powers and par­ti­ci­pa­ting in cru­cial decis­i­ons or making them them­sel­ves.

Howe­ver, the prin­ci­ples of a mar­ket eco­no­my and pri­va­te owner­ship of means of pro­duc­tion do not sole­ly deter­mi­ne our legal and social sys­tem. The fun­da­men­tal con­sti­tu­tio­nal decis­i­ons for demo­cra­cy and a wel­fa­re sta­te (Art. 20 Abs. 1 GG) also play a signi­fi­cant role in sha­ping this frame­work. They man­da­te a balan­ce of the descri­bed con­flic­ting inte­rests.

The wel­fa­re sta­te prin­ci­ple pre­vents unres­trai­ned capi­ta­lism and free uti­liza­ti­on of pro­duc­tion capi­tal becau­se it would adver­se­ly affect the soci­al­ly wea­k­er indi­vi­du­als. It requi­res essen­ti­al social safe­guards, and the majo­ri­ty of the popu­la­ti­on demands fur­ther social pro­tec­tions, even bey­ond what is strict­ly neces­sa­ry under the wel­fa­re sta­te prin­ci­ple. Con­se­quent­ly, labor law is tas­ked with pro­vi­ding exten­si­ve pro­tec­tion to employees.

While the demo­cra­cy prin­ci­ple initi­al­ly appli­es only to the sta­te sphe­re, it has poli­ti­cal impli­ca­ti­ons for the eco­no­my. It jus­ti­fies demands for employee par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on in com­pa­nies, which rest­ricts the owners’ con­trol over the means of pro­duc­tion (Art. 14 Abs. 1 S. 2 and Abs. 2 GG).

To sum­ma­ri­ze, the life situa­ti­on that labor law regu­la­tes can be descri­bed as fol­lows: in an indus­tri­al socie­ty, most gain­ful­ly employ­ed indi­vi­du­als are employees working for others (employ­ers). They are sub­ject to ins­truc­tions and work for someone else’s bene­fit, wit­hout bea­ring the direct eco­no­mic risks of their labor. In the Fede­ral Repu­blic of Ger­ma­ny, the inte­gra­ti­on of labor into the pro­duc­tion pro­cess and com­pen­sa­ti­on are gene­ral­ly sub­ject to mar­ket-based rules, and owner­ship of the means of pro­duc­tion is in the hands of busi­ness owners. The­se fac­tors give rise to the con­flic­ting inte­rests that labor law addres­ses.

The prin­ci­ples of the wel­fa­re sta­te, demo­cra­cy, and resul­ting poli­ti­cal move­ments, lea­ding to the social mar­ket eco­no­my as the Fede­ral Republic’s eco­no­mic model, demand a balan­ce of inte­rests that par­ti­cu­lar­ly con­siders employees. The­r­e­fo­re, the pur­po­se of labor law is to com­pen­sa­te for or alle­via­te the dis­ad­van­ta­ges faced by eco­no­mic­al­ly and soci­al­ly dis­ad­van­ta­ged employees in con­trac­tu­al nego­tia­ti­ons and per­for­mance resul­ting from the mar­ket eco­no­my.

1.2 Scope of Labor Law Employees and Employ­ers, Employ­ment Con­tracts, and Employ­ment Rela­ti­onships

Ger­man labor law governs the legal rela­ti­onships bet­ween indi­vi­du­al employees and employ­ers (indi­vi­du­al labor law), as well as the rela­ti­onships bet­ween employee and employ­er coali­ti­ons and the repre­sen­ta­ti­on bodies of employees and the employ­er (coll­ec­ti­ve labor law). Labor law ori­gi­na­ted as a means of pro­tec­ting employees, and it con­ti­nues to pri­ma­ri­ly ser­ve the pur­po­se of employee pro­tec­tion. Despi­te efforts and pro­vi­si­ons out­lined in the Uni­fi­ca­ti­on Trea­ty to estab­lish a labor code, the­re is still no com­pre­hen­si­ve codi­fi­ca­ti­on of labor law in place.

Regu­la­ti­ons can be found in the fol­lo­wing legal sources:

  1. Euro­pean law
  2. Sta­tu­tes
  3. Coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ments for sec­tors and indi­vi­du­al com­pa­nies
  4. Works agree­ments and ser­vice agree­ments (public ser­vice)
  5. Indi­vi­du­al employ­ment con­tracts

It is important to note that judi­cial decis­i­ons, often refer­red to as “judge-made law,” do not con­sti­tu­te a legal source as they are not legal­ly bin­ding. Howe­ver, in prac­ti­ce, judge-made law plays a signi­fi­cant role in labor law, espe­ci­al­ly in are­as that lack sta­tu­to­ry regu­la­ti­on, such as labor dis­pu­te law.

The con­cept of an employee is fun­da­men­tal to the scope of labor law. Labor law pro­tec­tions are only appli­ca­ble to employees, and the­se pro­tec­tions for employees are quite exten­si­ve. Addi­tio­nal­ly, lia­bi­li­ty for caus­ing dama­ge in labor law is signi­fi­cant­ly limi­t­ed com­pared to other con­trac­tu­al agree­ments. Howe­ver, not every indi­vi­du­al who pro­vi­des labor or ser­vices to others through a pri­va­te con­trac­tu­al rela­ti­onship is con­side­red an employee in the legal sen­se. The law does not pro­vi­de a uni­ver­sal­ly appli­ca­ble defi­ni­ti­on of the term “employee,” even though this term is used in various laws. Accor­ding to the Fede­ral Labor Court, the basic cri­te­ria are that the indi­vi­du­al pro­vi­des depen­dent and extern­al­ly direc­ted ser­vices to others under a pri­va­te law con­tract in exch­an­ge for remu­ne­ra­ti­on (Fede­ral Labor Court ruling of August 20, 2003 – 5 AZR 610/02, NZA 2004, 39).

The first requi­re­ment for qua­li­fy­ing as an employee is that the­re must be a pri­va­te con­trac­tu­al agree­ment bet­ween the employ­er and the employee. The­r­e­fo­re, the fol­lo­wing indi­vi­du­als are not con­side­red employees:

  • Civil ser­vants, jud­ges, and sol­diers. Their public law ser­vice rela­ti­onships are estab­lished by admi­nis­tra­ti­ve acts and regu­la­ted by spe­ci­fic laws. Howe­ver, workers and employees in the public sec­tor are con­side­red employees.
  • Inma­tes, indi­vi­du­als in secu­ri­ty detenti­on, and others working in an insti­tu­ti­on under a public law power rela­ti­onship.
  • Spou­ses and child­ren who pro­vi­de labor in the house­hold or busi­ness of their spou­se or par­ents. An excep­ti­on appli­es when the ext­ent of their invol­vement goes bey­ond fami­ly law obli­ga­ti­ons, in which case an impli­ed employ­ment con­tract may exist in indi­vi­du­al cases.
  • Indi­vi­du­als who act as mem­bers of an asso­cia­ti­on and have suf­fi­ci­ent pro­tec­tion through their mem­ber­ship rights.
  • The legal rela­ti­onship bet­ween employa­ble indi­vi­du­als recei­ving assis­tance and the ser­vice pro­vi­der based on § 16(3) sen­tence 2 of the Social Secu­ri­ty Code II (so-cal­led “one-euro job”) is not an employ­ment rela­ti­onship but rather a public law rela­ti­onship. The­r­e­fo­re, the assis­tance reci­pi­ent is not entit­led to remu­ne­ra­ti­on (Fede­ral Labor Court judgment of Sep­tem­ber 26, 2007 – 5 AZR 857/06).

For a long time, the employ­ment con­tract bet­ween the employ­er and the employee was con­side­red a sub­set of the ser­vice con­tract under § 611 of the Ger­man Civil Code (BGB), even though it was not expli­cit­ly men­tio­ned the­re. It was only in 2017 that the legis­la­tor intro­du­ced the employ­ment con­tract as a distinct type of con­tract, spe­ci­fied under § 611a BGB.

In a ser­vice con­tract, the ser­vice pro­vi­der com­mits to pro­vi­ding the pro­mi­sed ser­vices in exch­an­ge for remu­ne­ra­ti­on. This allows the employ­ment con­tract to be distin­gu­is­hed from con­tracts for spe­ci­fic work and agen­cy con­tracts:

  • Unli­ke an employ­ment con­tract bet­ween an employee and employ­er, in a con­tract for spe­ci­fic work (§ 631 BGB), the con­trac­tor owes a spe­ci­fic result. How the con­trac­tor achie­ves this result can be self-deter­mi­ned. In con­trast, the employee only needs to pro­vi­de their labor, and the employ­er deter­mi­nes the time, method, and place of work.
  • In an agen­cy con­tract (§ 662 BGB), the agent works wit­hout remu­ne­ra­ti­on, while the ser­vice pro­vi­der can request remu­ne­ra­ti­on.

Distin­gu­is­hing bet­ween an employ­ment con­tract and an inde­pen­dent ser­vice con­tract is not always straight­for­ward. § 84(1) sen­tence 2 of the Com­mer­cial Code (HGB) pro­vi­des a gui­de­line for dif­fe­ren­tia­ting self-employ­ed com­mer­cial agents from employees. Accor­ding to this pro­vi­si­on, an indi­vi­du­al is con­side­red self-employ­ed if they can lar­ge­ly deter­mi­ne the orga­niza­ti­on of their work and their working hours free­ly. In con­trast, an employee is someone who is per­so­nal­ly depen­dent.

The employ­ment rela­ti­onship dif­fers from that of an inde­pen­dent con­trac­tor based on the degree of per­so­nal depen­dence the ser­vice pro­vi­der has. Eco­no­mic depen­dence is neither requi­red nor suf­fi­ci­ent to estab­lish an employ­ment rela­ti­onship. Employees are inte­gra­ted into the employer’s work orga­niza­ti­on, pri­ma­ri­ly through their sub­or­di­na­ti­on to the employer’s ins­truc­tions. In par­ti­cu­lar, a work rela­ti­onship exists for employees who are unable to free­ly shape their work acti­vi­ties or deter­mi­ne their working hours.

Examp­les of indi­vi­du­als con­side­red employees include:

  • Field sales repre­sen­ta­ti­ves who have rela­ti­ve free­dom in choo­sing their work loca­ti­ons, usual­ly within spe­ci­fic geo­gra­phic are­as.
  • Employees with fle­xi­ble working hours who can deter­mi­ne their indi­vi­du­al working hours to some ext­ent.
  • Tele­com­mu­ting employees who can per­form their work from home using a com­pu­ter.
  • Chief phy­si­ci­ans, who, while main­ly free in their pro­fes­si­on, are inte­gra­ted into the orga­niza­ti­on of hos­pi­tal ope­ra­ti­ons.

Examp­les of indi­vi­du­als not con­side­red employees include:

  • Part­ners in part­ner­ships, who are not employees and pro­vi­de ser­vices to pro­mo­te the partnership’s goals based on the part­ner­ship agree­ment. They are gene­ral­ly not per­so­nal­ly depen­dent, as they pos­sess part­ner­ship shares and are invol­ved in decis­i­on-making within the part­ner­ship.
  • Legal enti­ties that act through their offi­cers (mana­ging direc­tors of a GmbH or board mem­bers of a stock cor­po­ra­ti­on). The offi­cers or mem­bers of gover­ning bodies per­form employ­er func­tions for the com­pa­ny. As such, they are gene­ral­ly not con­side­red employees but rather enga­ge in an inde­pen­dent ser­vice rela­ti­onship with the com­pa­ny. If an employee is appoin­ted as a mana­ging direc­tor, they may lose their employee sta­tus in case of doubt.

In deter­mi­ning whe­ther an indi­vi­du­al is an employee or a self-employ­ed con­trac­tor, various cri­te­ria may need to be con­side­red. In some cases, employ­ers may refer to employees as free­lan­cers to cir­cum­vent labor law pro­tec­tions and social insu­rance obli­ga­ti­ons. This mis­clas­si­fi­ca­ti­on can lead to indi­vi­du­als being dee­med “bogus” self-employ­ed. Howe­ver, the desi­gna­ti­on used in the con­tract is not decisi­ve. Rather, the actu­al imple­men­ta­ti­on of the con­tract is more important.

For exam­p­le, if a law firm owner assigns cases to a lawy­er who must work in exter­nal law firm offices during spe­ci­fied working hours, the lawy­er may be clas­si­fied as an employee due to their signi­fi­cant depen­dence, despi­te being labe­led as a free­lan­cer in the con­tract.

In some cases, it may be neces­sa­ry to con­sider addi­tio­nal cri­te­ria to dif­fe­ren­tia­te bet­ween an employ­ment con­tract and an inde­pen­dent ser­vice con­tract. Some fac­tors that sup­port the clas­si­fi­ca­ti­on of an indi­vi­du­al as an employee include:

  • The absence of per­so­nal capi­tal invest­ment
  • Lack of an inde­pen­dent work orga­niza­ti­on
  • No uti­liza­ti­on of their own auxi­lia­ry per­son­nel

1.4 Con­cept of the Employ­er

The ques­ti­on of who con­sti­tu­tes an employ­er can be ans­we­red swift­ly and straight­for­ward­ly. The­re is no sta­tu­to­ry defi­ni­ti­on of the term. An employ­er is any per­son or insti­tu­ti­on that employs at least one employee. The sta­tus of an employ­er is pri­ma­ri­ly shaped by the right of direc­tion, through which the employ­er can more pre­cis­e­ly deter­mi­ne the con­cre­te obli­ga­ti­ons of the employee regar­ding the natu­re, place, and time of work.

An employ­er can be:

  • A natu­ral per­son (e.g., sole pro­prie­tor, pri­va­te indi­vi­du­al).
  • A legal enti­ty under pri­va­te law (e.g., a stock cor­po­ra­ti­on, limi­t­ed lia­bi­li­ty com­pa­ny, incor­po­ra­ted asso­cia­ti­on).
  • A legal enti­ty under public law (e.g., fede­ral, sta­te, muni­ci­pa­li­ty, reli­gious com­mu­ni­ty).
  • An unin­cor­po­ra­ted asso­cia­ti­on (non-incor­po­ra­ted asso­cia­ti­on, civil law part­ner­ship).
  • A part­ner­ship (gene­ral or limi­t­ed part­ner­ship).

In the Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act, the con­cept of the employ­er is used in two ways: on one hand, the employ­er is the con­trac­tu­al part­ner of the employee, and on the other hand, the employ­er is an organ of works con­sti­tu­ti­on. In this con­text, the terms “entre­pre­neur” and “employ­er” are inter­ch­an­geable and mere­ly refer to dif­fe­rent legal rela­ti­onships, func­tions, and acti­vi­ties of the same per­son.

1.5 Appli­ca­bi­li­ty of Labor Law to Spe­ci­fic Groups of Indi­vi­du­als

1.5.1 Per­sons Simi­lar to Employees

A per­son simi­lar to an employee is someone who, like an employee, is eco­no­mic­al­ly depen­dent on a cli­ent but is not per­so­nal­ly depen­dent like an employee due to the lack of inte­gra­ti­on into a company’s orga­niza­ti­on and the essen­ti­al­ly free deter­mi­na­ti­on of their time. A per­son simi­lar to an employee is a self-employ­ed entre­pre­neur. The distinc­tion from employees is thus based on the degree of per­so­nal depen­dence. Per­sons simi­lar to employees are not as per­so­nal­ly depen­dent as employees becau­se of their lack of inte­gra­ti­on into a company’s orga­niza­ti­on and their essen­ti­al­ly free deter­mi­na­ti­on of time. The fea­ture of eco­no­mic depen­dence replaces per­so­nal depen­dence and being bound by ins­truc­tions. Addi­tio­nal­ly, the eco­no­mic­al­ly depen­dent indi­vi­du­al must, in terms of their over­all social posi­ti­on, be simi­lar­ly in need of social pro­tec­tion as an employee. The afo­re­men­tio­ned fea­tures pri­ma­ri­ly app­ly to home­wor­kers and sales repre­sen­ta­ti­ves who can only work for one employ­er due to con­trac­tu­al agree­ments or the scope of their acti­vi­ties. Someone who, in a ser­vice or work con­tract or a simi­lar legal rela­ti­onship, is eco­no­mic­al­ly depen­dent and pro­vi­des ser­vices or works per­so­nal­ly and pri­ma­ri­ly wit­hout the invol­vement of employees is thus simi­lar­ly in need of social pro­tec­tion as an employee.

Addi­tio­nal examp­les of per­sons simi­lar to employees include:

  • Artists
  • Wri­ters
  • Employees of audio and tele­vi­si­on broad­cas­ting, as well as
  • Sales repre­sen­ta­ti­ves, espe­ci­al­ly sin­gle-com­pa­ny repre­sen­ta­ti­ves with low inco­me. Howe­ver, they are con­side­red employees if, on avera­ge, they have not ear­ned more than 1,000.00 euros per month based on the employ­ment rela­ti­onship, inclu­ding com­mis­si­ons and com­pen­sa­ti­on for expen­ses incur­red in the regu­lar cour­se of busi­ness, during the last six months of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship (Fede­ral Labor Court, decis­i­on of Octo­ber 24, 2002 — 6 AZR 632/00, NZA 2003, 668).

Cer­tain pro­vi­si­ons of labor law are appli­ca­ble to the con­trac­tu­al rela­ti­onships bet­ween an entre­pre­neur and a per­son simi­lar to an employee due to their need for social pro­tec­tion. Howe­ver, the appli­ca­bi­li­ty of indi­vi­du­al labor laws or legal regu­la­ti­ons to other types of rela­ti­onships apart from employ­ment rela­ti­onships must be express­ly spe­ci­fied on a case-by-case basis (Fede­ral Labor Court, decis­i­on of May 8, 2007 — 9 AZR 777/06, BB 2007, 2298).

Examp­les of cor­re­spon­ding legal regu­la­ti­ons include:

  • Accor­ding to § 5 (1) of the Labor Court Act (Arbeits­ge­richts­ge­setz), per­sons simi­lar to employees have access to labor courts.
  • They are also entit­led to the legal mini­mum vaca­ti­on of 24 working days, as sta­ted in § 2, sen­tence 2 of the Fede­ral Vaca­ti­on Act (Bun­des­ur­laubs­ge­setz).
  • Based on various sta­te laws, per­sons simi­lar to employees may also be entit­led to edu­ca­tio­nal lea­ve.
  • Accor­ding to § 12a of the Coll­ec­ti­ve Agree­ment Act (Tarif­ver­trags­ge­setz), the employ­ment con­di­ti­ons of per­sons simi­lar to employees can be regu­la­ted by coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment. Such coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments pri­ma­ri­ly exist for free­lan­ce employees in the jour­na­lism sec­tor at broad­cas­ting com­pa­nies.
  • The con­trac­tu­al rela­ti­onships of sales repre­sen­ta­ti­ves who work exclu­si­ve­ly for one employ­er can also be sub­ject to mini­mum working con­di­ti­ons as per § 92a of the Com­mer­cial Code (Han­dels­ge­setz­buch).

Howe­ver, the exten­ded noti­ce peri­ods in accordance with § 622 of the Civil Code (Bür­ger­li­ches Gesetz­buch, BGB) also app­ly to so-cal­led “per­sons simi­lar to employees” (Regio­nal Labor Court of Colo­gne, decis­i­on of May 29, 2006 — 14 (5) Sa 1343/05).

The Employee Pro­tec­tion Act and the spe­cial ter­mi­na­ti­on pro­vi­si­ons in § 9 of the Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act and the Ninth Book of the Social Code (Sozi­al­ge­setz­buch, SGB IX) do not app­ly. The Con­tin­ued Remu­ne­ra­ti­on Act (Ent­gelt­fort­zah­lungs­ge­setz, EFZG), which regu­la­tes the right to pay­ment in cases of ill­ness-rela­ted inca­pa­ci­ty to work and on public holi­days, is also not appli­ca­ble to per­sons simi­lar to self-employ­ed workers. Sin­ce per­sons simi­lar to employees are not cover­ed by the Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act (Betriebs­ver­fas­sungs­ge­setz, BetrVG), the works coun­cil does not need to be con­sul­ted in the case of cor­re­spon­ding ter­mi­na­ti­ons. Howe­ver, the employ­er is obli­ged to regu­lar­ly inform the works coun­cil about the use of other indi­vi­du­als working in the com­pa­ny but not in an employ­ment rela­ti­onship (§ 80 Abs. 2 Satz 1 BetrVG), such as free­lan­ce workers and per­sons simi­lar to employees.

1.5.2 Indi­vi­du­als Enga­ged in Home­work

A home­wor­ker is someone who works in a self-sel­ec­ted place of work on behalf of others for remu­ne­ra­ti­on. An impli­cit cha­rac­te­ristic is that the work is of a straight­for­ward natu­re. This can also include simp­le cle­ri­cal work as home­work. A defi­ning fea­ture of home­work is that the home­wor­ker is eco­no­mic­al­ly depen­dent on their cli­ent but remains per­so­nal­ly inde­pen­dent. They can free­ly deter­mi­ne their working hours and the ext­ent of their work. The­r­e­fo­re, in the legal con­text of labor, they are not con­side­red employees. Labor law does not, the­r­e­fo­re, gene­ral­ly app­ly to home­work arran­ge­ments. Nevert­hel­ess, it is always neces­sa­ry to exami­ne the spe­ci­fic labor laws or coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments to deter­mi­ne whe­ther and to what ext­ent they also app­ly to home­work arran­ge­ments.

Examp­les of regu­la­ti­ons that equa­te home­wor­kers with employees:

  • Home­wor­kers are included in the defi­ni­ti­on of employees under the Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act (Betriebs­ver­fas­sungs­ge­setz) in accordance with § 5 (1) sen­tence 2 BetrVG.
  • For dis­pu­tes bet­ween the cli­ent and indi­vi­du­als enga­ged in home­work, the labor court is com­pe­tent, as per §§ 2, 5 (1) sen­tence 2 ArbGG.
  • They are entit­led to lea­ve and holi­day pay as per § 12 BUrlG.
  • Home­wor­kers are sub­ject to mate­r­ni­ty pro­tec­tion laws accor­ding to § 1, 9 MuSchG.
  • The­re is a right to home­wor­ker sup­ple­ments under § 10 EFZG.
  • On holi­days, remu­ne­ra­ti­on must be con­tin­ued accor­ding to § 11 EFZG.
  • Job secu­ri­ty for sever­ely dis­ab­led home­wor­kers is cover­ed by § 127 (2) SGB IX.

Indi­vi­du­als enga­ged in home­work are addi­tio­nal­ly pro­tec­ted by the Home Work Act (Heim­ar­beits­ge­setz, HAG) due to their eco­no­mic depen­dence. This includes pro­vi­si­ons rela­ted to:

To make a ter­mi­na­ti­on of a home­wor­ker arran­ge­ment effec­ti­ve, pro­per con­sul­ta­ti­on with the works coun­cil is man­da­to­ry under § 102 BetrVG, as home­wor­kers are part of the group pro­tec­ted by the Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act.

1.6 The Employ­ment Con­tract

The employ­ment con­tract is a mutu­al agree­ment through which the employee com­mits to pro­vi­ding the pro­mi­sed work, and the employ­er com­mits to pro­vi­ding the agreed-upon com­pen­sa­ti­on (wage) for that work. The initi­al stages of forming the con­tract crea­te a spe­cial rela­ti­onship bet­ween the par­ties, which leads to spe­ci­fic obli­ga­ti­ons such as obli­ga­ti­ons to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on, care, and con­fi­den­tia­li­ty.

The prin­ci­ple of con­tract free­dom gene­ral­ly appli­es to the con­clu­si­on of employ­ment con­tracts. This means that par­ties are free to deci­de whe­ther, with whom, with what con­tent, and in what form they want to enter into the con­tract. Employ­ment con­tracts can typi­cal­ly be con­cluded infor­mal­ly. Howe­ver, sin­ce the enact­ment of the Employ­ment Pro­of Act (Nach­weis­ge­setz), employees have the right to writ­ten docu­men­ta­ti­on of the essen­ti­al terms and con­di­ti­ons appli­ca­ble to them. Nevert­hel­ess, a for­mal requi­re­ment can be estab­lished, for exam­p­le, through a works agree­ment or a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment.

1.7 Con­cept of the Employ­ment Rela­ti­onship

An employ­ment rela­ti­onship is a legal rela­ti­onship that ari­ses from a legal­ly effec­ti­ve employ­ment con­tract bet­ween an employee and an employ­er, essen­ti­al­ly focu­sing on the exch­an­ge of work per­for­mance and remu­ne­ra­ti­on. An employ­ment rela­ti­onship exists from the moment when the­re is a legal obli­ga­ti­on for the com­ple­te or par­ti­al exe­cu­ti­on of the employ­ment con­tract.

Case Stu­dy “Com­mence­ment of the Employ­ment Rela­ti­onship”:

Employ­er T and care­gi­ver A enter into a con­tract on 02/01/2022, in which A is to begin work on 04/01/2022. A falls ill on 03/30/2022 and is unable to work for 4 weeks. Is she entit­led to con­tin­ued wage pay­ment during her ill­ness?

Solu­ti­on:

A is not entit­led to con­tin­ued wage pay­ment during ill­ness. Alt­hough the­re is an effec­ti­ve employ­ment con­tract, an employ­ment rela­ti­onship only exists start­ing on 04/01/2022. Addi­tio­nal­ly, the per­for­mance of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship through work com­mence­ment is a pre­re­qui­si­te for wage con­ti­nua­tion during ill­ness.

1.8 Manu­al Workers and Sala­ried Employees

Distin­gu­is­hing bet­ween manu­al workers and sala­ried employees varies bet­ween social secu­ri­ty law and labor law. In social secu­ri­ty law, the­re is no lon­ger a clear sepa­ra­ti­on bet­ween manu­al workers and sala­ried employees. In labor law, alt­hough the divi­si­on of employees into the cate­go­ries of manu­al workers and sala­ried employees is part­ly still defi­ned in the law and espe­ci­al­ly in coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ments, the­re are no lon­ger any legal distinc­tions bet­ween the­se two groups in labor law, except for the legal con­cept of exe­cu­ti­ve employees. Une­qual tre­at­ment of manu­al workers and sala­ried employees wit­hout a jus­ti­fia­ble reason is con­side­red a vio­la­ti­on of the prin­ci­ple of equa­li­ty.

A manu­al worker is an employee who pri­ma­ri­ly ear­ns their liveli­hood through phy­si­cal labor. They pro­vi­de their phy­si­cal labor to an employ­er in exch­an­ge for com­pen­sa­ti­on, which is typi­cal­ly refer­red to as wages. Manu­al workers are gene­ral­ly skil­led labo­rers or other employees enga­ged in phy­si­cal­ly deman­ding work.

Sala­ried employees are employees who pri­ma­ri­ly per­form intellec­tu­al (office-rela­ted, admi­nis­tra­ti­ve, hig­her tech­ni­cal, pre­do­mi­nant­ly mana­ge­ri­al, or other­wi­se ele­va­ted) tasks. The remu­ne­ra­ti­on for sala­ried employees is pro­vi­ded in the form of a sala­ry, usual­ly as a fixed month­ly amount, in con­trast to the hour­ly wages typi­cal­ly agreed upon for manu­al workers.

In the legal defi­ni­ti­on accor­ding to § 5 (3) of the Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act (BetrVG), the iden­ti­ty of exe­cu­ti­ve employees is expli­cit­ly deter­mi­ned. Accor­ding to this defi­ni­ti­on, an exe­cu­ti­ve employee is someone who, based on their employ­ment con­tract and their posi­ti­on in the com­pa­ny or estab­lish­ment:

  • Is aut­ho­ri­zed to inde­pendent­ly hire and dis­miss employees who work in the com­pa­ny or depart­ment (§ 5 (3) sen­tence 2 No. 1 BetrVG), or
  • Holds gene­ral power of att­or­ney or pro­cu­ra­ti­on, and the pro­cu­ra­ti­on is not insi­gni­fi­cant in rela­ti­on to the employ­er (§ 5 (3) sen­tence 2 No. 2 BetrVG), or
  • Rou­ti­ne­ly per­forms other tasks that are essen­ti­al for the exis­tence and deve­lo­p­ment of the com­pa­ny or estab­lish­ment and requi­re spe­cial expe­ri­ence and know­ledge, eit­her making decis­i­ons essen­ti­al­ly free from ins­truc­tions or signi­fi­cant­ly influen­cing decis­i­ons (§ 5 (3) sen­tence 2 No. 3 BetrVG).

Most com­mon­ly, the­se are refer­red to as seni­or non-uni­on employees. A seni­or non-uni­on employee is someone employ­ed in a com­pa­ny whe­re a coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment is in effect. Howe­ver, the seni­or non-uni­on employee enters into an indi­vi­du­al employ­ment con­tract with the employ­er. Their com­pen­sa­ti­on exceeds the hig­hest pay group of the rele­vant coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment. The defi­ning cha­rac­te­ristic of this group of sala­ried employees is that they have respon­si­bi­li­ties and qua­li­fi­ca­ti­ons excee­ding tho­se requi­red for the hig­hest sala­ry group under an appli­ca­ble coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment. Howe­ver, seni­or non-uni­on employees are not auto­ma­ti­cal­ly con­side­red exe­cu­ti­ve employees.

Exe­cu­ti­ve employees have a uni­que legal sta­tus in seve­ral respects:

  • The Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act (BetrVG) does not app­ly to exe­cu­ti­ve employees unless the BetrVG express­ly pro­vi­des other­wi­se. They have neither acti­ve nor pas­si­ve voting rights in works coun­cil elec­tions.
  • The law regar­ding spea­k­er com­mit­tees (SprAuG) includes par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on rights for exe­cu­ti­ve employees.
  • Alt­hough the Pro­tec­tion Against Unfair Dis­mis­sal Act (KSchG) appli­es, the cri­te­ria for jus­ti­fy­ing a ter­mi­na­ti­on are signi­fi­cant­ly more leni­ent. The employ­ment rela­ti­onship can be ter­mi­na­ted upon the employer’s request with a sever­ance pay­ment during the pro­tec­tion against unfair dis­mis­sal pro­cess.
  • Exe­cu­ti­ve employees are exempt from the Working Hours Act (Arbeits­zeit­ge­setz), but they are entit­led to over­ti­me pay if paid accor­ding to a coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment or slight­ly abo­ve it.
  • For the effec­ti­ve­ness of a fixed-term employ­ment con­tract, it is gene­ral­ly suf­fi­ci­ent for exe­cu­ti­ve employees to recei­ve finan­cial com­pen­sa­ti­on upon ter­mi­na­ti­on.
  • Exe­cu­ti­ve employees are not sub­ject to coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ments.
  • When ter­mi­na­ting an exe­cu­ti­ve employee, the works coun­cil is only requi­red to be infor­med, and a fail­ure to meet this obli­ga­ti­on does not affect the ter­mi­na­ti­on.

Labor law is typi­cal­ly divi­ded into indi­vi­du­al labor law and coll­ec­ti­ve labor law, accor­ding to its are­as of regu­la­ti­on.

2.1 Indi­vi­du­al Labor Law

Indi­vi­du­al labor law per­ta­ins to the part of labor law that regu­la­tes the legal rela­ti­onships bet­ween the employ­er and indi­vi­du­al employees. It encom­pas­ses aspects such as the crea­ti­on, con­tent, dis­rup­ti­ons, trans­fer, and ter­mi­na­ti­on of employ­ment rela­ti­onships.

First­ly, the­re are various laws that app­ly to all employees within their respec­ti­ve sub­ject mat­ter:

Addi­tio­nal­ly, the­re are spe­cial laws that app­ly to spe­ci­fic groups of employees depen­ding on the legal cha­rac­te­ristics of the employ­er:

  • Tho­se who pro­vi­de com­mer­cial ser­vices in com­mer­cial enter­pri­ses (the employ­er must be a mer­chant as defi­ned by the Ger­man Com­mer­cial Code or HGB) are clas­si­fied as com­mer­cial employees, and §§ 59 ff. HGB app­ly.
  • Miners and mining employees are sub­ject to spe­cial pro­vi­si­ons under the Fede­ral Mining Act (Bun­des­berg­ge­setz), §§ 51 ff.
  • Sea­fa­ring crew mem­bers are gover­ned by the Seamen’s Act (See­manns­ge­setz).

2.2 Coll­ec­ti­ve Labor Law

Coll­ec­ti­ve labor law rela­tes to the law gover­ning labor orga­niza­ti­ons (uni­ons and employ­er asso­cia­ti­ons) and work­force repre­sen­ta­ti­on (works coun­cils and staff coun­cils). This includes labor dis­pu­tes, coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments, the Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act, and co-deter­mi­na­ti­on rights.

Coll­ec­ti­ve labor law deals with legal rela­ti­onships in which a group (hence the term “coll­ec­ti­ve”) of employees is affec­ted, rather than an indi­vi­du­al employee. The term “coll­ec­ti­ve” can encom­pass various groups of peo­p­le, inclu­ding all employees in a com­pa­ny or estab­lish­ment, or spe­ci­fic groups like all sever­ely dis­ab­led employees. Well-known examp­les include labor dis­pu­te law, whe­re labor uni­ons and employ­er asso­cia­ti­ons face each other, as well as legal rela­ti­onships ari­sing from coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments or works coun­cil elec­tions. This field can be fur­ther divi­ded into two major are­as: “Coll­ec­ti­ve Agree­ment Law” and “Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Law.”

2.2.1 Coll­ec­ti­ve Agree­ment Law

Coll­ec­ti­ve auto­no­my is a con­sti­tu­tio­nal­ly pro­tec­ted right of labor uni­ons and employ­er asso­cia­ti­ons, enab­ling them to inde­pendent­ly nego­tia­te coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments. Coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments are a signi­fi­cant source of employ­ment con­di­ti­ons for many workers in Ger­ma­ny. A coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment is typi­cal­ly nego­tia­ted bet­ween labor uni­ons and employ­er asso­cia­ti­ons, and occa­sio­nal­ly bet­ween labor uni­ons and a sin­gle employ­er.

An agreed-upon coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment can also app­ly even if it has been declared gene­ral­ly bin­ding in accordance with § 5 TVG (Coll­ec­ti­ve Agree­ment Act). This is par­ti­cu­lar­ly important becau­se a gene­ral­ly bin­ding coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment appli­es even if an employ­er or employee is not affi­lia­ted with a labor uni­on or an employ­er asso­cia­ti­on, mea­ning all employ­ers and employees within the agreement’s scope are bound by its terms. The Fede­ral Minis­try of Labor and Social Affairs main­ta­ins a list of gene­ral­ly bin­ding coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments on its web­site.

2.2.2 Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Law

Works con­sti­tu­ti­on law governs the col­la­bo­ra­ti­on bet­ween the employ­er and the work­force of a com­pa­ny, repre­sen­ted by the elec­ted works coun­cil. Works con­sti­tu­ti­on law essen­ti­al­ly regu­la­tes the intra-com­pa­ny rela­ti­onship bet­ween the employ­er and the work­force.

A fun­da­men­tal prin­ci­ple of the Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act is the coope­ra­ti­ve col­la­bo­ra­ti­on bet­ween the employ­er and the works coun­cil. This col­la­bo­ra­ti­on occurs in con­cert with labor uni­ons and employ­er asso­cia­ti­ons pre­sent in the com­pa­ny. The objec­ti­ve is to work for the bene­fit of the employees and the com­pa­ny.

Sec­tion 2 of the Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act sta­tes:

“Employ­ers and works coun­cils must work tog­e­ther in a spi­rit of mutu­al trust and in coope­ra­ti­on with the labor uni­ons and employ­er asso­cia­ti­ons repre­sen­ted in the com­pa­ny in accordance with the appli­ca­ble coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments.”

The works coun­cil plays a cru­cial role in this con­text. Accor­ding to § 1 of the Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act, com­pa­nies with a usu­al mini­mum of five eli­gi­ble voters, of whom three are eli­gi­ble for elec­tion, must elect works coun­cils. The works coun­cil is elec­ted by the employees and is respon­si­ble for ensu­ring that the laws, regu­la­ti­ons, coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments, and com­pa­ny agree­ments that bene­fit the employees are obser­ved and imple­men­ted. It is also invol­ved in social, per­son­nel, and eco­no­mic mat­ters. The­se par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on rights are divi­ded into co-deter­mi­na­ti­on rights and par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on rights.

The most important laws rela­ted to works con­sti­tu­ti­on law include:

3 Sources of Labor Law and Design Fac­tors, and Their Hier­ar­chy

Despi­te some efforts and the pro­vi­si­on in the Uni­fi­ca­ti­on Trea­ty to crea­te a uni­fied labor code, the­re is still no uni­form codi­fi­ca­ti­on of labor law. As a result, the con­tent of employ­ment rela­ti­onships can depend on various legal sources and design fac­tors. The­r­e­fo­re, it is neces­sa­ry to estab­lish their hier­ar­chy, which is as fol­lows, from the hig­hest to the lowest design fac­tor:

  1. Euro­pean Pri­ma­ry Law and Secon­da­ry Law
  2. Ger­man Con­sti­tu­tio­nal Law
  3. Man­da­to­ry Labor Law Acts
  4. Coll­ec­ti­ve Agree­ments
  5. Coll­ec­ti­ve Agree­ments with Dis­cre­tio­na­ry Labor Laws
  6. Works Agree­ments
  7. Employ­ment Con­tracts (inclu­ding gene­ral employ­ment con­di­ti­ons, com­pa­ny prac­ti­ces, and the prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment under labor law)
  8. Dis­cre­tio­na­ry Labor Laws
  9. Employer’s Right of Direc­tion

In prin­ci­ple, the hig­her-ran­ked regu­la­ti­on takes pre­ce­dence over lower-ran­ked ones, a con­cept known as the hier­ar­chy prin­ci­ple. Howe­ver, the hier­ar­chy prin­ci­ple does not app­ly when a lower-ran­ked basis of entit­le­ment is more favorable to the employee, known as the prin­ci­ple of favora­bi­li­ty. Accor­ding to the prin­ci­ple of favora­bi­li­ty, the lower-ran­ked regu­la­ti­on is appli­ed when its con­tent is more favorable to the employee. While the prin­ci­ple of favora­bi­li­ty is legal­ly sti­pu­la­ted only in § 4 (3) TVG, it is wide­ly con­side­red to be appli­ca­ble throug­hout labor law.

Exam­p­le:

Accor­ding to a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment, all employees are entit­led to 30 days of annu­al lea­ve. Howe­ver, Employee A’s employ­ment con­tract spe­ci­fies 32 days of lea­ve. Alt­hough the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment is of hig­her rank, in this case, the pro­vi­si­on in Employee A’s employ­ment con­tract appli­es due to the prin­ci­ple of favora­bi­li­ty.

Within the same rank, the­re is no room for the hier­ar­chy or favora­bi­li­ty prin­ci­ples. In cases of com­pe­ti­ti­on among sources of the same rank, the spe­cial­ty prin­ci­ple appli­es, mea­ning the more spe­ci­fic norm takes pre­ce­dence over the more gene­ral norm, regard­less of the chro­no­lo­gi­cal order. When no regu­la­ti­on is more spe­ci­fic, the dis­pla­ce­ment prin­ci­ple or order prin­ci­ple is appli­ed, in which the newer regu­la­ti­on replaces the older one.

Exam­p­le:

The employ­ment con­tract grants Employee A 27 days of annu­al lea­ve, the in-house coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment spe­ci­fies 26 days, and the indus­try-wide coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment spe­ci­fies 28 days. Howe­ver, the works agree­ment pre­scri­bes 30 days of lea­ve. The hier­ar­chy of design fac­tors is as fol­lows:

I. Sta­tu­te: § 3 (1) BUrlG — at least 24 working days, Coll­ec­ti­ve Agree­ment: 26 or 28 working days Works Agree­ment: 30 working days Employ­ment Con­tract: 27 working days II. In resol­ving com­pe­ti­ti­on issues con­side­ring the hier­ar­chy and favora­bi­li­ty prin­ci­ples alo­ne, Employee A would be entit­led to 30 working days of paid lea­ve accor­ding to the works agree­ment. Howe­ver, the works agree­ment is inva­lid due to a vio­la­ti­on of § 77 (3) BetrVG.

III. Bet­ween the in-house coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment and the indus­try-wide coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment, the­re is com­pe­ti­ti­on at the same rank. Con­se­quent­ly, the in-house coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment pre­vails over the indus­try-wide coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment under the spe­cial­ty prin­ci­ple. The­re is no room for the appli­ca­ti­on of the prin­ci­ple of favora­bi­li­ty. Thus, the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment pro­vi­des a legal entit­le­ment to 26 working days of lea­ve. Nevert­hel­ess, the indi­vi­du­al con­trac­tu­al agree­ment in the employ­ment con­tract is more favorable, entit­ling Employee A to 27 working days of paid lea­ve based on the prin­ci­ple of favora­bi­li­ty.

4 Indi­vi­du­al Labor Law Fac­tors

4.1 Euro­pean Law

Euro­pean law is gai­ning incre­asing prac­ti­cal signi­fi­can­ce in labor law, with a distinc­tion bet­ween pri­ma­ry and secon­da­ry com­mu­ni­ty law.

4.1.1 Pri­ma­ry EU Law

Pri­ma­ry law con­sti­tu­tes the cen­tral legal source of Euro­pean law in the nar­rower sen­se. It con­sists of trea­ties con­cluded bet­ween the mem­ber sta­tes. The most important pri­ma­ry legal trea­ties today are the Trea­ty on Euro­pean Uni­on (EU Trea­ty) and the Trea­ty on the Func­tio­ning of the Euro­pean Uni­on (TFEU). The Trea­ty estab­li­shing the Euro­pean Ato­mic Ener­gy Com­mu­ni­ty (Eura­tom Trea­ty) is still valid. Also included in pri­ma­ry law are the pro­to­cols atta­ched to the­se trea­ties, which regu­la­te spe­ci­fic issues but are legal­ly equi­va­lent to the trea­ties.

Examp­les of pri­ma­ry Euro­pean law pro­vi­si­ons with rele­van­ce to labor law:

  • Artic­le 157 TFEU pro­hi­bits not only direct but also indi­rect dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on on grounds of sex con­cer­ning pay, unless such dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on is objec­tively jus­ti­fied and unre­la­ted to sex dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on. Indi­rect sex dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on occurs when a gen­der-neu­tral rule results in a con­sider­a­b­ly lar­ger num­ber of women being affec­ted com­pared to men, which is pri­ma­ri­ly the case when part-time employees are trea­ted less favor­ab­ly in com­pa­ri­son to full-time employees (see also § 4 (1) Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employ­ment Act). In case of a vio­la­ti­on of Artic­le 157 (1) TFEU, the­re is a right to obtain the with­held bene­fits. Accor­ding to con­sis­tent case law of the ECJ and BAG, the­re is no cla­im for over­ti­me sup­ple­ments due to lack of dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on against women as defi­ned in Artic­le 157 TFEU if the regu­lar working hours of a full-time employee are not excee­ded.
  • Artic­le 45 et seq. TFEU gua­ran­tee the free­dom of move­ment for workers of the mem­ber sta­tes. They cau­sed a sen­sa­ti­on, espe­ci­al­ly through the “Bos­man” ruling, which declared inva­lid the for­eign play­er clau­ses and trans­fer rules of foot­ball asso­cia­ti­ons. The right to invo­ke free­dom of move­ment under Artic­le 45 TFEU is excluded in purely “inter­nal” cir­cum­s­tances becau­se in such cases, it is not EU law but the inter­nal legal sys­tem of the mem­ber sta­te that is decisi­ve.
  • Artic­le 49 et seq. TFEU gua­ran­tee the free­dom of estab­lish­ment, while Artic­le 56 et seq. TFEU ensu­re the free­dom to pro­vi­de ser­vices. The­se pro­vi­si­ons have gai­ned prac­ti­cal importance in recent times, par­ti­cu­lar­ly due to cross-bor­der employee deploy­ment, the Pos­ted Workers Act, and so-cal­led “wage loyal­ty” regu­la­ti­ons (awar­ding con­tracts only to com­pa­nies pay­ing the local­ly agreed wage) in cross-bor­der ser­vice pro­vi­si­on.

4.1.2 Secon­da­ry EU Law

Secon­da­ry law (law deri­ved from pri­ma­ry law) com­pri­ses legal acts adopted by the insti­tu­ti­ons of the Euro­pean Uni­on or the Euro­pean Ato­mic Ener­gy Com­mu­ni­ty on the basis of pri­ma­ry law. Secon­da­ry law must not con­flict with pri­ma­ry law. In the event of a breach of pri­ma­ry law, the Euro­pean Court of Jus­ti­ce can decla­re secon­da­ry law inva­lid.

Artic­le 288 TFEU pro­vi­des for the fol­lo­wing legal acts:

  • Regu­la­ti­ons
  • Direc­ti­ves
  • Decis­i­ons (bin­ding pro­vi­si­ons in indi­vi­du­al cases)
  • Recom­men­da­ti­ons and opi­ni­ons (non-legal­ly bin­ding)

EU Regu­la­ti­ons, as per Artic­le 288 (2) TFEU, con­sti­tu­te direct­ly appli­ca­ble law in every mem­ber sta­te wit­hout the need for natio­nal trans­for­ma­ti­on. Howe­ver, the Coun­cil may only adopt EU Regu­la­ti­ons based on a spe­ci­fic aut­ho­riza­ti­on basis in the TFEU (e.g., Artic­le 46).

EU Direc­ti­ves, accor­ding to Artic­le 288 (3) TFEU, are addres­sed to indi­vi­du­al mem­ber sta­tes and impo­se an obli­ga­ti­on to achie­ve spe­ci­fic regu­la­to­ry objec­ti­ves within a cer­tain peri­od by enac­ting appro­pria­te legal norms. EU Direc­ti­ves gene­ral­ly only beco­me effec­ti­ve within natio­nal law through natio­nal legis­la­ti­ve action.

Examp­les of the imple­men­ta­ti­on of EU Direc­ti­ves in natio­nal law include:

  • The Gene­ral Equal Tre­at­ment Act (AGG), which came into force on August 18, 2006
  • § 613a of the Ger­man Civil Code (BGB)
  • The Pro­of of Employ­ment Act (Nach­wG)
  • The Occu­pa­tio­nal Health and Safe­ty Act (Arbeits­schutz­ge­setz)
  • Amend­ments to the Working Time Act (ArbZG)

The prac­ti­cal importance of anti-dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on direc­ti­ves is evi­dent, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in cases rela­ted to the pro­hi­bi­ti­on of dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on under § 7 (1) AGG, which has repla­ced the sex-spe­ci­fic dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on pro­hi­bi­ti­on of § 611a BGB a.F. (for­mer ver­si­on), women’s quo­ta regu­la­ti­ons, access for women to ser­vice invol­ving the use of fire­arms, and the pro­hi­bi­ti­on of dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on against sever­ely dis­ab­led employees under § 81 (2) SGB IX, which refers to the AGG due to the spe­ci­fics invol­ved.

4.2 Con­sti­tu­tio­nal Law

Labor law, as a pro­tec­ti­ve right for employees, is par­ti­cu­lar­ly com­mit­ted to the social wel­fa­re prin­ci­ple of the Basic Law (Grund­ge­setz), so con­sti­tu­tio­nal law plays a signi­fi­cant prac­ti­cal role in labor law as a legal source sub­or­di­na­te only to EU law. All sta­te or coll­ec­ti­ve legal norms are null and void if they vio­la­te the pri­ma­ry con­sti­tu­tio­nal law, espe­ci­al­ly fun­da­men­tal rights. Fun­da­men­tal rights are pri­ma­ri­ly defen­si­ve rights against sta­te power. The­r­e­fo­re, they do not have direct appli­ca­bi­li­ty among pri­va­te law sub­jects. Nevert­hel­ess, fun­da­men­tal rights indi­rect­ly affect pri­va­te law, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in labor law, through their signi­fi­can­ce in inter­pre­ting laws and spe­ci­fy­ing gene­ral clau­ses and gene­ral prin­ci­ples (so-cal­led “indi­rect third-par­ty effect” of fun­da­men­tal rights). Howe­ver, accor­ding to pre­vai­ling doc­tri­ne, Artic­le 9 (right to form trade uni­ons) con­sti­tu­tes a direct­ly effec­ti­ve fun­da­men­tal right.

The fol­lo­wing fun­da­men­tal rights are indi­rect­ly signi­fi­cant in labor law:

  • Artic­le 1 (Human Digni­ty)
  • Artic­le 2 (Free­dom of Indi­vi­du­al Deve­lo­p­ment)
  • Artic­le 2 (Right to Life and Phy­si­cal Inte­gri­ty)
  • Artic­le 2 (Free­dom of the Per­son)
  • Artic­le 3 (Equa­li­ty Prin­ci­ple)
  • Artic­le 3 (Equa­li­ty of Men and Women)
  • Artic­le 4 (Free­dom of Belief, Con­sci­ence, and Reli­gi­on)
  • Artic­le 5 (Free­dom of Expres­si­on)
  • Artic­le 6 (Pro­tec­tion of Mar­ria­ge and Fami­ly)
  • Artic­le 12 (Free­dom to Choo­se Occu­pa­ti­on, Work­place, and Voca­tio­nal Trai­ning)
  • Artic­le 9 (Free­dom of Asso­cia­ti­on)

Exam­p­le: Right to Per­so­nal Inte­gri­ty

Through the right to per­so­nal inte­gri­ty, labor law pro­tects employees against intru­si­ons into their per­so­nal pri­va­cy. An employee must, in excep­tio­nal cases, accept mea­su­res that inf­rin­ge upon their per­so­nal rights when jus­ti­fied by over­ri­ding ope­ra­tio­nal inte­rests. Gene­ral­ly, an appli­cant does not have to dis­c­lo­se pri­or con­vic­tions, espe­ci­al­ly if they have alre­a­dy been expun­ged from the Fede­ral Cen­tral Regis­ter. Howe­ver, if an employee appli­es for a posi­ti­on of trust, they must pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on about non-expun­ged pri­or con­vic­tions that rai­se doubts about their sui­ta­bi­li­ty for the inten­ded posi­ti­on (e.g., pri­or con­vic­tions rela­ted to finan­cial or pro­per­ty offen­ses).

Exam­p­le: Equa­li­ty Prin­ci­ple of Artic­le 3 of the Basic Law

In labor law, the gene­ral prin­ci­ple of equa­li­ty of Artic­le 3 (1) of the Basic Law has led to the cus­to­ma­ry legal con­cept known as the “equal tre­at­ment prin­ci­ple” or “prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment” (Gleich­be­hand­lungs­grund­satz). The gene­ral prin­ci­ple of equa­li­ty appli­es direct­ly bet­ween the par­ties to an employ­ment con­tract. It obli­ga­tes employ­ers not to tre­at indi­vi­du­als or groups of employees unf­air­ly. Une­qual noti­ce peri­ods for workers and sala­ried employees are in vio­la­ti­on of Artic­le 3 (1) of the Basic Law and are the­r­e­fo­re inva­lid. An employ­er who pro­vi­des a Christ­mas bonus to all employees can­not exclude an indi­vi­du­al employee from this bene­fit. Howe­ver, an employ­er may pro­vi­de les­ser bene­fits to non-uni­on employees who do not fall under a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment due to the absence of uni­on mem­ber­ship. The lower com­pen­sa­ti­on for non-uni­on employees is based on a legi­ti­ma­te reason, as the­se employees have not sub­mit­ted to the coll­ec­ti­ve power of the con­clu­ding uni­ons.

In labor law, the spe­ci­fic prin­ci­ple of equa­li­ty of Artic­le 3 (2) of the Basic Law is of par­ti­cu­lar importance and is also found in other regu­la­to­ry levels (e.g., Gene­ral Act on Equal Tre­at­ment, AGG). The equa­li­ty prin­ci­ple of men and women is espe­ci­al­ly rele­vant in terms of access to employ­ment. Howe­ver, a vio­la­ti­on of the equal tre­at­ment requi­re­ment does not grant a dis­ad­van­ta­ged employee the right to employ­ment but only an entit­le­ment to com­pen­sa­ti­on for dama­ges.

Exam­p­le: Free­dom of Belief, Con­sci­ence, and Reli­gi­on

If an employee refu­ses to per­form a job duty due to reli­gious reasons, this can jus­ti­fy ter­mi­na­ti­on by the employ­er. Howe­ver, no other reasonable job alter­na­ti­ves must be available. An employee hired as a “sales assistant” in a retail store must anti­ci­pa­te recei­ving work tasks that invol­ve hand­ling alco­ho­lic bever­a­ges. If they cla­im to be reli­gious­ly hin­de­red from per­forming tasks con­trac­tual­ly requi­red of them, they must inform the employ­er about the spe­ci­fic reli­gious reasons and indi­ca­te which tasks they are unable to per­form. If the employ­er, within the scope of its ope­ra­tio­nal orga­niza­ti­on, has the oppor­tu­ni­ty to pro­vi­de the employee with work that com­pli­es with the reli­gious limi­ta­ti­ons, it must assign this work to the employee (BAG, decis­i­on of Febru­ary 24, 2011, — 2 AZR 636/09).

4.3 Labor Laws

 Labor laws are gene­ral­ly fede­ral laws in most cases. Regio­nal varia­ti­ons affec­ting labor law are main­ly found in public holi­day regu­la­ti­ons and regu­la­ti­ons rela­ted to edu­ca­tio­nal lea­ve. Devia­ting from labor law regu­la­ti­ons is gene­ral­ly per­mis­si­ble to the advan­ta­ge of the employee (the so-cal­led prin­ci­ple of favora­bi­li­ty). Howe­ver, laws can only be devia­ted from to the detri­ment of the indi­vi­du­al employee if the law is dis­po­si­tiv, i.e., sub­ject to indi­vi­du­al agree­ment. Whe­ther a law is man­da­to­ry or dis­po­si­tiv can usual­ly be deter­mi­ned from the law its­elf (e.g., § 619 of the Ger­man Civil Code, BGB) or must be deter­mi­ned through inter­pre­ta­ti­on, whe­re the pro­tec­ti­ve pur­po­se of the norm is decisi­ve (e.g., the pro­vi­si­ons of the Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act and the Pro­tec­tion Against Unfair Dis­mis­sal Act are man­da­to­ry, as the pro­tec­tion of the per­sons invol­ved is para­mount). Regar­ding dis­po­si­tiv norms, a distinc­tion is made bet­ween coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning dis­po­si­tiv norms and par­ty dis­po­si­tiv norms. Coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning dis­po­si­tiv norms can be devia­ted from in coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ments, even to the detri­ment of the employees (e.g., shorter noti­ce peri­ods than the sta­tu­to­ry ones can be agreed upon, § 622 (4) BGB). Par­ty dis­po­si­tiv norms, which can also be devia­ted from in indi­vi­du­al employ­ment con­tracts to the detri­ment of the employee, are rare (e.g., § 613, § 616 BGB).

Howe­ver, if a coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment uses coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning dis­po­si­tiv norms, in most cases, the less favorable coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment can also be adopted in indi­vi­du­al employ­ment con­tracts. By inclu­ding the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment in the indi­vi­du­al con­tract, the legis­la­ti­ve pur­po­se of the law is met becau­se the regu­la­ti­on was nego­tia­ted by the coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning par­ties (e.g., § 622 (4) sen­tence 2 BGB). This ensu­res the balan­ce of power bet­ween the nego­tia­ting par­ties.

Exam­p­le: The Coll­ec­ti­ve Agree­ment for the Hotel and Restau­rant Indus­try in Sta­te X pre­scri­bes a noti­ce peri­od of three days during a one-month pro­ba­tio­na­ry peri­od. This regu­la­ti­on devia­tes from the sta­tu­to­ry noti­ce peri­od during the pro­ba­tio­na­ry peri­od sti­pu­la­ted in § 622 (3) BGB, to the detri­ment of the employee, and can only be agreed upon by the par­ties to the coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment, as per § 622 (4) sen­tence 1 BGB. In the scope of the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment, non-uni­on employ­ers can also adopt this regu­la­ti­on in indi­vi­du­al employ­ment con­tracts, as sti­pu­la­ted in § 622 (4) sen­tence 2 BGB. Howe­ver, they must adopt the enti­re regu­la­ti­ons and not just parts of it.

4.4 The Coll­ec­ti­ve Bar­gai­ning Agree­ment

A coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment is a con­tract bet­ween a trade uni­on and, on the other side, an employ­ers’ asso­cia­ti­on or an indi­vi­du­al employ­er. This con­tract regu­la­tes the working con­di­ti­ons of the employ­ment con­tracts cover­ed by it. Accor­ding to § 1 (1) of the Coll­ec­ti­ve Bar­gai­ning Agree­ment Act (Tarif­ver­trags­ge­setz, TVG), it sta­tes:

§ 1 Con­tent and Form of the Coll­ec­ti­ve Agree­ment

(1) The coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment regu­la­tes the rights and obli­ga­ti­ons of the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment par­ties and con­ta­ins legal pro­vi­si­ons that can regu­la­te the con­tent, con­clu­si­on, and ter­mi­na­ti­on of employ­ment rela­ti­onships, as well as ope­ra­tio­nal and works con­sti­tu­ti­on law mat­ters.

While coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments on the employ­er side can be con­cluded by both an employ­ers’ asso­cia­ti­on and an indi­vi­du­al employ­er, on the employee side, only trade uni­ons can con­clude coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments. For exam­p­le, a works coun­cil or a group of employees can­not con­clude coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments. They are not “tarif­fä­hig.”

Depen­ding on who has con­cluded a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment on the employ­er side, a distinc­tion is made bet­ween a man­da­to­ry coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment (= sec­tor-wide coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment) and a vol­un­t­a­ry coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment (= com­pa­ny-spe­ci­fic coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment). The sec­tor-wide coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment is con­cluded by the employ­ers’ asso­cia­ti­on. It covers all busi­nesses who­se owners are mem­bers of the employ­ers’ asso­cia­ti­on. The com­pa­ny-spe­ci­fic coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment, on the other hand, is con­cluded by an indi­vi­du­al employ­er. It is only valid for the ope­ra­ti­ons of this employ­er.

The­re are three dif­fe­rent reasons why a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment appli­es to an employ­ment rela­ti­onship:

  1. The coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment appli­es becau­se the employee is a mem­ber of the trade uni­on that has con­cluded the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment, and at the same time, the employ­er is bound by the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment becau­se they are eit­her a mem­ber of the employ­ers’ asso­cia­ti­on that con­cluded the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment (in the case of a sec­tor-wide coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment) or them­sel­ves a par­ty to the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment (in the case of a com­pa­ny-spe­ci­fic coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment). This is cal­led the “coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment effect.”
  2. The coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment appli­es becau­se the employee and the employ­er have agreed in the employ­ment con­tract that a spe­ci­fic coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment should app­ly to the employ­ment rela­ti­onship. This is known as the appli­ca­ti­on of the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment through indi­vi­du­al con­trac­tu­al agree­ment. In this case, it does not mat­ter whe­ther the employee is a mem­ber of a trade uni­on or whe­ther the employ­er is bound by the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment, i.e., whe­ther they are a mem­ber of an employ­ers’ asso­cia­ti­on or have con­cluded a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment.
  3. The coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment is declared uni­ver­sal­ly bin­ding by the Fede­ral Minis­ter of Labor and Social Affairs. This is known as the appli­ca­ti­on of the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment through uni­ver­sal bin­ding. Under cer­tain con­di­ti­ons, the Fede­ral Minis­ter can take this mea­su­re when the “nor­mal” appli­ca­ti­on of the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment (the first pos­si­bi­li­ty) is insuf­fi­ci­ent to ensu­re uni­form working con­di­ti­ons in a spe­ci­fic indus­try and ade­qua­te pro­tec­tion for employees. In this case as well, it does not mat­ter whe­ther the employee is a mem­ber of a trade uni­on or whe­ther the employ­er is bound by the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment.

When con­side­ring whe­ther the norms of a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment can be devia­ted from in an indi­vi­du­al employ­ment con­tract, it depends on which of the abo­ve-men­tio­ned three reasons the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment is appli­ca­ble to the employ­ment con­tract in the first place.

In the first sce­na­rio (coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment effect), devia­ti­on from a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment through the employ­ment con­tract is gene­ral­ly not pos­si­ble becau­se the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment direct­ly and man­da­to­ri­ly appli­es to the employ­ment rela­ti­onship. A devia­ti­on is per­mis­si­ble in excep­tio­nal cases if the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment allows for such devia­ti­on (the so-cal­led ope­ning clau­se), or if the devia­ti­on is pro­vi­ded in a regu­la­ti­on that is more favorable to the employee than the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment.

The­se prin­ci­ples also app­ly when the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment is uni­ver­sal­ly bin­ding (third pos­si­bi­li­ty). Employees can only devia­te from a coll­ec­tively agreed upon uni­ver­sal­ly bin­ding coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment if such devia­ti­on is allo­wed in the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment, or if the devia­ti­on is more favorable to the affec­ted employee than the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment from which they are devia­ting.

Howe­ver, things are dif­fe­rent when the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment appli­es through an indi­vi­du­al con­trac­tu­al agree­ment (second pos­si­bi­li­ty). In this case, your employ­er can­not easi­ly devia­te from the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment becau­se that would vio­la­te the employ­ment con­tract. Nevert­hel­ess, the employ­er can modi­fy the employ­ment con­tract in agree­ment with the employee to devia­te from the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment. The employ­er also has the opti­on to free them­sel­ves from the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment by issuing a chan­ge noti­ce. The chan­ge noti­ce first ter­mi­na­tes the exis­ting employ­ment rela­ti­onship (and thus the appli­ca­ti­on of the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment). If, in the next step, the­re is an agree­ment on the con­ti­nua­tion of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship under chan­ged con­di­ti­ons — wit­hout the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment — then the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment has effec­tively been excluded through the chan­ge noti­ce or chan­ge agree­ment.

As men­tio­ned ear­lier, the exclu­si­on of the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment by the employ­er must be in com­pli­ance with the law. Employees who enjoy pro­tec­tion against dis­mis­sal can accept the offer asso­cia­ted with the chan­ge noti­ce with a reser­va­ti­on and have the lega­li­ty of the con­tract chan­ge review­ed by the labor court.

4.5 The Works Agree­ment (Betriebs­ver­ein­ba­rung)

Ano­ther pecu­lia­ri­ty in Ger­man labor law is the works agree­ment (Betriebs­ver­ein­ba­rung). A works agree­ment is an agree­ment bet­ween an employ­er and a works coun­cil (Betriebs­rat) that regu­la­tes and shapes the company’s orga­niza­ti­on, co-deter­mi­na­ti­on rights, and indi­vi­du­al rela­ti­onships bet­ween the employ­er and employees. Works agree­ments have direct and man­da­to­ry legal effect (§ 77 Abs. 4 S. 1 BetrVG), making them the “laws of the com­pa­ny.”

Works agree­ments can be cate­go­ri­zed as eit­her man­da­to­ry or vol­un­t­a­ry, depen­ding on the mat­ters they address. Man­da­to­ry works agree­ments are tho­se that deal with issues whe­re the works coun­cil has “genui­ne” co-deter­mi­na­ti­on rights. This occurs when dis­pu­tes bet­ween the employ­er and the works coun­cil about co-deter­mi­na­ti­on rights requi­re a decis­i­on by the con­ci­lia­ti­on board (Eini­gungs­stel­le). On the other hand, vol­un­t­a­ry works agree­ments allow for com­pre­hen­si­ve regu­la­ti­on sin­ce the boun­da­ries bet­ween social, per­so­nal, and eco­no­mic co-deter­mi­na­ti­on are often flu­id (Fede­ral Labor Court (BAG) ruling of 07.11.1989, DB 90, 1724).

The scope of works agree­ments is limi­t­ed by the pri­ma­cy of the law and coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments, as set forth in §§ 77 Abs. 3 and 87 Abs. 1 BetrVG. Accor­ding to the pro­vi­si­on lock (Rege­lungs­sper­re) in § 77 Abs. 3 S. 1 BetrVG, issues such as wages and other working con­di­ti­ons that are typi­cal­ly regu­la­ted by coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments can­not be the sub­ject of a works agree­ment. Howe­ver, this does not app­ly when § 77 Abs. 3 S. 2 BetrVG per­mits the con­clu­si­on of sup­ple­men­ta­ry works agree­ments if a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment expli­cit­ly allows it (known as an ope­ning clau­se or Öff­nungs­klau­sel).

Works agree­ments should be distin­gu­is­hed from an infor­mal agree­ment, known as a “rege­lungs­ab­re­de,” bet­ween an employ­er and an employee con­cer­ning com­pa­ny issues. Unli­ke works agree­ments, a rege­lungs­ab­re­de does not have the same regu­la­to­ry effect (BAG from 14.02.1991, DB 91, 1990).

4.6 The Employ­ment Con­tract

An employ­ment con­tract (Arbeits­ver­trag) under Ger­man law is an agree­ment estab­li­shing a pri­va­te-law con­trac­tu­al rela­ti­onship for remu­ne­ra­ted and per­so­nal ser­vice pro­vi­si­on. Ori­gi­nal­ly, the employ­ment con­tract was not expli­cit­ly defi­ned in the Ger­man Civil Code (BGB). It was always con­side­red a sub­ca­te­go­ry of the ser­vice con­tract under § 611 BGB, wit­hout being expli­cit­ly men­tio­ned the­re.

Howe­ver, the for­mu­la­ti­on “In the case of an employ­ment rela­ti­onship that is not an employ­ment con­tract” in § 621 BGB (noti­ce peri­ods in ser­vice con­tracts) and the regu­la­ti­on in § 622 BGB (noti­ce peri­ods in employ­ment con­tracts) made it clear that the legis­la­tor distin­gu­is­hes bet­ween the (free and gene­ral) ser­vice con­tract and the (spe­ci­fic) employ­ment con­tract.

With the inclu­si­on of § 611a BGB, the legis­la­tor has now cla­ri­fied that the ser­vice con­tract con­ti­nues to be regu­la­ted under § 611 BGB, while the spe­ci­fic pro­vi­si­on of § 611a BGB appli­es to employ­ment con­tracts.

Nevert­hel­ess, the fol­lo­wing still holds:

Every employ­ment con­tract is a ser­vice con­tract, but not every ser­vice con­tract is an employ­ment con­tract.

The distinc­tion bet­ween an employ­ment rela­ti­onship and a gene­ral ser­vice con­tract is important becau­se the rights and obli­ga­ti­ons of the par­ties dif­fer based on the legal clas­si­fi­ca­ti­on.

The most signi­fi­cant dif­fe­rence bet­ween an employ­ment con­tract and a ser­vice con­tract is that the ser­vice con­tract is based on a rela­ti­onship bet­ween two equal part­ners, whe­re­as an employ­ment con­tract estab­lishes an employ­er-employee rela­ti­onship.

An employ­er-employee rela­ti­onship is cha­rac­te­ri­zed by the employ­er having a posi­ti­on of power over the employee. This posi­ti­on of power includes the right to issue ins­truc­tions (§ 106 GewO, § 611a BGB), demand spe­ci­fic work results, and con­trol the work pro­cess.

In con­trast to a free ser­vice rela­ti­onship, the employ­ment rela­ti­onship estab­lished by the employ­ment con­tract is mark­ed by the employee’s per­so­nal depen­dence on the employ­er. The employee is essen­ti­al­ly unable to deter­mi­ne their own acti­vi­ties and working hours, as a self-employ­ed indi­vi­du­al can (§ 84 Abs. 1 sen­tence 2 HGB). The employee is ins­tead inte­gra­ted into the employer’s work orga­niza­ti­on and is typi­cal­ly sub­ject to the employer’s ins­truc­tions regar­ding the con­tent, exe­cu­ti­on, time, dura­ti­on, and loca­ti­on of the work.

Due to this depen­den­cy, spe­cial pro­tec­tion is requi­red. The­r­e­fo­re, labor law is often refer­red to as the spe­cial law or pro­tec­ti­ve law for employees.

Employees are sub­ject to the spe­cial pro­tec­ti­ve regu­la­ti­ons of labor law, which do not app­ly to the self-employ­ed, who “can essen­ti­al­ly deter­mi­ne their acti­vi­ties and working hours free­ly.”

The employ­ment con­tract is, the­r­e­fo­re, a spe­cial form of the ser­vice con­tract, which is why spe­ci­fic pro­vi­si­ons of the employ­ment con­tract, in addi­ti­on to the gene­ral ser­vice con­tract regu­la­ti­ons, app­ly. The pro­vi­si­ons of the employ­ment con­tract take pre­ce­dence over the gene­ral ser­vice con­tract pro­vi­si­ons.

Based on the employ­ment con­tract, the employee is obli­ged to pro­vi­de the con­trac­tu­al work per­for­mance. In return, the employ­er must pro­vi­de com­pen­sa­ti­on. The amount of com­pen­sa­ti­on is deter­mi­ned by the agree­ment in the employ­ment con­tract or an appli­ca­ble coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment. If no com­pen­sa­ti­on is agreed upon, the usu­al com­pen­sa­ti­on for com­pa­ra­ble work must be paid, as per § 612 BGB. Addi­tio­nal­ly, other obli­ga­ti­ons can be spe­ci­fied in the employ­ment con­tract. When the con­tent, time, and place of the work are not expli­cit­ly defi­ned in the employ­ment con­tract, their deter­mi­na­ti­on falls under the employer’s right of direc­tion, which they can exer­cise reason­ab­ly.

As a who­le, the employ­ment rela­ti­onship is flan­ked by labor law regu­la­ti­ons (pro­tec­tion against dis­mis­sal, limi­ta­ti­on of fixed-term con­tracts, labor pro­tec­tion, working time laws, works con­sti­tu­ti­on laws, etc.). The­se regu­la­ti­ons par­ti­al­ly limit the dis­cre­ti­on of the con­trac­ting par­ties. This is the result of the struc­tu­ral power imba­lan­ce bet­ween the con­trac­ting par­ties and the social-sta­te inten­ti­on that is based on the fact that the majo­ri­ty of the popu­la­ti­on ear­ns their liveli­hood through depen­dent work.

Employ­ment con­tracts, in gene­ral, do not requi­re a spe­ci­fic form. They can be for­med both in wri­ting and oral­ly, through a hand­shake, or even by sim­ply com­men­cing the work. Nevert­hel­ess, in terms of evi­dence, ente­ring into a writ­ten employ­ment con­tract is gene­ral­ly recom­men­ded. The­re is a man­da­to­ry legal requi­re­ment for writ­ten form when con­clu­ding a fixed-term employ­ment con­tract. A vio­la­ti­on of this requi­re­ment has far-rea­ching con­se­quen­ces. To pro­tect the employee, and often to the dis­may of the employ­er, the employ­ment con­tract is not null and void but is con­side­red con­cluded for an inde­fi­ni­te peri­od under the law (as explai­ned in rela­ti­on to fixed-term employ­ment con­tracts). Simi­lar­ly, valid coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments may requi­re the writ­ten con­clu­si­on of an employ­ment con­tract. Howe­ver, vio­la­ti­ons of this requi­re­ment typi­cal­ly do not lead to the inva­li­di­ty of the employ­ment con­tract, as they are usual­ly of a decla­ra­to­ry natu­re.

If employ­ment con­tract terms are pre-for­mu­la­ted for a lar­ge num­ber of con­tracts, they gene­ral­ly fall under the law of gene­ral terms and con­di­ti­ons as per §§ 305 et seq. BGB.

4.6.1 The Pro­of of Employ­ment Law (Nach­weis­ge­setz)

Even when no writ­ten employ­ment con­tract is estab­lished, par­ti­cu­lar atten­ti­on should be paid to the Pro­of of Employ­ment Law (Nach­weis­ge­setz).

The Pro­of of Employ­ment Law its­elf is not new. Howe­ver, in prac­ti­ce, it was­n’t given much importance becau­se a vio­la­ti­on of the employer’s obli­ga­ti­on to record the actu­al con­trac­tu­al con­di­ti­ons was pre­vious­ly wit­hout sanc­tions.

This has now chan­ged abrupt­ly.

In order to imple­ment the Direc­ti­ve on Trans­pa­rent and Pre­dic­ta­ble Working Con­di­ti­ons in the Euro­pean Uni­on (EU 2019/1152, “EU Trans­pa­ren­cy Direc­ti­ve”), the Ger­man legis­la­tu­re amen­ded the Pro­of of Employ­ment Law (Nach­wG) as of August 1, 2022.

The goal is to make employ­ment con­tracts more trans­pa­rent, which is why far more details must now be put in wri­ting than befo­re.

Addi­tio­nal­ly, for the first time, the­re is now a pos­si­bi­li­ty of sanc­tions for a vio­la­ti­on, spe­ci­fi­cal­ly a fine of up to €2,000. A vio­la­ti­on is now trea­ted as an admi­nis­tra­ti­ve offen­se.

In the case of a vio­la­ti­on of the Pro­of of Employ­ment Law, the employ­ment con­tract remains valid, but it can be cos­t­ly for the employ­er. As a result, it can be expec­ted that employ­ers will incre­asing­ly stri­ve to com­ply with the Pro­of of Employ­ment Law’s requi­re­ments in the future.

The pre­vious obli­ga­ti­ons of the employ­er included:

The employ­er had to put the most important con­trac­tu­al con­di­ti­ons in wri­ting and hand them to the employee in wri­ting within one month after the start of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship. This included the fol­lo­wing points:

  • Names and addres­ses of the con­trac­ting par­ties
    • Com­mence­ment of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship
    • Dura­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship in the case of fixed-term con­tracts
    • Place of work
    • Descrip­ti­on of the job or acti­vi­ty
    • Com­po­si­ti­on and amount of the remu­ne­ra­ti­on
    • Working hours
    • Dura­ti­on of annu­al lea­ve
    • Noti­ce peri­ods
    • A gene­ral refe­rence to coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments, works agree­ments, and ser­vice agree­ments appli­ca­ble to the employ­ment rela­ti­onship.

From August 1, 2022, the fol­lo­wing addi­tio­nal points must also be docu­men­ted in wri­ting:

  • End date of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship
  • If appli­ca­ble, the employee’s choice of work­place
  • If agreed upon, the dura­ti­on of the pro­ba­tio­na­ry peri­od
  • Com­po­si­ti­on and amount of the remu­ne­ra­ti­on, inclu­ding com­pen­sa­ti­on for over­ti­me, surchar­ges, allo­wan­ces, bonu­ses, and spe­cial pay­ments, each to be sta­ted sepa­ra­te­ly along with the due dates and method of pay­ment
  • The agreed-upon working hours, rest breaks, and rest peri­ods, and, in the case of shift work, the shift sys­tem, shift rota­ti­on, and requi­re­ments for shift chan­ges
  • If agreed upon, the pos­si­bi­li­ty of orde­ring over­ti­me and its con­di­ti­ons
  • Any entit­le­ment to employ­er-pro­vi­ded fur­ther trai­ning
  • If the employ­er pro­mi­ses the employee a com­pa­ny pen­si­on through a pen­si­on pro­vi­der, the name and address of this pen­si­on pro­vi­der; the obli­ga­ti­on to pro­vi­de pro­of is wai­ved if the pen­si­on pro­vi­der is obli­ged to pro­vi­de this infor­ma­ti­on.
  • The pro­ce­du­re to be fol­lo­wed when ter­mi­na­ting the employ­ment rela­ti­onship by the employ­er and employee, at the very least the requi­re­ment for writ­ten noti­ce and the dead­lines for giving noti­ce, as well as the dead­line for brin­ging a legal action chal­len­ging the ter­mi­na­ti­on; § 7 of the Pro­tec­tion Against Unfair Dis­mis­sal Act is also appli­ca­ble to the dead­line for brin­ging a legal action chal­len­ging the ter­mi­na­ti­on in the event of an incom­ple­te pro­of of noti­ce.

The­se new obli­ga­ti­ons only app­ly to new hires from August 1, 2022. Unli­ke the pre­vious regu­la­ti­on, the writ­ten record con­tai­ning the infor­ma­ti­on about the names and addres­ses of the con­trac­ting par­ties, the remu­ne­ra­ti­on and its com­po­si­ti­on, and working hours must be available to the employee on the first day of work. The remai­ning records must be pro­vi­ded within seven calen­dar days at the latest.

Employees hired befo­re August 1, 2022, only need to be infor­med in wri­ting about their essen­ti­al employ­ment con­di­ti­ons if they request it from the employ­er. Then, a dead­line of seven days appli­es. Infor­ma­ti­on about vaca­ti­on, com­pa­ny pen­si­ons, man­da­to­ry fur­ther trai­ning, the ter­mi­na­ti­on pro­ce­du­re, and appli­ca­ble coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments must be made available within one month at the latest.

4.6.2 Gene­ral Terms of Employ­ment

Gene­ral terms of employ­ment refer to the stan­dard employ­ment con­tracts uni­la­te­ral­ly estab­lished by the employ­er and used as the basis for indi­vi­du­al employ­ment con­tracts. They also include so-cal­led gene­ral pro­mi­ses or com­mit­ments made by the employ­er to the work­force. With the­se com­mit­ments, employees acqui­re indi­vi­du­al con­trac­tu­al rights to the pro­mi­sed bene­fits, which they can eit­her accept or reject. An expli­cit accep­tance by each employee is not neces­sa­ry accor­ding to § 151 of the Ger­man Civil Code (BGB).

In the con­text of labor law, it is unders­tood that gene­ral pro­mi­ses can only rela­te to pro­vi­si­ons that favor the employee. In the rela­ti­onship bet­ween a gene­ral pro­mi­se and a (devia­ting) works agree­ment, the prin­ci­ple of favora­bi­li­ty appli­es. A gene­ral pro­mi­se results in the crea­ti­on of genui­ne con­trac­tu­al rights for employees regar­ding the pro­mi­sed bene­fits, which are to be trea­ted in the same way as claims that are docu­men­ted in a writ­ten con­tract. Wit­hout a vol­un­t­a­ry or revo­ca­ti­on clau­se, the employ­er can no lon­ger uni­la­te­ral­ly with­draw the obli­ga­ti­on to pro­vi­de the­se bene­fits.

If an employ­er wis­hes to revo­ke employees’ entit­le­ment under a gene­ral pro­mi­se, they can gene­ral­ly only do so by ente­ring into cor­re­spon­ding modi­fi­ca­ti­on agree­ments with the employees or by issuing effec­ti­ve amend­ment noti­ces (Ände­rungs­kün­di­gun­gen).

4.6.3 Com­pa­ny Prac­ti­ce

Com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce is not gover­ned by sta­tu­te; it was deve­lo­ped by labor courts. Com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce refers to the regu­lar repe­ti­ti­on of spe­ci­fic employ­er beha­vi­ors from which employees can con­clude that they will be gran­ted a bene­fit or con­ces­si­on over the long term. Com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce thus leads to an impro­ve­ment in the employee’s con­trac­tu­al rights and the­r­e­fo­re to a sub­stan­ti­ve chan­ge in the employ­ment con­tract. Com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce can give rise to various claims, often invol­ving pay­ment claims.

For exam­p­le:

An employ­er pays its employees a Christ­mas bonus equal to one month’s sala­ry in 2018, 2019, and 2020, even though the­re is no obli­ga­ti­on to do so. In 2021, due to poor eco­no­mic con­di­ti­ons, the employ­er deci­des not to pay the Christ­mas bonus. Mean­while, employees have gai­ned a legal­ly enforceable cla­im to an annu­al Christ­mas bonus equal to one month’s sala­ry due to com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce.

A requi­re­ment for com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce is that the entit­le­ment is neither regu­la­ted by coll­ec­ti­ve nor indi­vi­du­al law (BAG 24.11.2004 — 10 AZR 202/04). In addi­ti­on, com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce must app­ly to a signi­fi­cant num­ber of employees or at least to a distinct group of employees. The con­cept of com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce con­ta­ins a coll­ec­ti­ve ele­ment. The mere pro­vi­si­on of bene­fits to indi­vi­du­al employees does not, on the prin­ci­ples of com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce, imply a bin­ding intent by the employ­er to extend the bene­fits to all employees or at least to all employees in a distin­gu­is­ha­ble group (BAG 11.04.2006 — 9 AZR 500/05). If an employee’s entit­le­ment is con­tin­gent on this requi­re­ment, an indi­vi­du­al employ­ment con­tract may result in an impli­ed agree­ment (BAG 21.04.2010 — 10 AZR 163/09).

The­re is no uni­ver­sal­ly appli­ca­ble rule spe­ci­fy­ing at what point an employee can expect that they will recei­ve a bene­fit once they ful­fill the cri­te­ria. The three-time repe­ti­ti­on prin­ci­ple, whe­re an obli­ga­ti­on beco­mes bin­ding after being gran­ted three times wit­hout reser­va­ti­on, was deve­lo­ped for bonu­ses paid annu­al­ly to the enti­re work­force. For other bene­fits, the assess­ment should be based on the type, dura­ti­on, and fre­quen­cy of the bene­fits. The eva­lua­ti­on of the rela­ti­onship bet­ween the num­ber of repe­ti­ti­ons and the dura­ti­on of the prac­ti­ce should con­sider the natu­re and con­tent of the bene­fits. Hig­her requi­re­ments are impo­sed on the num­ber of repe­ti­ti­ons for less signi­fi­cant bene­fits than for more important ones (BAG 28.05.2008 — 10 AZR 274/07).

An entit­le­ment from com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce can also ari­se when pay­ments made to a group of employees are not dis­c­lo­sed to other employees and are not gene­ral­ly com­mu­ni­ca­ted within the com­pa­ny (BAG 17.11.2009 — 9 AZR 765/08). The estab­lish­ment of com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce is not pre­cluded if the employ­ment con­tract con­ta­ins a (simp­le) writ­ten form clau­se requi­ring any chan­ges to the con­tract to be in wri­ting. Accor­ding to a decis­i­on by the Fede­ral Labor Court, even a dou­ble writ­ten form clau­se (“Chan­ges to the employ­ment con­tract must be in wri­ting. This also appli­es to this writ­ten form clau­se”) can­not avo­id com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce (BAG 20.05.2008 — 9 AZR 382/07, NJW 2009, 316).

Howe­ver, if the employ­er made the pay­ment as “vol­un­t­a­ry,” with vary­ing amounts, or with the dis­clai­mer “wit­hout ack­now­led­ging any legal obli­ga­ti­on,” the employee could not expect it to con­ti­nue.

Nevert­hel­ess, high stan­dards are set for the vol­un­t­a­ry reser­va­ti­on clau­se.

For exam­p­le:

An employ­er paid a Christ­mas bonus equal to one month’s gross ear­nings each year from 2002 to 2007, wit­hout expli­cit­ly sta­ting a reser­va­ti­on at the time of pay­ment. In 2008, the com­pa­ny refu­sed to make the spe­cial pay­ment due to the eco­no­mic cri­sis. It reli­ed on the fol­lo­wing clau­se in the employ­ment con­tract: “To the ext­ent that the employ­er grants bene­fits not requi­red by law or coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment, such as bonu­ses, allo­wan­ces, vaca­ti­on pay, gra­tui­ties, and Christ­mas bonu­ses, they are pro­vi­ded vol­un­t­a­ri­ly and wit­hout any legal obli­ga­ti­on. They are, the­r­e­fo­re, revo­ca­ble at any time wit­hout spe­cial noti­ce.” The Fede­ral Labor Court found the con­tract clau­se to be unclear and ambi­guous. It could also be unders­tood to mean that the employ­er wan­ted to vol­un­t­a­ri­ly com­mit to pro­vi­ding the bene­fit. Fur­ther­mo­re, revo­king the bene­fit as reser­ved would requi­re that a cla­im had been estab­lished in the first place. The uncer­tain­ties in the pro­vi­si­on were detri­men­tal to the employ­er. Sin­ce the employ­er had not expli­cit­ly refer­red to the vol­un­t­a­ry natu­re of the pay­ment in pre­vious Christ­mas bonus pay­ments, the prac­ti­ce of com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce remain­ed in effect in the fol­lo­wing years, despi­te the unclear con­trac­tu­al pro­vi­si­on (BAG 08.12.2010 — 10 AZR 671/09).

Under the pre­vious juris­pru­dence of the Fede­ral Labor Court, com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce that had alre­a­dy ari­sen could also be chan­ged by a so-cal­led “nega­ti­ve com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce.” Nega­ti­ve com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce occurs when the employ­er indi­ca­tes over a peri­od of three years that it intends to tre­at com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce dif­fer­ent­ly from befo­re. In this case, the old com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce was mutual­ly chan­ged to reflect the new approach if employees did not object to the new prac­ti­ce during this three-year peri­od. Howe­ver, the Fede­ral Labor Court has now ruled, in a depar­tu­re from its pre­vious case law, that three-time unop­po­sed accep­tance of a bonus paid by the employ­er under a reser­va­ti­on of vol­un­t­a­ri­ne­ss can no lon­ger lead to the loss of a con­trac­tu­al entit­le­ment estab­lished through com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce due to the three-year limi­ta­ti­on clau­se under § 308 No. 5 of the Ger­man Civil Code (BGB) (BAG, March 18, 2009 — 10 AZR 281/08).

If an entit­le­ment has ari­sen from com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce, it exists along­side other con­di­ti­ons in the employ­ment con­tract. It can no lon­ger be uni­la­te­ral­ly with­drawn or chan­ged. Only through an amend­ment noti­ce (Ände­rungs­kün­di­gung) can the estab­lished com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce be eli­mi­na­ted, fol­lo­wing the prin­ci­ples of § 2 of the Ger­man Pro­tec­tion Against Unfair Dis­mis­sal Act (KSchG). The ter­mi­na­ti­on of the prac­ti­ce of com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce, like any other ter­mi­na­ti­on, must be jus­ti­fied on social grounds.

4.6.4 The Prin­ci­ple of Equal Tre­at­ment in Labor Law

The prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment in labor law is a prin­ci­ple deve­lo­ped by case law and is not gene­ral­ly gover­ned by sta­tu­to­ry law. The gene­ral prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment in labor law is deri­ved from the con­sti­tu­tio­nal prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment in Artic­le 3 of the Basic Law (Grund­ge­setz, GG) in Ger­ma­ny. Spe­ci­fic forms of the equal tre­at­ment prin­ci­ple are, howe­ver, often found in the law, such as in Sec­tions 7, 11, 12 of the Gene­ral Act on Equal Tre­at­ment (All­ge­mei­nes Gleich­be­hand­lungs­ge­setz, AGG), § 612a of the Ger­man Civil Code (Bür­ger­li­ches Gesetz­buch, BGB), § 75 of the Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act (Betriebs­ver­fas­sungs­ge­setz, BetrVG), and § 4(1) of the Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employ­ment Act (Teil­zeit- und Befris­tungs­ge­setz, TzBfG).

The prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment requi­res the employ­er to tre­at employees or groups of employees who are in a com­pa­ra­ble situa­ti­on equal­ly when app­ly­ing a self-impo­sed rule. It pro­hi­bits arbi­tra­ry dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on against indi­vi­du­al employees within the groups and crea­ting groups for reasons unre­la­ted to work (BAG 13.09.2006 — 4 AZR 236/05). When the prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment appli­es, it has a cla­im-estab­li­shing effect, mea­ning that, like with com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce, it beco­mes part of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship.

The reasons for dif­fe­ren­ti­al tre­at­ment must be dis­c­lo­sed by the employ­er, espe­ci­al­ly when the employee requests bet­ter tre­at­ment. If the­se reasons are only pre­sen­ted during a lawsu­it, they will not be taken into account.

Howe­ver, the prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment does not obli­ge the employ­er to tre­at all employees the same. Employ­ers are not pre­ven­ted from dif­fe­ren­ti­al­ly com­pen­sa­ting employees for the same work based on indi­vi­du­al employ­ment agree­ments (BAG 13.09.2006 — 4 AZR 236/05). This means that the pre­fe­ren­ti­al tre­at­ment or finan­cial bene­fit of one employee can­not be exten­ded to others through the prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment. The­re is, in fact, con­trac­tu­al free­dom in terms of com­pen­sa­ti­on, which is only limi­t­ed by legal obli­ga­ti­ons such as anti-dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on laws and coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments.

Examp­les of vio­la­ting the prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment:

  1. The employ­er dif­fe­ren­tia­tes in Christ­mas bonus pay­ments based on the sta­te of the job mar­ket. Employees in pro­fes­si­ons with an over­sup­p­ly do not recei­ve a Christ­mas bonus.
  2. Mar­ried fema­le employees are excluded from cer­tain bonu­ses or sala­ry increa­ses, citing their husband’s inco­me.

4.6.5 Clau­ses in Employ­ment Con­tracts and Their Signi­fi­can­ce

Not only in gene­ral busi­ness dealings, with banks and insu­rance com­pa­nies, or when buy­ing a car, fine print can often be found in con­tracts. It is incre­asing­ly pre­sent in employ­ment con­tracts as well. This can be in the form of stan­dard employ­ment con­tracts that employ­ers regu­lar­ly use, or the fine print may be added to sup­ple­ment the con­tract.

4.6.5.1 For­feit­u­re Clau­ses

For­feit­u­re clau­ses, also known as exclu­si­on clau­ses, ensu­re that the claims of both the employ­er and the employee auto­ma­ti­cal­ly expi­re if they are not asser­ted within a cer­tain time frame. The­se clau­ses can pre­vent dis­pu­tes over mat­ters (e.g., over­ti­me work­ed) that date back seve­ral years from ari­sing after the ter­mi­na­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship. The Fede­ral Labor Court (Bun­des­ar­beits­ge­richt, BAG) accepts for­feit­u­re clau­ses only under strict con­di­ti­ons.

As ear­ly as March 2, 2004 (1 AZR 271/03), the BAG ruled that for­feit­u­re clau­ses are only effec­ti­ve if they not only affect the employee but can also lead to the for­feit­u­re of the employer’s claims. In a judgment on May 25, 2005 (5 AZR 572/04), the BAG com­men­ted on for­feit­u­re peri­ods in stan­dard employ­ment con­tracts. The BAG found it per­mis­si­ble to struc­tu­re for­feit­u­re clau­ses in two stages. This means that in the first stage, all claims expi­re if they are not asser­ted within a spe­ci­fic peri­od against the other par­ty. In the second stage, claims expi­re if they are not filed in court within a spe­ci­fic peri­od after being rejec­ted by the other par­ty. Accor­ding to the BAG, the second-stage peri­od must be at least 3 months. Howe­ver, the BAG did not spe­ci­fy the maxi­mum dura­ti­on of the for­feit­u­re peri­od for the first stage of the for­feit­u­re clau­se. Accor­ding to the juris­pru­dence of the Regio­nal Labor Courts, it is also assu­med here that a dura­ti­on of less than three months would ren­der the for­feit­u­re clau­se inef­fec­ti­ve (Regio­nal Labor Court of Hamm — 10 Sa 1113/08).

Exam­p­le wor­ding for a two-stage for­feit­u­re clau­se:

Claims ari­sing from an employ­ment rela­ti­onship will expi­re if they are not asser­ted in wri­ting within three months of beco­ming due. If the other par­ty rejects the cla­im or does not respond within two weeks of the cla­im being asser­ted, the cla­im will expi­re if it is not asser­ted in court within three months of the rejec­tion or the expi­ra­ti­on of the dead­line.

4.6.5.2 Repay­ment Clau­ses

Repay­ment clau­ses are con­trac­tu­al agree­ments in which employees are obli­ga­ted to repay spe­ci­fic finan­cial bene­fits to the employ­er if the employ­ment rela­ti­onship cea­ses at a par­ti­cu­lar time or if it is ter­mi­na­ted by the employee.

Repay­ment clau­ses can gene­ral­ly be found in employ­er-for­mu­la­ted employ­ment con­tracts, pro­vi­ded:

  • They are not con­cea­led (other­wi­se, they are not incor­po­ra­ted into the con­tract as “sur­pri­sing clau­ses” under § 305c(1) of the Ger­man Civil Code (Bür­ger­li­ches Gesetz­buch, BGB).
  • They are for­mu­la­ted cle­ar­ly and under­stan­d­a­b­ly (other­wi­se, they are inva­lid due to their lack of cla­ri­ty under § 307(1), Sen­tence 2 of the BGB).
  • They do not impo­se an unre­ason­ab­ly long com­mit­ment on the employee in rela­ti­on to the bene­fit recei­ved, as this would vio­la­te the employee’s free­dom to choo­se a pro­fes­si­on (Art. 12 of the Basic Law, GG) and con­sti­tu­te “unre­asonable dis­ad­van­ta­ge” under § 307(1), Sen­tence 1, § 307(2) of the BGB, making the clau­se inva­lid.
4.6.5.3 Repay­ment Clau­ses for Trai­ning Cos­ts

When employ­ers spon­sor an employee’s trai­ning with the aim of fur­the­ring their skills or qua­li­fi­ca­ti­ons, they often want to ensu­re that the employee does not resign short­ly after com­ple­ting the trai­ning, espe­ci­al­ly if the employee moves to a com­pe­ti­tor. To pre­vent this, employ­ers typi­cal­ly include con­trac­tu­al clau­ses requi­ring the employee to repay the trai­ning cos­ts if the employee vol­un­t­a­ri­ly ter­mi­na­tes the employ­ment befo­re the end of a spe­ci­fied bin­ding peri­od or pro­vi­des a cau­se for ter­mi­na­ti­on by the employ­er. This is gene­ral­ly per­mis­si­ble.

Prac­ti­cal Exam­p­le:

A regio­nal savings bank asso­cia­ti­on allo­wed an employee to par­ti­ci­pa­te in a pro­gram to beco­me a cer­ti­fied savings bank spe­cia­list. Accor­ding to the agree­ment, the employ­er cover­ed the cour­se and exami­na­ti­on fees and gran­ted the employee paid time off to par­ti­ci­pa­te in the pro­gram. In return, the employee com­mit­ted to reim­bur­sing the employ­er for the­se expen­ses if they left the employ­ment at their own request befo­re com­ple­ting the trai­ning. The Fede­ral Labor Court did not find any legal objec­tions to the repay­ment clau­se. This did not con­flict with the fact that the fur­ther edu­ca­ti­on, initia­ted by the employ­er, was not con­ti­nuous but con­sis­ted of seve­ral trai­ning pha­ses sepa­ra­ted by time. This arran­ge­ment was not arbi­tra­ry and did not con­sti­tu­te an unre­asonable dis­ad­van­ta­ge for the employee. As a result, after dis­con­ti­nuing the stu­dies after eight months, the employee had to repay the pro-rated cos­ts (BAG, Janu­ary 19, 2011 – 3 AZR 621/08).

Apart from trai­ning cos­ts, gra­tui­ties are often sub­ject to repay­ment clau­ses in prac­ti­ce. For ins­tance, the employee agrees to repay a spe­cial pay­ment, such as a Christ­mas bonus, if they ter­mi­na­te the employ­ment by resi­gna­ti­on befo­re March 31 or June 30 of the fol­lo­wing year. In this case as well, the repay­ment clau­se aims to moti­va­te the employee to remain with the employ­er and not ter­mi­na­te the employ­ment too quick­ly.

In the con­text of a trai­ning pro­gram, the agreed-upon repay­ment clau­ses typi­cal­ly detail the spe­ci­fic cos­ts bor­ne by the employ­er, making it clear to both par­ties what is meant by “trai­ning cos­ts.” The cos­ts sub­ject to repay­ment usual­ly include the total cos­ts for the employ­er, such as cour­se fees and/or the sala­ry paid to the employee during their lea­ve, tra­vel and accom­mo­da­ti­on cos­ts, or other expen­ses, such as tea­ching mate­ri­als.

A bin­ding peri­od is then agreed upon, obliging the employee not to ter­mi­na­te the employ­ment rela­ti­onship for a cer­tain num­ber of years after com­ple­ting the trai­ning, depen­ding on the spe­ci­fic terms. Some­ti­mes, a lon­ger bin­ding peri­od may be agreed upon, alt­hough, in prac­ti­ce, bin­ding peri­ods excee­ding five years are rare.

The employee’s repay­ment obli­ga­ti­on is gene­ral­ly struc­tu­red incre­men­tal­ly. At the begin­ning of the bin­ding peri­od, the full amount is requi­red to be repaid, but as time pas­ses and the bin­ding peri­od pro­gres­ses, the repay­ment obli­ga­ti­on decrea­ses gra­du­al­ly. For exam­p­le, if the agree­ment spe­ci­fies a total cost of €20,000 and a 24-month bin­ding peri­od, the amount to be repaid one year into the bin­ding peri­od may be redu­ced to €10,000, and after 18 months, it may be redu­ced to €5,000.

In past decis­i­ons, labor court juris­pru­dence has gene­ral­ly limi­t­ed the dura­ti­on of the bin­ding peri­od in favor of the employee. That is, it has often deter­mi­ned that the requi­red bin­ding peri­od impo­sed on the employee is too long. The decis­i­on is sub­stan­ti­al­ly based on how long the trai­ning pro­gram finan­ced by the employ­er, which includes paid lea­ve from work, las­ted (i.e., the dura­ti­on of the cour­se when cou­pled with paid lea­ve).

In addi­ti­on to the cour­se dura­ti­on, the cos­ts bor­ne by the employ­er and whe­ther the employee has gai­ned long-term bene­fits on the job mar­ket due to the trai­ning play a role. Sub­ject to the con­di­ti­on that the employee is released from work for the dura­ti­on of the trai­ning, the fol­lo­wing gui­de­lines app­ly:

  • A two-month trai­ning peri­od typi­cal­ly jus­ti­fies a bin­ding peri­od of no more than one year in most cases.
  • A cour­se las­ting three to four months can, in most cases, jus­ti­fy a bin­ding peri­od of up to two years.
  • If the trai­ning pro­gram spans six to twel­ve months, in most cases, a bin­ding peri­od of no more than three years is per­mis­si­ble.
  • For pro­grams las­ting more than two years, a bin­ding peri­od of up to five years is legal­ly pos­si­ble. Howe­ver, this is an abso­lu­te maxi­mum, rare­ly allo­wed in very excep­tio­nal cases.

The­se rules app­ly under nor­mal cir­cum­s­tances. They do not app­ly when the cos­ts bor­ne by the employ­er are excep­tio­nal­ly high or low or when the bene­fits to the employee are excep­tio­nal­ly signi­fi­cant or minor.

4.6.5.4 Repay­ment Clau­ses for Bonu­ses

For a sub­stan­ti­al bonus, the employ­er can expect the employee to refrain from resig­ning for a rela­tively lon­ger peri­od. If the bonus is rela­tively small, the employ­er can anti­ci­pa­te less exten­ded job loyal­ty.

Spe­ci­fi­cal­ly, labor court juris­pru­dence has estab­lished the fol­lo­wing rules:

  • For so-cal­led small bonu­ses, i.e., spe­cial pay­ments of up to appro­xi­m­ate­ly 100.00 EUR, the employ­er can­not expect the employee to refrain from ter­mi­na­ti­on in the fol­lo­wing year at all.
  • If the bonus is more than 100.00 EUR but less than one month’s sala­ry, a bin­ding peri­od can be agreed upon until March 31 of the fol­lo­wing year at the latest. In other words, the employee can con­trac­tual­ly be requi­red to repay the bonus if they resign ear­lier than March 31 of the fol­lo­wing year. This means that an employee who recei­ves a bonus of, for exam­p­le, half a month’s sala­ry towards the end of the year can resign in a way that they lea­ve the employ­ment exact­ly by March 31 of the fol­lo­wing year wit­hout being obli­ga­ted to repay the bonus (BAG, judgment of June 9, 1993, 10 AZR 529/92; BAG, judgment of May 21, 2003, 10 AZR 390/02).
  • If the bonus amounts to a full month’s sala­ry or more, a bin­ding peri­od can be agreed upon until June 30 of the fol­lo­wing year at the latest. In this case, the employee can be obli­ged to repay the bonus if they resign ear­lier than June 30 of the fol­lo­wing year. The­r­e­fo­re, it is legal­ly per­mis­si­ble to fre­quent­ly find the agree­ment in prac­ti­ce that a bonus equal to a full month’s sala­ry is repa­ya­ble if the employee ter­mi­na­tes the employ­ment “on March 31 of the fol­lo­wing year or ear­lier.”
  • Repay­ment clau­ses bin­ding the employee for a peri­od bey­ond June 30 of the fol­lo­wing year are gene­ral­ly con­side­red inva­lid.

For deca­des, it was the estab­lished juris­pru­dence that when a con­trac­tual­ly agreed-upon bin­ding peri­od excee­ded the legal­ly per­mis­si­ble dura­ti­on, it was to be redu­ced to the legal­ly per­mis­si­ble scope. This cor­rec­tion of an exces­si­ve and hence inad­mis­si­ble repay­ment agree­ment is cal­led the “vali­di­ty-pre­ser­ving reduc­tion” of a con­tract clau­se. It focu­sed on the dura­ti­on of the agreed-upon bin­ding and did not affect the amount of the cos­ts to be repaid by the employee.

Exam­p­le:

In a repay­ment clau­se rela­ting to trai­ning cos­ts, a three-year bin­ding peri­od for the employee to the employ­ment con­tract is agreed. The employ­er had incur­red a total of 20,000 EUR for the trai­ning, during which the employee was released from work with con­tin­ued pay for two months. Accor­ding to the abo­ve-men­tio­ned gui­de­lines, such a bin­ding peri­od is too long, and the legal­ly per­mis­si­ble dura­ti­on should be at most one year. Under pre­vious juris­pru­dence, this repay­ment clau­se was “redu­ced” to its legal­ly per­mis­si­ble con­tent, i.e., main­tai­ned to the ext­ent of a valid bin­ding of one year. Howe­ver, this did not chan­ge the amount of the pay­ment obli­ga­ti­on. If the employee, in this exam­p­le, left the employ­er six months after the com­ple­ti­on of the trai­ning, i.e., half­way through the legal­ly per­mis­si­ble bin­ding, they had to repay 10,000 EUR.

Sin­ce the Schuld­rechts­re­form (Law Reform of Obli­ga­ti­ons) came into force on Janu­ary 1, 2002, the legal pro­vi­si­ons for revie­w­ing gene­ral terms and con­di­ti­ons (AGB) are also appli­ed to employ­ment rela­ti­onships. As a result, the juris­pru­dence of the Fede­ral Labor Court con­cer­ning the vali­di­ty-pre­ser­ving reduc­tion of exces­si­ve repay­ment clau­ses has beco­me ques­tionable. This juris­pru­dence, by favoring the employ­er who draf­ted the repay­ment clau­se, pro­tec­ted the employ­er from the risk of the total inva­li­di­ty of the clau­se.

In con­trast, it has been the pre­do­mi­nant view in AGB law that the user of gene­ral terms and con­di­ti­ons bears the risk of their com­pli­ance with legal requi­re­ments. In other words, the vali­di­ty-pre­ser­ving reduc­tion was rejec­ted by the over­whel­ming juris­pru­dence.

With a ruling on Janu­ary 14, 2009 (3 AZR 900/07), the Fede­ral Labor Court aban­do­ned its pre­vious juris­pru­dence and held that a repay­ment clau­se pre­sen­ted by the employ­er as gene­ral terms and con­di­ti­ons is enti­re­ly inva­lid if the agreed-upon dura­ti­on of the bin­ding in it exceeds what may be legal­ly per­mis­si­ble based on labor court juris­pru­dence. This judgment, con­cer­ning a repay­ment clau­se rela­ted to trai­ning cos­ts, can be ana­log­ous­ly appli­ed to repay­ment clau­ses con­cer­ning bonu­ses. Hence, in repay­ment clau­ses rela­ted to bonu­ses as well, the employ­er will bear the full risk that the bin­ding peri­od resul­ting from the clau­se remains within the limits of what is legal­ly per­mis­si­ble. If the­se limits are excee­ded, the clau­se is not to be rest­ric­ted to its per­mis­si­ble scope but is enti­re­ly inva­lid.

4.6.5.5 Right of Revo­ca­ti­on Clau­ses

The Fede­ral Labor Court declared con­tract clau­ses that grant the employ­er the right to revo­ke extra-con­trac­tu­al sala­ry com­pon­ents at any time wit­hout rest­ric­tions as void (BAG, Janu­ary 12, 2005, 5 AZR 364/04). Howe­ver, for exis­ting con­tracts, due to con­side­ra­ti­ons of legal pro­tec­tion, an addi­tio­nal con­tract inter­pre­ta­ti­on can be taken into account. In this inter­pre­ta­ti­on, it is exami­ned what the con­trac­ting par­ties would have agreed upon if they had known the inva­li­di­ty of the revo­ca­ti­on clau­se. If the inter­pre­ta­ti­on shows that the par­ties would have agreed to revo­ca­ti­on under cer­tain cir­cum­s­tances, and tho­se cir­cum­s­tances exist, then the revo­ca­ti­on is per­mis­si­ble, as long as it does­n’t encroach upon the core area of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship pro­tec­ted by § 2 of the Kün­di­gungs­schutz­ge­setz (Pro­tec­tion Against Unfair Dis­mis­sal) (with a limit at addi­tio­nal remu­ne­ra­ti­on com­pon­ents of 25% to 30% of the total com­pen­sa­ti­on).

4.6.5.6 Penal­ty Clau­ses Pur­su­ant to §§ 339 ff. BGB

The Fede­ral Labor Court gene­ral­ly con­siders agree­ments on penal­ty clau­ses in the fine print of employ­ment con­tracts to be per­mis­si­ble (BAG, Decem­ber 18, 2008, 8 AZR 81/08). Con­cerns can poten­ti­al­ly ari­se about the amount of the penal­ty, as the hig­hest court objec­ted to a penal­ty of three gross month­ly sala­ries as an unfair dis­ad­van­ta­ge to the employee (BAG, Sep­tem­ber 25, 2008, 8 AZR 717/07). The Hano­ver Regio­nal Labor Court simi­lar­ly ruled on Janu­ary 23, 2004, against a penal­ty of 20 gross dai­ly ear­nings for an employee during the pro­ba­ti­on peri­od (16 Sa 1400/03).

Fur­ther­mo­re, the courts demand that the amount of the penal­ty must be fixed from the out­set. The­r­e­fo­re, a clau­se that sti­pu­la­tes a gross month­ly sala­ry as a penal­ty but the employee’s sala­ry con­sists of both a fixed com­pen­sa­ti­on and a varia­ble sales par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on along­side would be con­side­red inad­mis­si­ble. This was ruled by the Ber­lin-Bran­den­burg Regio­nal Labor Court on Novem­ber 12, 2009 (25 Sa 29/09). The Fede­ral Labor Court also view­ed a pro­vi­si­on as inad­mis­si­ble, which obli­ga­ted an employee to pay a penal­ty if they gave the employ­er cau­se for imme­dia­te ter­mi­na­ti­on. The court saw this as an inap­pro­pria­te over­pro­tec­tion of the employ­er (BAG, August 14, 2007, 8 AZR – 973/06).

Trans­fer Pro­vi­si­ons

A trans­fer pro­vi­si­on mode­led after the pro­vi­si­ons of § 106 GewO (Ger­man Trade Regu­la­ti­on) is effec­ti­ve. This appli­es even when no spe­ci­fic reasons for the trans­fer are given. Ano­ther ques­ti­on is whe­ther the exer­cise of the trans­fer right com­pli­es with the reasonable dis­cre­ti­on under § 315 BGB (Ger­man Civil Code) in each indi­vi­du­al case. Howe­ver, a trans­fer clau­se is inva­lid under § 307(1) BGB when it does not ensu­re that the assign­ment must at least invol­ve equi­va­lent work. A vali­di­ty-pre­ser­ving reduc­tion of the over­ly broad trans­fer clau­se is not appli­ca­ble.

4.7 The Employer’s Right of Direc­ti­ve

The right of direc­ti­ve, also known as the right of ins­truc­tion, is the employer’s right, based on the employ­ment con­tract, to issue ins­truc­tions to the employee. The cen­tral pro­vi­si­on gover­ning the right of direc­ti­ve is § 106 of the Gewer­be­ord­nung (Ger­man Trade Regu­la­ti­on). Through this right of deter­mi­na­ti­on as per §§ 315 ff. BGB (Ger­man Civil Code), the duties of the employee are spe­ci­fied in the con­trac­tu­al rela­ti­onship. The right to issue ins­truc­tions is ves­ted in tho­se who can exer­cise the right of direc­ti­ve and ins­truc­tion over other employees as per § 106 of the Gewer­be­ord­nung. The­r­e­fo­re, it is a deri­ved right from the employ­er to con­cre­ti­ze or influence the con­trac­tu­al obli­ga­ti­on in terms of time, place, con­tent, and man­ner, in who­le or in part. Mere fac­tu­al per­for­mance of con­cre­tiza­ti­on of duties is not suf­fi­ci­ent.

The right of direc­ti­ve is impro­per­ly exer­cis­ed if the ins­truc­tions go bey­ond the terms of the employ­ment con­tract. They must not vio­la­te any sta­tu­to­ry pro­hi­bi­ti­ons or be against public poli­cy (§§ 134, 138 BGB). If an unlawful direc­ti­ve is not fol­lo­wed, the­re is no ground for ter­mi­na­ti­on, as the employee is not obli­ga­ted to com­ply with an imper­mis­si­ble ins­truc­tion. If sanc­tions are impo­sed for non-com­pli­ance with an imper­mis­si­ble direc­ti­ve, they vio­la­te the pro­hi­bi­ti­on of dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on as laid down in § 612a BGB.

The so-cal­led expan­ded right of direc­ti­ve obli­ga­tes the employee, due to their duty to avert harm, to fol­low the employer’s ins­truc­tions in emer­gen­ci­es that go bey­ond the defi­ned obli­ga­ti­ons in the employ­ment con­tract. An emer­gen­cy exists when an event is unfo­re­seeable and avo­ida­ble, is not within the respon­si­bi­li­ty of the affec­ted employ­er, and/or the­re is a risk of sub­stan­ti­al finan­cial dama­ge.

Exam­p­le:

Over­ti­me ins­truc­tion to the hotel recep­tio­nist becau­se a bus­load of guests arri­ves later than expec­ted due to a traf­fic jam.

The right of direc­ti­ve must be exer­cis­ed accor­ding to § 106 of the GewO with reasonable dis­cre­ti­on and is sub­ject to judi­cial review. In this pro­cess, the fun­da­men­tal rights of the employee must be con­side­red, espe­ci­al­ly if the ins­truc­tion affects mat­ters sub­ject to co-deter­mi­na­ti­on, in which case the works coun­cil must be con­sul­ted. If par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on is omit­ted in such cases, the ins­truc­tion is inef­fec­ti­ve, and the employee is not obli­ged to fol­low it (theo­ry of dual effec­ti­ve­ness requi­re­ment).

5 Estab­lish­ment and Defi­ci­en­ci­es in the Employ­ment Rela­ti­onship

5.1 Employer’s Ques­tio­ning and Dis­clo­sure Obli­ga­ti­ons of Employees in Job Inter­views

During con­tract nego­tia­ti­ons bet­ween the employ­er and the appli­cant, two dif­fe­rent sets of inte­rests usual­ly con­ver­ge. The employ­er has a par­ti­cu­lar inte­rest in gathe­ring infor­ma­ti­on about the sui­ta­bi­li­ty of the future employee for the inten­ded posi­ti­on. The employee, on the other hand, may not want to dis­c­lo­se per­so­nal infor­ma­ti­on to a stran­ger. The employee’s con­sti­tu­tio­nal right to pri­va­cy gua­ran­teed by Artic­le 1 and Artic­le 2 of the Basic Law (GG) is at sta­ke.

Accor­ding to gene­ral con­sen­sus, the employ­er is only entit­led to ask ques­ti­ons when they have a legi­ti­ma­te, reasonable, and pro­tec­ta­ble inte­rest in the ans­wers for the employ­ment rela­ti­onship to pro­ceed (BAG vom 07.06.1984 — 2 AZR 270/83). Such a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest exists only when the employer’s inte­rest is so signi­fi­cant that it out­weighs the employee’s inte­rest in kee­ping per­so­nal cir­cum­s­tances pri­va­te to pro­tect their right to per­so­nal pri­va­cy and the invio­la­bi­li­ty of their indi­vi­du­al sphe­re (BAG vom 15.10.1995 — 2 AZR 923/94, NZA 1996, p. 371).

From the­se prin­ci­ples, it fol­lows that the employee must truthful­ly ans­wer per­mis­si­ble ques­ti­ons. A fal­se ans­wer could poten­ti­al­ly lead to the rescis­si­on of the employ­ment con­tract under §§ 123, 142 BGB. Impro­per ques­ti­ons, on the other hand, can be ans­we­red untruthful­ly by the employee sin­ce not ans­we­ring would be equi­va­lent to pro­vi­ding a nega­ti­ve respon­se, thus achie­ving the employer’s goal. In such cases, the employee has the “right to lie.”

Ques­ti­ons about Pregnan­cy

Gene­ral­ly, a fema­le appli­cant is not obli­ga­ted to dis­c­lo­se an exis­ting pregnan­cy to the employ­er during the appli­ca­ti­on pro­cess. Accor­ding to the juris­pru­dence of the Euro­pean Court of Jus­ti­ce, exis­ting employ­ment rest­ric­tions rela­ted to the spe­ci­fic job do not mat­ter sin­ce Euro­pean law pro­hi­bits rejec­ting the appli­ca­ti­on of a pregnant woman for a per­ma­nent posi­ti­on if she can­not be employ­ed in that posi­ti­on from the begin­ning due to a legal employ­ment rest­ric­tion. In most cases, asking about pregnan­cy befo­re hiring an appli­cant is con­side­red gen­der dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on and a vio­la­ti­on of the non-dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on prin­ci­ple. As a result, such a ques­ti­on is imper­mis­si­ble and does not need to be truthful­ly ans­we­red. The­re is also no obli­ga­ti­on to dis­c­lo­se an exis­ting pregnan­cy (EuGH, Urt. v. 3. 2. 2000 – Rs C‑207/98).

Ques­ti­ons about Uni­on Mem­ber­ship

Sin­ce the applicant’s mem­ber­ship in a labor orga­niza­ti­on does not affect their com­mit­ment to per­form the requi­red duties in the forth­co­ming employ­ment rela­ti­onship, ques­ti­ons about uni­on mem­ber­ship are con­side­red impro­per. Appli­cants are not requi­red to dis­c­lo­se their uni­on mem­ber­ship or ans­wer such ques­ti­ons truthful­ly. An excep­ti­on appli­es when the appli­cant is app­ly­ing for a key posi­ti­on, par­ti­cu­lar­ly if the posi­ti­on demands the employer’s spe­ci­fic trust, in a labor uni­on, an employ­ers’ asso­cia­ti­on, or a workers’ coun­cil.

Ques­ti­ons about Ill­nesses

Ques­ti­ons about ill­nesses are only per­mis­si­ble if the spe­ci­fic ill­ness direct­ly affects the applicant’s sui­ta­bi­li­ty for the job duties in ques­ti­on. In this con­text, the appli­cant is obli­ga­ted to dis­c­lo­se their health sta­tus even wit­hout a spe­ci­fic inquiry from the employ­er if they rea­li­ze or should have rea­li­zed that their ill­ness will pre­vent them from per­forming the con­trac­tual­ly agreed-upon duties. The same appli­es if the appli­cant is curr­ent­ly ill at the time of the appli­ca­ti­on and can­not expect to be hea­led by the time of employ­ment com­mence­ment. If the appli­cant knows that they will be unable to work due to ill­ness, inju­ry, or con­va­le­s­cence, they must dis­c­lo­se this to the employ­er. Only ques­ti­ons about ill­nesses that could poten­ti­al­ly affect the duties to be under­ta­ken are per­mis­si­ble, not gene­ral ques­ti­ons about the over­all health of the appli­cant.

Ques­ti­ons about an HIV Infec­tion or AIDS

The ques­ti­on of an employ­er regar­ding an HIV infec­tion and AIDS pres­ents a uni­que chall­enge. The legal situa­ti­on in this regard is evol­ving. It’s gene­ral­ly agreed that the fol­lo­wing dif­fe­ren­tia­ti­on should be made: The ques­ti­on about the pre­sence of an AIDS infec­tion is enti­re­ly per­mis­si­ble sin­ce the serious­ness of the dise­a­se would likely have a direct impact on the employee’s per­for­mance. As for the ques­ti­on about an HIV infec­tion, the appro­pria­ten­ess of this inquiry depends on the effect it might have on the applicant’s job. This means that the­re may be a valid reason to ask in pro­fes­si­ons that deal with blood cont­act, such as health­ca­re workers, flo­rists, and pos­si­bly pilots and pro­fes­sio­nal dri­vers due to the absence of infec­tion risks. Howe­ver, in posi­ti­ons whe­re the­re is no such risk, like kit­chen staff, it is not appro­pria­te to ask.

Ques­ti­ons about Work Histo­ry

Ques­ti­ons about pro­fes­sio­nal skills, care­er histo­ry, and pri­or employ­ment are per­mis­si­ble. Par­ti­cu­lar­ly, in con­nec­tion with the plan­ned con­clu­si­on of an employ­ment con­tract with no spe­ci­fic reason for ter­mi­na­ti­on, the employ­er has the right to ask the appli­cant whe­ther they have pre­vious­ly work­ed for the same employ­er. The appli­cant must ans­wer the­se ques­ti­ons truthful­ly.

Ques­ti­ons about Reli­gi­on or Par­ty Affi­lia­ti­on

Ques­ti­ons about reli­gi­on or par­ty affi­lia­ti­on are not per­mis­si­ble out­side of orga­niza­ti­ons with a spe­ci­fic ideo­lo­gi­cal or poli­ti­cal ori­en­ta­ti­on (ten­denz­be­trieb). Appli­cants do not have to ans­wer the­se ques­ti­ons truthful­ly.

Ques­ti­ons about Cri­mi­nal Records or Ongo­ing Inves­ti­ga­ti­ons

In spe­ci­fic cases, ques­ti­ons about cri­mi­nal records or ongo­ing inves­ti­ga­ti­ons may be per­mis­si­ble if the natu­re of the job to be fil­led neces­si­ta­tes this inquiry. What mat­ters is an objec­ti­ve stan­dard, not the sub­jec­ti­ve atti­tu­de of the employ­er. For exam­p­le, if the job invol­ves hand­ling money, ques­ti­ons about the applicant’s finan­cial histo­ry, inclu­ding past con­vic­tions for finan­cial cri­mes, might be per­mis­si­ble.

Ques­ti­ons about Finan­cial Situa­ti­on

Ques­ti­ons about an applicant’s finan­cial situa­ti­on are only per­mis­si­ble to a limi­t­ed ext­ent. Appli­cants are not gene­ral­ly obli­ged to dis­c­lo­se their finan­cial sta­tus. This obli­ga­ti­on does not app­ly even when finan­cial situa­tions are poor, and wage gar­nish­ments have occur­red. The appro­pria­ten­ess of ques­ti­ons about finan­cial sta­tus, again, depends on the spe­ci­fic posi­ti­on being fil­led. The­se ques­ti­ons are sup­po­sed to be per­mis­si­ble when fil­ling posi­ti­ons of trust, whe­re dis­or­de­red finan­cial situa­tions could poten­ti­al­ly pose a thre­at to the employer’s finan­cial inte­rests.

Howe­ver, the ques­ti­on of whe­ther an appli­cant has taken an oath of dis­clo­sure about their insol­ven­cy, the exis­tence of wage gar­nish­ments, or wage assign­ments, out­side of spe­cial posi­ti­ons of trust, is not per­mis­si­ble sole­ly due to the bur­den this impo­ses on the employ­er.

Ques­ti­ons about Disa­bi­li­ty

Ques­ti­ons about the exis­tence of a disa­bi­li­ty are not per­mis­si­ble when the­re are no signs that the indi­ca­ted disa­bi­li­ty makes the applicant’s abili­ty to per­form the con­trac­tual­ly agreed-upon work impos­si­ble, thus jus­ti­fy­ing dif­fe­ren­ti­al tre­at­ment under § 8 Abs. 1 AGG (Ger­man Gene­ral Equal Tre­at­ment Act). While the Fede­ral Labor Court pre­vious­ly con­side­red asking about disa­bi­li­ty to be per­mis­si­ble even in cases of disa­bi­li­ty not rela­ted to the job’s natu­re (BAG 05.10.1995 — 2 AZR 923/94), nowa­days, the near­ly unani­mous opi­ni­on is that the employer’s right to inqui­re about disa­bi­li­ties has been lar­ge­ly rejec­ted (LAG Hamm 19.10.2006 — 15 Sa 740/06). § 8 Abs. 1 AGG expli­cit­ly sti­pu­la­tes that dif­fe­ren­ti­al tre­at­ment due to disa­bi­li­ty is only allo­wed when the absence of disa­bi­li­ty is an essen­ti­al and decisi­ve pro­fes­sio­nal requi­re­ment due to the natu­re of the job or the con­di­ti­ons of its per­for­mance, pro­vi­ded that the pur­po­se is legi­ti­ma­te and the requi­re­ment is pro­por­tio­na­te. This pro­vi­si­on excludes the employer’s right to inqui­re about disa­bi­li­ties for the reasons that the Fede­ral Labor Court had reco­gni­zed ear­lier. Only when the employer’s inten­ti­on is to take posi­ti­ve action to pro­mo­te dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als can the employ­er ask about disa­bi­li­ty under § 5 AGG. In this case, the employ­er must dis­c­lo­se the

pur­po­se of their ques­ti­ons (LAG Baden-Würt­tem­berg vom 06.09.2010 — 4 Sa 18/10). Howe­ver, the Regio­nal Labor Court Hamm ruled on June 30, 2010 (2 Sa 49/10) that, within an exis­ting employ­ment rela­ti­onship, ques­ti­ons about disa­bi­li­ties are not gene­ral­ly imper­mis­si­ble. If the pur­po­se of the­se ques­ti­ons is to inform the employ­er about the inter­ven­ti­on of pro­tec­ti­ve mea­su­res bene­fiting the dis­ab­led employee in the event of upco­ming ter­mi­na­ti­ons (e.g., the neces­si­ty of appr­oval from the Inte­gra­ti­on Office befo­re ter­mi­na­ting the employ­ment), then the ques­ti­on is allo­wed. If the employee refu­ses to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on or kno­wing­ly pro­vi­des fal­se infor­ma­ti­on, it may be pre­cluded from rely­ing on the lack of appr­oval from the Inte­gra­ti­on Office when the ter­mi­na­ti­on is other­wi­se valid, at least when the Inte­gra­ti­on Office has appro­ved a sub­se­quent dis­mis­sal.

In sum­ma­ry, employ­ers must careful­ly con­sider the natu­re of their ques­ti­ons during job inter­views to ensu­re that they com­ply with appli­ca­ble laws and do not inf­rin­ge upon the pri­va­cy or non-dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on rights of appli­cants. Asking ques­ti­ons about cer­tain aspects, such as pregnan­cy or disa­bi­li­ty, should be approa­ched cau­tious­ly, and employ­ers should be awa­re of legal and ethi­cal gui­de­lines to ensu­re a fair and non­dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry hiring pro­cess.

5.2 Cos­ts of the Job Inter­view

If the pro­s­pec­ti­ve employ­er invi­tes a can­di­da­te to a job inter­view, accor­ding to the Fede­ral Labour Court (Bun­des­ar­beits­ge­richt), they must reim­bur­se the can­di­da­te for the expen­ses incur­red, regard­less of the out­co­me of the inter­view (BAG vom 29.06.1988 – 5 AZR 433/87). The­se expen­ses are refer­red to as reim­bur­se­ment of expen­ses under §§ 662, 670 of the Ger­man Civil Code (BGB).

Spe­ci­fi­cal­ly, this includes the cos­ts of tra­vel to and from the inter­view by second-class train (LAG Mün­chen, vom 30.05.1985 – 9 Sa 986/84). Fur­ther­mo­re, if the pro­s­pec­ti­ve employ­er pro­vi­des an exam­p­le in their direc­tions that includes taking a taxi from the train sta­ti­on to the company’s loca­ti­on, the can­di­da­te may also use a taxi. Howe­ver, they should con­firm before­hand whe­ther such cos­ts will be reim­bur­sed (ArbG Köln, vom 20.05.2005 – 2 Ca 10220/04). Simi­lar rules app­ly to air tra­vel: the com­pa­ny must gene­ral­ly have agreed to cover the rele­vant expen­ses (ArbG Ham­burg, vom 02.11.1994 – 13 Ca 24/94). Other­wi­se, a reim­bur­se­ment cla­im in such a case is only appli­ca­ble for par­ti­cu­lar­ly spe­cia­li­zed posi­ti­ons (ArbG Wup­per­tal, vom 28.04.1983 – 2 Ca 926/83). Addi­tio­nal­ly, pos­si­ble neces­sa­ry appli­ca­ti­on expen­ses can include tho­se for over­night stays and meals (BAG vom 14.02.1977 – 5 AZR 171/76).

The reim­bur­se­ment obli­ga­ti­on is wai­ved if the invi­ta­ti­on expli­cit­ly sta­tes that inter­view expen­ses will not be reim­bur­sed (ArbG Kemp­ten, vom 12.04.1994 – 4 Ca 720/94). In such cases, the secon­da­ry lia­bi­li­ty of the employ­ment agen­cy may be con­side­red.

6 Rights and Obli­ga­ti­ons Ari­sing from the Employ­ment Con­tract

Just like any con­trac­tu­al agree­ment under civil law, the rights and obli­ga­ti­ons stem­ming from the employ­ment con­tract are estab­lished. Accor­ding to § 611a of the Ger­man Civil Code (BGB), the employee is obli­ga­ted to pro­vi­de the pro­mi­sed ser­vices, while the employ­er is obli­ga­ted to pro­vi­de the agreed-upon com­pen­sa­ti­on. From this, the duties of work and loyal­ty of the employee are deri­ved.

Accor­ding to § 613 BGB, the employee is requi­red to per­form their work per­so­nal­ly unless the employ­ment con­tract spe­ci­fies other­wi­se. They can­not sim­ply send a sub­sti­tu­te. On the posi­ti­ve side, they are not obli­ged to arran­ge for a sub­sti­tu­te, for exam­p­le, in case of ill­ness. The duty to work is the pri­ma­ry per­for­mance of the employee, and in return, they recei­ve the agreed-upon com­pen­sa­ti­on. The duty to work is sub­ject to legal pro­vi­si­ons, such as the Occu­pa­tio­nal Health and Safe­ty Act (ArbSchG) or the Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act, as well as valid coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments and com­pa­ny agree­ments. For tem­po­ra­ry employ­ment con­tracts, spe­cial regu­la­ti­ons of the Tem­po­ra­ry Employ­ment Act (AÜG) app­ly.

The con­tent, scope, time, and place of the duty to work are gover­ned by the employ­ment con­tract and the employer’s right to give ins­truc­tions. The employee brea­ches their duty to work when they do not com­ply with per­mis­si­ble ins­truc­tions from the employ­er. Vio­la­ti­ons of the duty to work can result in a war­ning, and in the case of repea­ted vio­la­ti­ons, it may lead to imme­dia­te ter­mi­na­ti­on.

Exam­p­le:

The employee does not show up for work (“unex­cu­sed absence”). In such a case, the employ­er is not obli­ga­ted to pay them any com­pen­sa­ti­on.

The natu­re of the tasks that the employee is expec­ted to per­form is often a point of dis­pu­te. In prin­ci­ple, the employee is only obli­ged to pro­vi­de the work per­for­mance spe­ci­fied in the employ­ment con­tract. Howe­ver, in emer­gen­ci­es and excep­tio­nal situa­tions, the con­cept of the duty to work is inter­pre­ted broad­ly. Assig­ning lower-paid work is gene­ral­ly imper­mis­si­ble. Pro­vi­si­ons to this effect can be included in the employ­ment con­tract. Wit­hout such an agree­ment, the employ­er must obtain the employee’s con­sent. Wit­hout the employee’s con­sent, the only opti­on for the employ­er is to issue a chan­ge noti­ce. The employee can file a cla­im for wrongful dis­mis­sal against the chan­ge noti­ce.

The employee does not owe the employ­er a spe­ci­fic work result but is only obli­ged to work within their capa­bi­li­ties under reasonable con­di­ti­ons. In the case of poor job per­for­mance, the employ­er can ter­mi­na­te the employ­ment rela­ti­onship based on beha­vi­or or per­for­mance. Howe­ver, in cases of dis­sa­tis­fac­tion due to poor job per­for­mance, the bur­den of pro­of lies with the employ­er becau­se the qua­li­ty of work is often not objec­tively deter­minable. A ter­mi­na­ti­on based on per­so­nal cir­cum­s­tances due to insuf­fi­ci­ent job per­for­mance requi­res the employ­er to demons­tra­te befo­re the labor court that the­re is a “signi­fi­cant impair­ment of the company’s inte­rests.” A rule of thumb is that a demons­tra­ble decrease in per­for­mance of around one-third com­pared to the avera­ge of other employees may be con­side­red as signi­fi­cant.

In addi­ti­on to the duty to work, the employee has a num­ber of gene­ral obli­ga­ti­ons fal­ling under the term “duty of loyal­ty,” which deri­ves from the prin­ci­ple of “good faith.” Among other things, the employee must refrain from any actions that could impair the employer’s inte­rests and busi­ness situa­ti­on. The ext­ent of the duty of loyal­ty depends on the employee’s posi­ti­on within the com­pa­ny. The hig­her the employee’s posi­ti­on in the com­pa­ny, the grea­ter their duty of loyal­ty.

Par­ti­cu­lar­ly note­wor­t­hy are the fol­lo­wing duties of loyal­ty:

  • The duty of con­fi­den­tia­li­ty
  • The duty not to accept bri­bes
  • The duty not to enga­ge in com­pe­ti­ti­on
  • The duty to report immi­nent dama­ges
  • The duty of loyal­ty beg­ins even during the initi­al stages of an employ­ment rela­ti­onship, such as when infor­ma­ti­on not inten­ded for the public is dis­c­lo­sed to the pro­s­pec­ti­ve employee during a job inter­view. Even after the ter­mi­na­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship, a cer­tain degree of duty of loyal­ty con­ti­nues to exist. Con­tra­ry to com­mon belief, the duty of loyal­ty does not cea­se with the ter­mi­na­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship. Attemp­ting to soli­cit cli­ents of a for­mer employ­er after the ter­mi­na­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship can also vio­la­te the duty of loyal­ty.

Gene­ral obli­ga­ti­ons of employees and employ­ers after the ter­mi­na­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship include the return of all work equip­ment and busi­ness docu­ments, as well as post-con­trac­tu­al con­fi­den­tia­li­ty obli­ga­ti­ons. If an employee is ter­mi­na­ted with imme­dia­te effect, the employ­er can demand the imme­dia­te return of the pro­vi­ded com­pa­ny car. Accor­ding to a judgment of the Stutt­gart Labor Court, this remains true even if the employee legal­ly chal­lenges the ter­mi­na­ti­on and files a time­ly pro­tec­tion against dis­mis­sal cla­im. An excep­ti­on only appli­es if the ter­mi­na­ti­on is obvious­ly inva­lid (Stutt­gart Labor Court, May 18, 2010 – 16 Ga 50/10). Busi­ness and trade secrets obtai­ned during the cour­se of employ­ment must be safe­guard­ed. Employ­ers must retain important docu­ments for employees until the end of the legal­ly requi­red sta­tu­te of limi­ta­ti­ons. Gene­ral­ly, the­re is no post-employ­ment non-com­pe­ti­ti­on obli­ga­ti­on. Howe­ver, such a non-com­pe­ti­ti­on agree­ment can be estab­lished in wri­ting, typi­cal­ly in exch­an­ge for com­pen­sa­ti­on.

Every employ­ment rela­ti­onship car­ri­es the employer’s duty of care, which requi­res the employ­er to safe­guard the inte­rests of the employee rela­ting to the employ­ment rela­ti­onship, as deman­ded by good faith and taking into account the inte­rests and con­cerns of both par­ties in accordance with the prin­ci­ples of good faith. The employer’s obli­ga­ti­on to pro­tect the eco­no­mic inte­rests of employees also appli­es (BAG, Janu­ary 14, 2009, 3 AZR 71/07). The addi­tio­nal obli­ga­ti­ons of the employ­er under labor law are not limi­t­ed to pro­vi­ding employees with neither fal­se nor incom­ple­te infor­ma­ti­on (BAG, May 23, 1989 – 3 AZR 257/88). To avo­id legal con­se­quen­ces for employees, the employ­er may also be requi­red to pro­vi­de sui­ta­ble infor­ma­ti­on on their own initia­ti­ve. While it is gene­ral­ly true that each par­ty must look after their own inte­rests and seek cla­ri­ty about the con­se­quen­ces of a pro­po­sed agree­ment, the self-inte­rest of each par­ty has its limits when it inf­rin­ges on the pro­tec­ted sphe­re of life of the other par­ty (BAG, Sep­tem­ber 23, 2003 – 3 AZR 658/02). The obli­ga­ti­on to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on and cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­on is based on the par­ti­cu­lar cir­cum­s­tances of each case and results from a com­pre­hen­si­ve weig­hing of inte­rests. The employer’s duty to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on can be par­ti­cu­lar­ly signi­fi­cant, espe­ci­al­ly when a dis­ad­van­ta­ge­ous agree­ment is con­cluded at the employer’s initia­ti­ve and in the employer’s inte­rest.

Taking pre­cau­ti­ons to pro­tect employees from risks to life and health is a spe­cial obli­ga­ti­on of the employ­er. The employ­er must at least com­ply with occu­pa­tio­nal health and safe­ty regu­la­ti­ons. The Ger­man Civil Code impo­ses a duty of com­pen­sa­ti­on on all par­ties under § 823 of the BGB if, at the very least, the life, body, health, or any other right of ano­ther is unlawful­ly and negli­gent­ly vio­la­ted. The same obli­ga­ti­on appli­es to tho­se who vio­la­te a law inten­ded to pro­tect someone else. The Occu­pa­tio­nal Health and Safe­ty Act is one such law. The­r­e­fo­re, employees have a right to com­pen­sa­ti­on from the employ­er in the event of phy­si­cal harm and a vio­la­ti­on of such regu­la­ti­ons.

7 Lia­bi­li­ty of Employees in Labor Law

The Fede­ral Labor Court has estab­lished prin­ci­ples of employee lia­bi­li­ty, to the ext­ent that the employee’s actions are work-rela­ted, which app­ly the gene­ral civil lia­bi­li­ty rules with some adjus­t­ments.

The yard­stick for lia­bi­li­ty is the seve­ri­ty of the fault. In this regard, the Fede­ral Labor Court dif­fe­ren­tia­tes as fol­lows:

  • If the employee inten­tio­nal­ly cau­sed the dama­ge (e.g., arbi­tra­ry dama­ge to a machi­ne), they must ful­ly com­pen­sa­te the employ­er for the dama­ge.
  • If the employee is gross­ly at fault (the Fede­ral Labor Court equa­tes this with “gross” negli­gence) in caus­ing the dama­ge, they must also gene­ral­ly pay for the full dama­ge. Howe­ver, an excep­ti­on is made if it would be gross­ly unfair under the cir­cum­s­tances. Con­tra­ry to § 276 BGB (Ger­man Civil Code), gross negli­gence can only be assu­med if the employee has com­mit­ted a “sub­jec­tively inex­cusable” breach of duty. Only in this case can the employee be sub­ject to a seve­re per­so­nal accu­sa­ti­on, accor­ding to the case law of the Fede­ral Labor Court.
  • If the dama­ge is cau­sed by the employee’s mode­ra­te (nor­mal) negli­gence, the dama­ge is divi­ded bet­ween the employ­er and the employee based on prin­ci­ples of fair­ness. All cir­cum­s­tances of the indi­vi­du­al case must be con­side­red.
  • If the employee cau­sed the dama­ge only slight­ly negli­gent­ly (“slight” and “very slight” negli­gence = minor fault), they are not obli­ga­ted to com­pen­sa­te the employ­er for the dama­ge at all.

In con­trast to the Civil Code (BGB), intent and negli­gence must not only rela­te to the breach of duty but also to the impair­ment of the legal inte­rest its­elf.

For exam­p­le, intent and gross negli­gence are not assu­med sole­ly becau­se the employee dis­re­gards the employer’s ins­truc­tions.

Also devia­ting from the lia­bi­li­ty pro­vi­si­ons of the BGB, the employ­er must pro­ve the employee’s fault, accor­ding to § 619 a BGB. The courts must also con­sider the employer’s con­tri­bu­to­ry fault ex offi­cio. If the employ­er shares bla­me, it will redu­ce lia­bi­li­ty even when the employee cau­sed the dama­ge through gross negli­gence. If the employee cau­sed dama­ge to a third par­ty within the scope of work-rela­ted acti­vi­ties, they are lia­ble to the third par­ty for the full dama­ge. Howe­ver, they have a cla­im for indem­ni­fi­ca­ti­on against the employ­er, as far as they are not lia­ble or not ful­ly lia­ble accor­ding to the prin­ci­ples men­tio­ned. This means they can demand that the employ­er pay the dama­ge to the third par­ty up to their share of lia­bi­li­ty. If the employ­er goes bank­rupt and, as a result, can­not pay the third par­ty, the employee is lia­ble for the full dama­ge.

When an employee’s beha­vi­or leads to harm to a fel­low employee, the fol­lo­wing rules app­ly:

  • In case of pro­per­ty dama­ge, the employee is ful­ly lia­ble. Howe­ver, they have a cla­im for indem­ni­fi­ca­ti­on against the employ­er to the ext­ent that the employ­er is lia­ble as men­tio­ned abo­ve.
  • For per­so­nal inju­ries, all lia­bi­li­ty is excluded, accor­ding to § 105 (1) SGB VII.

8 Lia­bi­li­ty of Employees for Inven­to­ry Shorta­ges

Man­ko­haf­tung (lia­bi­li­ty for inven­to­ry shorta­ges) is a sub­set of employee lia­bi­li­ty. It con­cerns who is respon­si­ble for the dama­ge suf­fe­r­ed by the employ­er when items, espe­ci­al­ly goods or a cash regis­ter pro­vi­ded to the employee, have a shorta­ge. The con­trac­tu­al basis for this is typi­cal­ly the so-cal­led Man­ko­ab­re­de (inven­to­ry shorta­ge agree­ment) bet­ween the employ­er and the employee.

Con­trac­tu­al Man­ko­ab­re­den typi­cal­ly govern:

  • A reasonable dis­tri­bu­ti­on of the bur­den of pro­of, adapt­ed to the cha­rac­te­ristics of the busi­ness and the job, to the dis­ad­van­ta­ge of the employee.
  • The “gua­ran­teed” respon­si­bi­li­ty of the employee for an inven­to­ry shorta­ge, even wit­hout pro­of of fault, which occur­red exclu­si­ve­ly in their work and con­trol area.

The judi­cia­ry allows such “gua­ran­teed” Man­ko­ab­re­den, whe­re a typi­cal employ­er risk is trans­fer­red to the employee, only within nar­row limits. The stan­dards are § 138 BGB (vio­la­ti­on of good morals) and § 242 BGB (good faith). Addi­tio­nal­ly, a Man­ko­ab­re­de regar­ding the ext­ent of lia­bi­li­ty must be clear and unam­bi­guous.

The employee must recei­ve reasonable finan­cial com­pen­sa­ti­on for assum­ing the addi­tio­nal lia­bi­li­ty risk, known as Man­ko­geld or Fehl­geld­ent­schä­di­gung (shorta­ge money or defi­ci­en­cy com­pen­sa­ti­on). This com­pen­sa­ti­on must be suf­fi­ci­ent for the employee to cover any shorta­ges that may occur if neces­sa­ry. Other­wi­se, it would con­sti­tu­te an unre­asonable dis­ad­van­ta­ge, as the employee is assum­ing a spe­cial risk wit­hout recei­ving an equi­va­lent eco­no­mic bene­fit.

Ano­ther requi­re­ment is that the employee has sole con­trol and access to the money or goods ent­rus­ted to them. Only in this case, accor­ding to the juris­pru­dence of the Fede­ral Labor Court (BAG), can it be reason­ab­ly expec­ted that the employee is respon­si­ble for an inven­to­ry shorta­ge. For exam­p­le, a deli­very dri­ver can­not be held lia­ble for an inven­to­ry shorta­ge through a Man­ko­ab­re­de if the cash regis­ters of the vehic­le are joint­ly mana­ged and used by mul­ti­ple deli­very dri­vers. A Man­ko­ab­re­de is also void if it results in under­cut­ting the tariff pay­ment. Man­ko­geld or Fehl­geld­ent­schä­di­gung is con­side­red part of the remu­ne­ra­ti­on under § 2 (1) No. 6 Nach­wG (Noti­fi­ca­ti­on Act). The­r­e­fo­re, a Man­ko­ab­re­de must be included in the employ­ment con­tract.

If an inven­to­ry shorta­ge occurs, the employee’s lia­bi­li­ty can be based on a con­trac­tu­al Man­ko­ab­re­de, pro­vi­ded that the lega­li­ty con­di­ti­ons of the Man­ko­ab­re­de have been met, par­ti­cu­lar­ly that reasonable Man­ko­geld has been paid. Lia­bi­li­ty is limi­t­ed to the amount of Man­ko­geld. In the absence of a Man­ko­ab­re­de or if it is inva­lid, the usu­al con­trac­tu­al and tort lia­bi­li­ty of the employee is appli­ca­ble. In con­trast to the Man­ko­ab­re­de, both con­trac­tu­al and tort lia­bi­li­ty requi­re a cul­pa­ble breach of duty, which means wrongful and negli­gent beha­vi­or by the employee. Con­trac­tu­al lia­bi­li­ty can be based on a posi­ti­ve con­tract breach, as well as on the ina­de­qua­te ful­fill­ment of cus­t­ody and sto­rage duties or accoun­ting and report­ing duties. Tort lia­bi­li­ty based on wrongful acts deri­ves from § 823 BGB.

Regar­ding lia­bi­li­ty based on fault, the judi­cia­ry distin­gu­is­hes bet­ween “inde­pen­dent” and “depen­dent” employees. In this regard, eco­no­mic­al­ly inde­pen­dent employees, who can inde­pendent­ly mana­ge the ent­rus­ted goods or money, are con­side­red lia­ble under the cus­t­ody and man­da­te pro­vi­si­ons of the BGB. This is jus­ti­fied by the pre­sence of ele­ments of cus­t­ody and man­da­te in employ­ment con­tracts. In con­trast, eco­no­mic­al­ly depen­dent employees are only lia­ble for ina­de­qua­te per­for­mance based on gene­ral prin­ci­ples. In all cases, any con­tri­bu­to­ry fault on the part of the employ­er must be con­side­red under § 254 BGB, both in the lia­bi­li­ty based on a Man­ko­ab­re­de and in the con­trac­tu­al and tort lia­bi­li­ty of the employee. Con­tri­bu­to­ry fault of the employ­er is pre­sent, espe­ci­al­ly when the employ­er does not rec­ti­fy orga­niza­tio­nal defi­ci­en­ci­es, over­bur­dens the employee, fails to imple­ment secu­ri­ty mea­su­res, negle­cts regu­lar inspec­tions and invent­ories, or keeps spa­re keys to cash regis­ters mana­ged by the employee wit­hout strict secu­ri­ty mea­su­res. It is undis­pu­ted that the prin­ci­ples of inter­nal dama­ge com­pen­sa­ti­on are appli­ca­ble to Man­ko­haf­tung.

In case of an inven­to­ry shorta­ge, the employ­er must:

  • Pro­ve the exis­tence of a valid Man­ko­ab­re­de.
  • Estab­lish the employee’s sole con­trol and access to the mana­ged cash regis­ter or goods.
  • Demons­tra­te that an effec­ti­ve shorta­ge, not just a book­kee­ping error, has actual­ly occur­red, and it is not due to other cau­ses.

In the absence of a spe­ci­fic Man­ko­ab­re­de, the employ­er must gene­ral­ly pro­ve the employee’s wrongful beha­vi­or, the dama­ge cau­sed by it, and the employee’s fault (at least ordi­na­ry negli­gence). Regar­ding the man­da­to­ry risk dis­tri­bu­ti­on in labor law, it is dis­pu­ted whe­ther a bur­den of pro­of rever­sal in favor of the employee is per­mis­si­ble.

9 Employ­er Lia­bi­li­ty in Labor Law

Employ­ers are gene­ral­ly held lia­ble for dama­ges under the same con­di­ti­ons as employees are lia­ble for dama­ges.

The employ­er must have:

  • Vio­la­ted their legal obli­ga­ti­ons,
  • Cau­sed harm as a result of the vio­la­ti­on, and
  • Com­mit­ted the vio­la­ti­on inten­tio­nal­ly or negli­gent­ly.

If the employ­er is a legal enti­ty (such as a GmbH or AG), the lia­bi­li­ty depends on the fault of the mana­ging direc­tor (GmbH) or the board mem­bers (AG).

Howe­ver, your employer’s lia­bi­li­ty is excluded when the dama­ge:

  • Invol­ves per­so­nal inju­ry and
  • Can be attri­bu­ted to an “insu­rance event” as defi­ned by acci­dent insu­rance law, and
  • The employ­er did not inten­tio­nal­ly cau­se this insu­rance event or per­so­nal inju­ry.

This exclu­si­on of lia­bi­li­ty is based on § 104 (1) Sen­tence 1 of the Seventh Book of the Social Code (SGB VII). This pro­vi­si­on sta­tes:

“Entre­pre­neurs are only obli­ga­ted to com­pen­sa­te insu­red per­sons, who work for their com­pa­nies or have ano­ther rela­ti­onship to their com­pa­nies that estab­lishes insu­rance, and their rela­ti­ves and sur­vi­vors, for per­so­nal inju­ry cau­sed by an insu­rance event if they inten­tio­nal­ly cau­sed the insu­rance event or it occur­red in a way insu­red under § 8 (2) Nos. 1 to 4.”

The reason for this exclu­si­on of lia­bi­li­ty is that in the cases men­tio­ned here, whe­re the employ­er is not lia­ble, the acci­dent insu­rance covers the employee’s (the “insu­red person’s”) dama­ge. The­r­e­fo­re, the employ­er, who finan­ces the acci­dent insu­rance through their con­tri­bu­ti­ons, is reli­e­ved from lia­bi­li­ty in the case of an insu­rance event. The exclu­si­on of lia­bi­li­ty also appli­es to claims for pain and suf­fe­ring.

Howe­ver, for pro­per­ty and finan­cial dama­ges suf­fe­r­ed by the affec­ted employees, the employer’s lia­bi­li­ty is not excluded. Sin­ce sta­tu­to­ry acci­dent insu­rance does not pro­vi­de com­pen­sa­ti­on for such los­ses, the employ­er remains lia­ble.

The employ­er is con­side­red to have cau­sed harm “cul­pa­b­ly” (inten­tio­nal­ly or negli­gent­ly) not only when per­so­nal fault can be attri­bu­ted to them per­so­nal­ly but also when their “agents” (employees, inde­pen­dent con­trac­tors) have acted negli­gent­ly and, as a result, cau­sed harm. Accor­ding to § 278 of the Ger­man Civil Code (BGB), the employ­er is attri­bu­ted the fault of their agents as if it were their own fault.

Exam­p­le:

The secu­ri­ty guard, wit­hout thin­king (negli­gent­ly), hands over the key to the bike sto­rage room to an unaut­ho­ri­zed per­son, who sub­se­quent­ly ste­als an employee’s bicy­cle. In this case, the employ­er is lia­ble due to the negli­gent breach of their secon­da­ry obli­ga­ti­ons under the employ­ment con­tract. They must attri­bu­te the negli­gence of the secu­ri­ty guard (their “agent”) as their own fault. Whe­ther the secu­ri­ty guard is an employee or employ­ed by an exter­nal com­pa­ny is irrele­vant.

In some cases, the employ­er or their agents may not be at fault or their fault can­not be pro­ven. In such situa­tions, it is ques­tio­ned whe­ther the employ­er might still be requi­red to com­pen­sa­te for a loss suf­fe­r­ed by their employees wit­hout any fault. For exam­p­le, it is ques­tio­ned how the obli­ga­ti­on to replace worn-out or com­ple­te­ly soi­led clot­hing works, or whe­ther the employ­er might be respon­si­ble for dama­ges incur­red due to the par­ti­cu­lar hazards of the job.

Sin­ce the­re is no obli­ga­ti­on for com­pen­sa­ti­on under gene­ral rules wit­hout fault, the employer’s obli­ga­ti­on to com­pen­sa­te is deri­ved from the obli­ga­ti­on of the prin­ci­pal to reim­bur­se expen­ses. Legal­ly, such finan­cial los­ses of the employee are not trea­ted as dama­ges but as “expen­ses” incur­red by the employee, which are vol­un­t­a­ry sacri­fices of their assets. The rele­vant pro­vi­si­on for this is § 670 of the Ger­man Civil Code (BGB), which sta­tes:

“If the agent, for the pur­po­se of exe­cu­ting the com­mis­si­on, makes expen­dit­ures that he or she is jus­ti­fied in con­side­ring neces­sa­ry under the cir­cum­s­tances, the prin­ci­pal shall be obli­ga­ted to reim­bur­se.”

Accor­ding to the juris­pru­dence of the Fede­ral Labor Court regar­ding this pro­vi­si­on, the fol­lo­wing rules app­ly: First and fore­most, the employee has no cla­im for com­pen­sa­ti­on for pro­per­ty dama­ges that can be expec­ted based on the natu­re and type of the work or ope­ra­ti­on. This pri­ma­ri­ly con­cerns dama­ges that are ine­vi­ta­ble or regu­lar­ly occur. Such dama­ges (such as hea­vi­ly soi­led or worn-out clot­hing) are con­side­red “job-rela­ted.” The­r­e­fo­re, in the employ­ment rela­ti­onship, they are not con­side­red “expen­dit­ures” within the mea­ning of § 670 BGB.

For other (non-“job-related,” but “extra­or­di­na­ry”) dama­ges, the­re is a cla­im for com­pen­sa­ti­on, in accordance with the appli­ca­ti­on of § 670 BGB, if the­se dama­ges can­not be attri­bu­ted to the employee’s per­so­nal life but are within the scope of the employer’s acti­vi­ties, and the employee does not recei­ve spe­cial com­pen­sa­ti­on cove­ring the risk of such dama­ges.

Exam­p­le:

In a psych­ia­tric hos­pi­tal, a pati­ent dama­ges a nurse’s glas­ses. Sin­ce this pro­per­ty dama­ge is not “job-rela­ted” (but rather “extra­or­di­na­ry”), it can be attri­bu­ted to the employer’s scope of acti­vi­ties, and the employee does not recei­ve spe­cial com­pen­sa­ti­on from the employ­er to cover the risk of such pro­per­ty dama­ges cau­sed by deal­ing with pati­ents, the juris­pru­dence of the Fede­ral Labor Court reco­gni­zes a cla­im for com­pen­sa­ti­on by the employee.

Accor­ding to legal pre­ce­dent, the employee also has a cla­im for com­pen­sa­ti­on for dama­ge to their pri­va­te vehic­le when the employee uses the vehic­le for busi­ness trips with the “appr­oval” of the employ­er (i.e., “within the scope of the employer’s acti­vi­ties”) and does not recei­ve spe­cial com­pen­sa­ti­on cove­ring the risk of acci­dent-rela­ted dama­ges. The usu­al reim­bur­se­ment paid per kilo­me­ter, com­mon­ly refer­red to as mileage allo­wan­ce, typi­cal­ly does not cover the spe­ci­fic risk of acci­dent-rela­ted dama­ges but is only com­pen­sa­ti­on for ongo­ing cos­ts and nor­mal wear and tear. The use “within the scope of the employer’s acti­vi­ties” typi­cal­ly occurs when the employ­er would need to use their own vehic­le if the employee’s vehic­le were not used. If the employee’s pri­va­te vehic­le is not direct­ly dama­ged during a busi­ness trip but while park­ed near the work­place bet­ween two (to be car­ri­ed out on the same day) busi­ness trips, this par­king is still con­side­red use “within the scope of the employer’s acti­vi­ties.” In such a case, the employ­er must com­pen­sa­te the employee for the dama­ge to their vehic­le if the employee does not recei­ve alter­na­ti­ve com­pen­sa­ti­on.

10 Ter­mi­na­ti­on of the Employ­ment Rela­ti­onship

An employ­ment rela­ti­onship is based on a civil law con­tract in the form of a con­ti­nuous obli­ga­ti­on. The­r­e­fo­re, all the ter­mi­na­ti­on cir­cum­s­tances that gene­ral­ly app­ly to such con­tracts are also appli­ca­ble. Howe­ver, the­re are usual­ly spe­ci­fic labor law con­side­ra­ti­ons.

Under Ger­man labor law, an employ­ment con­tract can ter­mi­na­te due to the fol­lo­wing reasons:

Fixed-Term Con­tract (Befris­tung):

 Ter­mi­na­ti­on by the pas­sa­ge of time when the con­tract is only valid for a spe­ci­fic peri­od. The legal regu­la­ti­ons regar­ding fixed-term con­tracts also app­ly when the employ­ment rela­ti­onship is inten­ded to com­mence upon the occur­rence of a cer­tain event. Howe­ver, fixed-term employ­ment con­tracts are only valid if the­re is an objec­ti­ve reason for the limi­ta­ti­on or if the agree­ment is made with a new employee for a maxi­mum of the first two years of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship.

Ful­fill­ment of a Dis­sol­ving Con­di­ti­on (Ein­tritt einer auf­lö­sen­den Bedin­gung):

 While a fixed-term con­tract results in the ter­mi­na­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship at a pre­de­ter­mi­ned date or upon the occur­rence of a reason­ab­ly anti­ci­pa­ted event, a dis­sol­ving con­di­ti­on ends the employ­ment rela­ti­onship if an event of uncer­tain occur­rence takes place.

A com­mon exam­p­le is the ter­mi­na­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship upon the com­mence­ment of reti­re­ment bene­fits. This con­di­ti­on must be agreed upon in the rele­vant coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment or indi­vi­du­al­ly in the employ­ment con­tract to take effect. Other­wi­se, the employ­ment rela­ti­onship must be ter­mi­na­ted through dis­mis­sal or mutu­al agree­ment once the employee rea­ches the reti­re­ment age. Such con­trac­tu­al clau­ses are con­side­red jus­ti­fia­ble and valid accor­ding to con­sis­tent case law from the Fede­ral Labor Court and are not in vio­la­ti­on of Euro­pean law, espe­ci­al­ly regar­ding age dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on (ECJ, 12 Octo­ber 2010 – C‑45/09). In this decis­i­on, the ECJ deter­mi­ned that § 10(3)(5) of the Gene­ral Equal Tre­at­ment Act, which allows for an agree­ment to end the employ­ment rela­ti­onship wit­hout noti­ce at a time when the employee can app­ly for an old-age pen­si­on, does not con­sti­tu­te pro­hi­bi­ted age dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on.

Ano­ther good exam­p­le is the agree­ment with an actress from the tele­vi­si­on series “Gute Zei­ten – Schlech­te Zei­ten” (in the role of Char­lot­te Bohl­städt) whe­re the employ­ment rela­ti­onship would auto­ma­ti­cal­ly end when the actress’s role in the series was no lon­ger included.

Dis­sol­ving con­di­ti­ons are con­side­red valid by the Fede­ral Labor Court if they are jus­ti­fied by an objec­ti­ve reason. The agree­ment with the actress was dee­med jus­ti­fied as an expres­si­on of artis­tic free­dom becau­se the role was dis­con­tin­ued, and the series con­tin­ued wit­hout Char­lot­te. The auto­ma­tic ter­mi­na­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship through a dis­sol­ving con­di­ti­on was dee­med valid.

Mutu­al Agree­ment for Ter­mi­na­ti­on (Auf­he­bungs­ver­trag):

Vol­un­t­a­ri­ly ending an employ­ment rela­ti­onship is per­mis­si­ble. To be effec­ti­ve, such agree­ments, like fixed-term agree­ments and dis­mis­sals, requi­re writ­ten form (§ 623 BGB). Howe­ver, the writ­ten form does not app­ly to mutual­ly agreed ter­mi­na­ti­ons in the form of a sett­le­ment agree­ment (a con­tract spe­ci­fy­ing the moda­li­ties for the con­clu­si­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship after the issu­an­ce of noti­ce of ter­mi­na­ti­on to avo­id nega­ti­ve con­se­quen­ces for unem­ploy­ment bene­fits). Dis­pu­tes in labor courts regar­ding ter­mi­na­ti­ons often con­clude with a sett­le­ment on ending the employ­ment rela­ti­onship with pay­ment of a sever­ance pay­ment. Sub­stan­tively, this is also a sett­le­ment agree­ment. In the­se cases, the social secu­ri­ty impli­ca­ti­ons should be con­side­red. Under recent case law from the Fede­ral Social Court and the imple­men­ta­ti­on ins­truc­tions from the Fede­ral Employ­ment Agen­cy, the sig­ning of a ter­mi­na­ti­on or sett­le­ment agree­ment often results in a wai­ting peri­od for unem­ploy­ment bene­fits. Employees should be awa­re that by sig­ning a ter­mi­na­ti­on agree­ment, they for­feit any pro­tec­tion against dis­mis­sal, and a sub­se­quent legal chall­enge to the ter­mi­na­ti­on is not per­mit­ted. This appli­es even if the employ­er unex­pec­ted­ly pres­ents the ter­mi­na­ti­on agree­ment in a con­flict situa­ti­on. The pro­tec­tion that appli­es to door-to-door con­tracts does not app­ly here, accor­ding to cur­rent case law. Affec­ted employees should request at least one day to think about the ter­mi­na­ti­on agree­ment and, if neces­sa­ry, careful­ly review the agree­ment with legal assis­tance. In some cases, a dis­mis­sal wit­hout noti­ce may be more favorable becau­se it can be ful­ly review­ed by a court, which is only limi­t­ed in the case of a ter­mi­na­ti­on agree­ment.

Ordi­na­ry Ter­mi­na­ti­on (Ordent­li­che Kün­di­gung):

Ordi­na­ry ter­mi­na­ti­on results in the end of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship through a uni­la­te­ral decla­ra­ti­on. Noti­ce peri­ods spe­ci­fied by law (§ 622 BGB), a coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment, or the employ­ment con­tract must be obser­ved. Noti­ce of ter­mi­na­ti­on must be made in wri­ting accor­ding to § 623 BGB.

Employee ter­mi­na­ti­ons are not sub­ject to any addi­tio­nal requi­re­ments. Howe­ver, employ­ers in the scope of the Pro­tec­tion Against Unfair Dis­mis­sal Act (Kün­di­gungs­schutz­ge­setz) must pro­ve grounds for the ter­mi­na­ti­on that jus­ti­fy it on social grounds. For cer­tain groups of indi­vi­du­als with spe­cial pro­tec­tion from dis­mis­sal, the employ­er can only ter­mi­na­te their employ­ment with good cau­se or with the appr­oval of an aut­ho­ri­ty. In cases with a reim­bur­se­ment clau­se, an unp­lea­sant con­se­quence of employee ter­mi­na­ti­on may be the finan­cial reim­bur­se­ment of bene­fits recei­ved or expen­ses incur­red to the employ­er.

Extra­or­di­na­ry Ter­mi­na­ti­on (Außer­or­dent­li­che Kün­di­gung):

Extra­or­di­na­ry ter­mi­na­ti­on can be made wit­hout noti­ce or with noti­ce, but it requi­res an important reason to be valid. It must also be issued within two weeks of beco­ming awa­re of the grounds for ter­mi­na­ti­on (§ 626(2) BGB). The­se requi­re­ments app­ly to both employee and employ­er ter­mi­na­ti­ons.

Amend­ment Ter­mi­na­ti­on Pur­su­ant to § 2 of the Ger­man Pro­tec­tion Against Unfair Dis­mis­sal Act (Ände­rungs­kün­di­gung gemäß § 2 KSchG):

An amend­ment ter­mi­na­ti­on is the ter­mi­na­ti­on of an employ­ment rela­ti­onship cou­pled with an offer to enter into a new con­tract to con­ti­nue the rela­ti­onship under revi­sed terms.

Dis­so­lu­ti­on Order by the Labor Court (Auf­lö­sungs­ur­teil durch das Arbeits­ge­richt):

The dis­so­lu­ti­on order is a uni­que aspect of labor law. The labor court can ter­mi­na­te an employ­ment rela­ti­onship by judgment through a decla­ra­to­ry action, with the requi­re­ment ort he pay­ment of sever­ance, if an employer‘s ter­mi­na­ti­on is soci­al­ly unju­s­ti­fia­ble and, the­r­e­fo­re, inef­fec­ti­ve. Such a decis­i­on is only pos­si­ble under spe­ci­fic cir­cum­s­tances.

Rescis­si­on Pur­su­ant to Sec­tions 119 ff. of the Ger­man Civil Code (Anfech­tung gemäß §§ 119 ff BGB):

An employ­ment rela­ti­onship can be resc­in­ded if the par­ty see­king to annul the con­tract made an error at the time of its con­clu­si­on, was threa­ten­ed, or was decei­ved by frau­du­lent con­duct. Howe­ver, it should be noted that the decep­ti­on of an employee does not give the employ­er the right to rescind if the decep­ti­on was not ille­gal; in other words, the employ­er asked an imper­mis­si­ble ques­ti­on, and the employee had a “right to lie.”

Rescis­si­on usual­ly retroac­tively annuls the con­tract, as if it had never exis­ted (ex tunc). Per­for­man­ces made are unwound. Howe­ver, employ­ment ser­vices can­not be retroac­tively undo­ne, so rescis­si­on of an employ­ment rela­ti­onship that has alre­a­dy been exe­cu­ted (i.e., a defec­ti­ve employ­ment rela­ti­onship) is not retroac­ti­ve but ope­ra­tes simi­lar­ly to an imme­dia­te effect like a ter­mi­na­ti­on wit­hout noti­ce.

Death of the Employee (Tod des Arbeit­neh­mers):

The death of the employee ter­mi­na­tes the employ­ment rela­ti­onship. The pro­vi­si­on of work is a high­ly per­so­nal obli­ga­ti­on that can­not be assu­med by the heirs. Con­ver­se­ly, the death of the employ­er does not affect the exis­tence of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship, as the heirs assu­me the legal posi­ti­on of the decea­sed employ­er.

11 Fun­da­men­tal Employ­ment Laws

11.1 The Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employ­ment Act

The Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employ­ment Act (TzBfG) regu­la­tes part-time employ­ment and fixed-term employ­ment in Ger­man labor law. The aim of this law is to pro­mo­te part-time work, defi­ne the con­di­ti­ons for the per­mis­si­bi­li­ty of fixed-term employ­ment con­tracts, and pre­vent dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on against part-time and fixed-term employees (§ 1 TzBfG).

The first sec­tion includes gene­ral pro­vi­si­ons such as the objec­ti­ves, defi­ni­ti­ons of part-time work and fixed-term employ­ment, as well as anti-dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on and non-dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on pro­vi­si­ons. The second sec­tion regu­la­tes part-time work, spe­ci­fi­cal­ly the employee’s sta­tu­to­ry right to work fewer hours than the regu­lar working hours under cer­tain cir­cum­s­tances and sets mini­mum stan­dards.

11.1.1 Employee’s Right to Redu­ce Working Hours

§ 8 TzBfG The TzBfG estab­lishes a legal entit­le­ment to a part-time job (§ 8 TzBfG). Howe­ver, this entit­le­ment only appli­es to com­pa­nies with typi­cal­ly more than 15 employees, with the num­ber of indi­vi­du­als in voca­tio­nal trai­ning not being coun­ted (§ 7 TzBfG). In other cases, all employees are asses­sed with a fac­tor of 1. This signi­fi­can­ce is also pro­vi­ded in § 15 (7) of the Fede­ral Paren­tal Allo­wan­ce and Paren­tal Lea­ve Act (BErzGG), which has also gua­ran­teed the right to part-time work during paren­tal lea­ve sin­ce Janu­ary 1, 2001. An entit­le­ment to part-time employ­ment is also included in the disa­bi­li­ty employ­ment law sin­ce Janu­ary 1, 2001. Accor­ding to § 81 (4) SGB IX, dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als have a right to part-time employ­ment if shorter working hours are neces­sa­ry due to the natu­re or seve­ri­ty of the disa­bi­li­ty. Accor­ding to § 8 (1) TzBfG, it is only neces­sa­ry that the employ­ment rela­ti­onship has exis­ted for more than six months (wai­ting peri­od). The request to redu­ce working hours must be made three months befo­re the start of the reques­ted working hours reduc­tion (§ 8 (2) TzBfG). While the entit­le­ment to a reduc­tion ari­ses only after the six-month wai­ting peri­od has expi­red, the request for a reduc­tion can be made three months befo­re the entit­le­ment beg­ins. When reques­t­ing a reduc­tion in working hours, the employee must also spe­ci­fy how the redu­ced weekly working hours should be dis­tri­bu­ted across the indi­vi­du­al working days of the week (§ 8 (2) sen­tence 2 TzBfG). The employ­er must com­mu­ni­ca­te the decis­i­on on this request for reduc­tion to the employee in wri­ting no later than four weeks befo­re the start of the reduc­tion (§ 8 (5) sen­tence 2 TzBfG). If the employ­er does not make this decis­i­on, the working hours must be redu­ced accor­ding to the employee’s request (§ 8 (5) sen­tence 2 TzBfG). The agreed or desi­red dis­tri­bu­ti­on of weekly working hours can be chan­ged by the employ­er if the company’s inte­rest signi­fi­cant­ly out­weighs the employee’s inte­rest in main­tai­ning it (§ 8 (5) sen­tence 3 TzBfG), with the works coun­cil being invol­ved accor­ding to § 87 BetrVG. In order to mini­mi­ze admi­nis­tra­ti­ve efforts, an appli­ca­ti­on for a reduc­tion in working hours can be sub­mit­ted again at the ear­liest two years after the pre­vious request (§ 8 (6) TzBfG). The request must be for an inde­fi­ni­te reduc­tion. The entit­le­ment is limi­t­ed to redu­cing working hours at the cur­rent job, not a right to be allo­ca­ted a dif­fe­rent, available job. Howe­ver, the employ­er can gene­ral­ly choo­se which com­pa­ra­ble job the reduc­tion request would best app­ly to. Nevert­hel­ess, he must make his decis­i­on based on reasonable judgment. The dis­tri­bu­ti­on pro­po­sal of redu­ced working hours can only be rejec­ted for ope­ra­tio­nal reasons. The employ­er can­not, the­r­e­fo­re, pre­sent an arran­ge­ment that appears more con­ve­ni­ent to him as an objec­tion to the employee. If the employee wants an even reduc­tion of working hours on indi­vi­du­al days of the week, the employ­er can­not object by sta­ting that he would pre­fer to have days off gathe­red during a full-day work. Such a rejec­tion must ins­tead be based on ope­ra­tio­nal reasons and must be cle­ar­ly explai­ned (§ 8 (4)).

The pro­ce­du­re for rea­li­zing the entit­le­ment to part-time work and spe­ci­fy­ing the dis­tri­bu­ti­on request con­sists of three pha­ses:

It beg­ins with the employee’s request to redu­ce their working hours and a pro­po­sed dis­tri­bu­ti­on plan.

The second pha­se invol­ves dis­cus­sing the­se pro­po­sals joint­ly with the employ­er (§ 8 Sec. 3 TzBfG). Alt­hough the employ­er is not obli­ga­ted to enga­ge in nego­tia­ti­ons, no sanc­tions are spe­ci­fied if nego­tia­ti­ons do not take place. Howe­ver, doubts about the serious­ness of the reasons for refu­sal could be rai­sed in later legal pro­cee­dings. An ami­ca­ble agree­ment ali­gns best with prac­ti­cal needs. The employee can invol­ve a mem­ber of the works coun­cil in the­se nego­tia­ti­ons.

As a result, in the third pha­se, three pos­si­bi­li­ties are con­ceiva­ble:

Spe­cial annu­al pay­ments with the cha­rac­ter of remu­ne­ra­ti­on are to be redu­ced accor­din­gly, and for the months in which full work was per­for­med, they are to be paid in full on a pro-rata basis.

Accor­ding to § 8 Sec. 4 TzBfG, the employ­er must con­sent to the reduc­tion in working hours and spe­ci­fy their dis­tri­bu­ti­on in accordance with the employee’s wis­hes, pro­vi­ded the­re are no ope­ra­tio­nal reasons to the con­tra­ry. This estab­lishes an obli­ga­ti­on for the employ­er to issue a decla­ra­ti­on of intent. Sec. 4 crea­tes a con­trac­tu­al obli­ga­ti­on for the employ­er to redu­ce the con­trac­tu­al working hours to the ext­ent desi­red by the employee. The obli­ga­ti­on to con­sent is only wai­ved in the pre­sence of objec­ti­ve ope­ra­tio­nal reasons.

An entit­le­ment to redu­ce working hours and/or object to the dis­tri­bu­ti­on of spe­ci­fic working hours is not gran­ted if the employ­er pres­ents ope­ra­tio­nal reasons under § 8 Sec. 4 Sub­sec. 1 TzBfG that oppo­se the employee’s wis­hes. The bur­den of pro­of for the exis­tence of ope­ra­tio­nal reasons rests with the employ­er. Ope­ra­tio­nal reasons, in par­ti­cu­lar, exist when redu­cing working hours would signi­fi­cant­ly impair the orga­niza­ti­on, work­flow, or safe­ty in the com­pa­ny, or cau­se dis­pro­por­tio­na­te cos­ts (§ 8 Sec. 4 Sub­sec. 2 TzBfG).

Ori­gi­nal­ly, the draft law for TzBfG pro­po­sed that the ope­ra­tio­nal reasons pre­sen­ted by the employ­er must be “urgent.” Howe­ver, the adjec­ti­ve “urgent” was remo­ved during sub­se­quent legis­la­ti­ve pro­cee­dings. Ins­tead, the examp­les initi­al­ly pro­vi­ded only in the expl­ana­to­ry memo­ran­dum were incor­po­ra­ted into the text of the law. None­thel­ess, the absence of “urgent” does not imply that ope­ra­tio­nal reasons can be arbi­tra­ry. The two legal spe­ci­fi­ca­ti­ons (“signi­fi­cant impair­ment” and “dis­pro­por­tio­na­te cos­ts”) make it clear that ope­ra­tio­nal reasons must be of sub­stan­ti­al weight to over­ri­de the employee’s part-time request.

The employer’s requi­red pro­of of a “signi­fi­cant impair­ment” or “dis­pro­por­tio­na­te cos­ts” impli­es that when imple­men­ting the part-time request, some dis­rup­ti­on to the exis­ting orga­niza­tio­nal work­flow and addi­tio­nal cos­ts may be accept­ed, pro­vi­ded they are in reasonable pro­por­ti­on to the part-time request.

The requi­re­ment of a “signi­fi­cant impair­ment” sug­gests that not every dis­rup­ti­on to com­pa­ny ope­ra­ti­ons jus­ti­fies refu­sing the entit­le­ment. Ins­tead, the employ­er must make reasonable efforts, par­ti­cu­lar­ly by exer­cis­ing their right of direc­tion, to intern­al­ly reor­ga­ni­ze and mini­mi­ze any dis­rup­ti­ons to work­flow or orga­niza­tio­nal func­tio­ning. Any­thing less would ren­der the entit­le­ment under § 8 TzBfG prac­ti­cal­ly meanin­g­less.

While an orga­niza­tio­nal con­cept pre­sen­ted by the employ­er, in the con­text of ope­ra­tio­nal reasons, can­not be exami­ned for its appro­pria­ten­ess by the labor court, fol­lo­wing the case law of the Fede­ral Labor Court on ter­mi­na­ti­on law and the employer’s pre­ro­ga­ti­ve to orga­ni­ze, the employ­er must sub­mit spe­ci­fic infor­ma­ti­on regar­ding a com­pre­hen­si­ble cor­po­ra­te plan for sche­du­ling work hours. This makes the ope­ra­tio­nal reasons sub­stan­tia­ted and not mere­ly expres­sed in catch­phra­ses. The reasons must be com­pre­hen­si­ble in their impact on work­flow, orga­niza­ti­on, or safe­ty in the com­pa­ny, which allows the labor court to ful­ly review whe­ther the asser­ted ope­ra­tio­nal reasons inde­ed exist and signi­fi­cant­ly impair work­flow or orga­niza­ti­on or pose safe­ty con­cerns within the com­pa­ny.

The cri­ter­ion of “signi­fi­cant impair­ment” is, inci­den­tal­ly, known from § 111 BetrVG (Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act) and has been quan­ti­ta­tively inter­pre­ted by juris­pru­dence con­cer­ning the scope of the company’s work­force. Here, it’s con­ceiva­ble that the ext­ent of the part-time request is rela­ted to the exis­ting volu­me of working hours, and a spe­ci­fic thres­hold may be deve­lo­ped. On the other hand, the cri­ter­ion of “dis­pro­por­tio­na­te cos­ts” does not have a par­al­lel in other laws and is likely to be inter­pre­ted in clo­se con­nec­tion with the “signi­fi­cant impair­ment” cri­ter­ion.

This also appli­es to the objec­tion that the cor­po­ra­te con­cept only envi­sa­ges full-time employees and the objec­tion that no sui­ta­ble addi­tio­nal work­force can be found. The first objec­tion is only valid if it can be infer­red from the company’s pre­vious per­son­nel poli­cy. The lat­ter objec­tion is only rele­vant if the employ­er pro­ves that no addi­tio­nal work­force cor­re­spon­ding to the employee’s job pro­fi­le is available in the rele­vant job mar­ket. Mere refe­ren­ces to dif­fi­cul­ties in fin­ding a sui­ta­ble employee in the past may not be suf­fi­ci­ent.

The fact that the intro­duc­tion of part-time work and hiring addi­tio­nal staff can incur cos­ts for the employ­er was reco­gni­zed and accept­ed by the legis­la­tor. The legis­la­ti­ve ratio­na­le notes that the­se addi­tio­nal cos­ts may be off­set by ongo­ing cost savings through increased pro­duc­ti­vi­ty and bet­ter capi­tal uti­liza­ti­on. The­r­e­fo­re, the employ­er must pre­sent the cau­se and amount of cos­ts, along with the cir­cum­s­tances that sub­stan­tia­te the dis­pro­por­tio­na­li­ty. Increased cos­ts alo­ne are not suf­fi­ci­ent.

The coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning par­ties are aut­ho­ri­zed to spe­ci­fy, through coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments, the reasons for rejec­ting a reduc­tion in working hours, taking into account the spe­ci­fic requi­re­ments of each indus­try (§ 8 Sec. 4 Sub­sec. 3). The reasons for rejec­ting a reduc­tion in working hours that are regu­la­ted in a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment within the scope of that agree­ment can also be agreed upon bet­ween non-unio­ni­zed employ­ers and employees (§ 8 Sec. 4 Sub­sec. 4 TzBfG).

11.1.2 The right of part-time employees to extend their working hours, § 9 TzBfG

The Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employ­ment Act not only grants full-time employees the right to redu­ce their working hours but also allows part-time employees, under the con­di­ti­ons of § 9 TzBfG, to cla­im an exten­si­on of their agreed-upon working hours. The­r­e­fo­re, the employ­er must con­sider the request of a part-time employee for an increase in their con­trac­tual­ly agreed working hours, favoring them when fil­ling an appro­pria­te available posi­ti­on of equal sui­ta­bi­li­ty, unless the­re are ope­ra­tio­nal reasons or the working hour wis­hes of other part-time employees stand in the way. Moreo­ver, the employee takes pre­ce­dence over exter­nal appli­cants with equal qua­li­fi­ca­ti­ons, § 9 TzBfG.

The employee’s request for an increase in their con­trac­tual­ly agreed working hours can be infor­mal and does­n’t have to be in wri­ting. Accor­ding to the wor­ding of the law, it is not neces­sa­ry to spe­ci­fy the ext­ent of the increase. Howe­ver, the employee should pro­vi­de an appro­xi­ma­te num­ber of hours desi­red sin­ce other­wi­se, the labor court can­not veri­fy which available posi­ti­ons are rele­vant. The Ber­lin Regio­nal Labor Court (judgment of Decem­ber 2, 2003 — 3 Sa 1041/03) has also ruled that the noti­fi­ca­ti­on does not have to refer to a spe­ci­fic posi­ti­on.

A cla­im for an increase in working hours accor­ding to § 9 TzBfG also requi­res the exis­tence of an “appro­pria­te job” with lon­ger working hours. The requi­re­ment of an “appro­pria­te job” is usual­ly met only when the posi­ti­on to be fil­led is com­pa­ra­ble in con­tent to the posi­ti­on on which the part-time employee per­forms their con­trac­tual­ly requi­red tasks. Both tasks gene­ral­ly place the same demands on the per­so­nal and pro­fes­sio­nal qua­li­fi­ca­ti­ons of the employee. Part-time employees only excep­tio­nal­ly have a cla­im to an increase in working hours if it is asso­cia­ted with a chan­ge to a posi­ti­on with hig­her-value duties. Such an excep­tio­nal case is affirm­ed when the employer’s per­son­nel orga­niza­ti­on only allows part-time work at a lower hier­ar­chi­cal level than pre­vious­ly held. This crea­tes a self-bin­ding effect: the boun­da­ry bet­ween the two hier­ar­chy levels beco­mes per­meable for the later request to increase working hours by the part-time employee. In this case, the posi­ti­on with the hig­her-value duties is also con­side­red an “appro­pria­te job” within the mea­ning of § 9 TzBfG (Fede­ral Labor Court, judgment of Sep­tem­ber 16, 2008 — 9 AZR 781/07).

In addi­ti­on, the part-time employee must be sui­ta­ble for the vacant posi­ti­on. In par­ti­cu­lar, the employ­er is not obli­ged to con­sider them when fil­ling available posi­ti­ons for which the employee is eit­her not suf­fi­ci­ent­ly qua­li­fied or over­qua­li­fied.

If ano­ther sui­ta­ble available posi­ti­on that matches the working hour wis­hes of the part-time employee is available, it is dif­fi­cult to ima­gi­ne any ope­ra­tio­nal reason why they should not be allo­wed to fill that posi­ti­on. The ratio­na­le that the part-time employee can­not be repla­ced is not suf­fi­ci­ent and cle­ar­ly con­tra­dicts the pur­po­se of the law. If an increase in hours on the cur­rent posi­ti­on is deman­ded, the employ­er can suc­cessful­ly argue that they only want to car­ry out a cer­tain acti­vi­ty with part-time employees. The Fede­ral Labor Court con­firm­ed that the entre­pre­neu­ri­al decis­i­on to fill a full-time posi­ti­on with two part-time employees in the future can even con­sti­tu­te an urgent ope­ra­tio­nal requi­re­ment for a chan­ge in ter­mi­na­ti­on (Fede­ral Labor Court, judgment of April 22, 2004 — 2 AZR 385/03). So, an urgent ope­ra­tio­nal reason for refu­sal can also be the fact that the employ­er only employs part-time workers. Howe­ver, the employ­er in this case is not enti­re­ly free in their decis­i­on. In case of a dis­pu­te, they must put for­ward com­pre­hen­si­ble work­place-rela­ted reasons for the exclu­si­ve estab­lish­ment of part-time posi­ti­ons (Colo­gne Regio­nal Labor Court, judgment of Sep­tem­ber 30, 2010 — 7 Sa 952/10).

If the con­di­ti­ons are met, the employ­er is obli­ga­ted to trans­fer the vacant posi­ti­on to the employee. If the employ­er vio­la­tes this obli­ga­ti­on, the employee typi­cal­ly has two opti­ons:

If the posi­ti­on has not been fil­led by someone else, it is advi­sa­ble to first seek an inte­rim injunc­tion to pre­vent the employ­er from fil­ling the posi­ti­on else­whe­re and then file a lawsu­it in the main pro­cee­dings to obtain con­sent for the exten­si­on of the con­trac­tu­al working hours. If, on the other hand, the posi­ti­on has alre­a­dy been fil­led else­whe­re, the employee’s right to per­for­mance is extin­gu­is­hed due to impos­si­bi­li­ty (§ 275 Abs. 1 BGB — Ger­man Civil Code). The employ­er is then obli­ged to pay dama­ges to the employee. In this case, the requi­si­te negli­gence (§ 276 Abs. 1 BGB) is neces­sa­ry for lia­bi­li­ty. The third sec­tion covers fixed-term employ­ment con­tracts (§§ 14 et seq. TzBfG). The­se are unders­tood to be employ­ment rela­ti­onships that are not con­cluded for an inde­fi­ni­te peri­od but are ins­tead limi­t­ed by time or pur­po­se. Accor­din­gly, the­re are distinc­tions made bet­ween time limi­ta­ti­on (unju­s­ti­fied limi­ta­ti­on) and pur­po­se limi­ta­ti­on (jus­ti­fied limi­ta­ti­on). Apart from the man­da­to­ry writ­ten form requi­re­ment under § 14 Abs. 4 TzBfG, a fixed-term employ­ment con­tract must ful­fill addi­tio­nal requi­re­ments to be legal­ly effec­ti­ve. The effec­ti­ve­ness of the limi­ta­ti­on depends on whe­ther it is a time limi­ta­ti­on or a pur­po­se limi­ta­ti­on.

11.1.3 Fixed-term employ­ment with an objec­ti­ve reason, § 14 Abs. 1 TzBfG

A (writ­ten) fixed-term employ­ment con­tract is valid if the­re is an objec­ti­ve reason accor­ding to § 14 Abs. 1 TzBfG. Pos­si­ble objec­ti­ve reasons that jus­ti­fy a limi­ta­ti­on are lis­ted in § 14 Abs. 1 TzBfG in the form of stan­dard examp­les. An objec­ti­ve reason for a fixed-term or pur­po­se limi­ta­ti­on exists, in par­ti­cu­lar, accor­ding to § 14 Abs. 1 TzBfG, when:

  • The­re is a tem­po­ra­ry ope­ra­tio­nal need for the employee’s work.
  • The limi­ta­ti­on fol­lows an edu­ca­ti­on or stu­dy pro­gram to faci­li­ta­te the employee’s tran­si­ti­on to sub­se­quent employ­ment.
  • The employee is hired to sub­sti­tu­te for ano­ther employee.
  • The natu­re of the work jus­ti­fies the limi­ta­ti­on.
  • The limi­ta­ti­on is for tri­al or test­ing pur­po­ses.
  • The­re are per­so­nal reasons con­cer­ning the employee that jus­ti­fy the limi­ta­ti­on.
  • The employee is paid from funds desi­gna­ted for limi­t­ed-term employ­ment by bud­ge­ta­ry regu­la­ti­ons and is employ­ed accor­din­gly.
  • The limi­ta­ti­on is based on a court sett­le­ment.

If such an objec­ti­ve reason exists, a pur­po­se limi­ta­ti­on is valid. As the term “in par­ti­cu­lar” indi­ca­tes, this list of eight dif­fe­rent objec­ti­ve reasons for a limi­ta­ti­on is not exhaus­ti­ve, mea­ning the employ­er can jus­ti­fy the per­mis­si­bi­li­ty of the limi­ta­ti­on with other reasons not included in this list. The enu­me­ra­ti­on of objec­ti­ve reasons for the limi­ta­ti­on of employ­ment con­tracts in § 14 Abs. 1 Satz 2 No. 1 — 8 TzBfG is not com­pre­hen­si­ve. Howe­ver, other objec­ti­ve reasons not men­tio­ned in § 14 Abs. 1 Satz 2 No. 1 — 8 TzBfG can only jus­ti­fy the limi­ta­ti­on of an employ­ment con­tract if they cor­re­spond to the valua­ti­on cri­te­ria expres­sed in § 14 Abs. 1 TzBfG and are of equal signi­fi­can­ce to the objec­ti­ve reasons lis­ted in the cata­log in § 14 Abs. 1 Satz 2 No. 1 — 8 TzBfG. This also appli­es to reasons regu­la­ted by a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment (Fede­ral Labor Court, judgment of Decem­ber 9, 2009 — 7 AZR 399/08). The dif­fe­rence com­pared to the non-objec­ti­ve fixed-term con­tract under § 14 Abs. 2 TzBfG is that with objec­ti­ve reasons for limi­ta­ti­on, the­re is no maxi­mum dura­ti­on spe­ci­fied sin­ce it is deter­mi­ned by the spe­ci­fic reason.

11.1.4 Fixed-term employ­ment wit­hout an objec­ti­ve reason, § 14 Abs. 2 TzBfG

Accor­ding to § 14 Abs. 2 sen­tence 1 TzBfG, it is per­mis­si­ble to extend a fixed-term employ­ment con­tract wit­hout an objec­ti­ve reason up to three times, with a total dura­ti­on of up to two years. An exten­si­on, as defi­ned by § 14 Abs. 2 sen­tence 1 TzBfG, requi­res that it is agreed upon during the term of the con­tract being exten­ded, and it pri­ma­ri­ly chan­ges only the dura­ti­on of the con­tract, not the other terms and con­di­ti­ons of employ­ment. This appli­es even when the modi­fied employ­ment con­di­ti­ons are more favorable for the employee. Other­wi­se, it would be the initia­ti­on of a new fixed-term employ­ment con­tract, and such a limi­ta­ti­on wit­hout an objec­ti­ve reason is not per­mis­si­ble under § 14 Abs. 2 sen­tence 2 TzBfG due to the exis­ting employ­ment rela­ti­onship. This does not exclude chan­ges to the employ­ment con­di­ti­ons during the term of the ori­gi­nal con­tract or the exten­ded con­tract. Chan­ges to the con­tract during an exten­si­on under § 14 Abs. 2 TzBfG are per­mis­si­ble when the altera­ti­on is based on an agree­ment pre­vious­ly rea­ched bet­ween the par­ties or when the employee had the right to the con­tract chan­ge at the time of the exten­si­on. In both cases, the modi­fied con­tract con­di­ti­on is based on the exis­ting employ­ment con­tract bet­ween the par­ties. This was deci­ded by the Seventh Sena­te of the Fede­ral Labor Court (BAG) in its judgment of August 23, 2006 (7 AZR 12/06), in addi­ti­on to its pre­vious case law on § 14 Abs. 2 TzBfG.

Both types of limi­ta­ti­ons must be agreed upon in wri­ting accor­ding to § 14 Abs. 4 TzBfG for the limi­ta­ti­on to be valid. In the case of an agree­ment that is sole­ly oral or is other­wi­se imper­mis­si­ble, the fixed-term employ­ment con­tract is con­side­red to have been con­cluded for an inde­fi­ni­te peri­od under § 16 TzBfG.

When a fixed-term employ­ment con­tract has been con­cluded, the employ­ment rela­ti­onship does not end through ter­mi­na­ti­on but by the expi­ra­ti­on of the agreed-upon peri­od. Ordi­na­ry ter­mi­na­ti­on is, the­r­e­fo­re, gene­ral­ly pre­cluded during the term of the con­tract, as sta­ted in § 15 Abs. 3 TzBfG, unless such a ter­mi­na­ti­on opti­on is pro­vi­ded for indi­vi­du­al­ly or through an appli­ca­ble coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment. Con­se­quent­ly, the employ­er has the advan­ta­ge of not having to fear an unfair dis­mis­sal lawsu­it. On the other hand, it is always pos­si­ble to ter­mi­na­te the con­tract pre­ma­tu­re­ly for a gra­ve reason. This legal opti­on does not need to be expli­cit­ly agreed upon. Accor­ding to § 15 Abs. 2 of the Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employ­ment Act (TzBfG), a pur­po­se-limi­t­ed employ­ment con­tract ends when the pur­po­se is achie­ved or, at the ear­liest, two weeks after the employ­er informs the employee in wri­ting about the attain­ment of the pur­po­se.

Final­ly, the fourth sec­tion con­ta­ins com­mon pro­vi­si­ons, such as pro­vi­si­ons for pre­ven­ting cir­cum­ven­ti­on and refe­ren­ces to other sta­tu­to­ry and coll­ec­ti­ve regu­la­ti­ons.

The legal­ly per­mis­si­ble maxi­mum dura­ti­on of working time is regu­la­ted by the Working Hours Act (Arbeits­zeit­ge­setz or ArbZG). The Working Hours Act does not app­ly to mana­ging employees, chief medi­cal offi­cers, and depart­ment and per­son­nel mana­gers in the public sec­tor, as sta­ted in § 18 ArbZG. An excep­ti­on is also made for employees, such as employ­ed child­ca­re workers, who live with the indi­vi­du­als they are respon­si­ble for in a dome­stic set­ting.

Accor­ding to § 3 of the ArbZG, the dai­ly working time for employees should not exceed 8 hours in prin­ci­ple. The­r­e­fo­re, it is essen­ti­al to cla­ri­fy the defi­ni­ti­on of working time and other basic terms rela­ted to working time. The fol­lo­wing are the most essen­ti­al defi­ni­ti­ons:

Working Time: This is the peri­od from the start to the end of work, exclu­ding rest breaks. In under­ground mining, rest breaks are con­side­red part of working time (§ 2 Abs. 1 ArbZG). It is the span during which the employee must make their working capa­ci­ty available to the employ­er and for which they recei­ve remu­ne­ra­ti­on. It does not mat­ter whe­ther they are actual­ly assi­gned work. The dura­ti­on of working time is typi­cal­ly regu­la­ted by an employ­ment con­tract.

Tra­vel Time: This is the time requi­red to tra­vel from home to the work­place and back. It is not con­side­red working time, and the­re is no entit­le­ment to remu­ne­ra­ti­on for tra­vel time. Howe­ver, tra­vel time within the com­pa­ny or from the com­pa­ny to an exter­nal work­place is con­side­red part of working time.

Rest Time: This is the time after the end of the dai­ly working time during which the employee does not per­form work or stand­by duties (§ 5 Abs. 1 ArbZG). During this peri­od, the employee should reco­ver from the work per­for­med and gather new strength. § 5 Abs. 1 ArbZG requi­res that employees be gran­ted an unin­ter­rupt­ed rest peri­od of at least 11 hours after work. An excep­ti­on exists in the trans­por­ta­ti­on and hos­pi­ta­li­ty sec­tor: in some are­as, the rest peri­od can be redu­ced to 10 hours if the­re is com­pen­sa­ti­on within a month or a four-week peri­od through an exten­si­on of rest times. § 7 Abs. 1 no. 3 ArbZG allows for an even fur­ther excep­ti­on: in a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment, a reduc­tion of the rest peri­od to 9 hours and com­pen­sa­ti­on within a free­ly defi­ned peri­od can be agreed upon. Rest time, of cour­se, is not con­side­red working time.

Rest Breaks: The­se are pre­de­ter­mi­ned inter­rup­ti­ons of working time, during which the employee is released from all ser­vice obli­ga­ti­ons, inclu­ding the obli­ga­ti­on to remain on stand­by. The employee can lea­ve their work­sta­tion and deter­mi­ne how and whe­re they spend their time. § 4 ArbZG sta­tes that after more than 6 hours of working time, a rest break of half an hour should be pro­vi­ded, which can be repla­ced by two breaks of a quar­ter-hour each. Rest breaks are not con­side­red working time. Inter­rup­ti­ons of less than 15 minu­tes are not con­side­red rest breaks under the Working Hours Act and are coun­ted as working time.

Stand­by Duty: This is the time when an employee is not per­forming full work but must remain at their work­place and be rea­dy to inter­ve­ne at their dis­cre­ti­on. Accor­ding to the defi­ni­ti­on pro­vi­ded by the Fede­ral Labor Court (BAG), it is a “peri­od of alert atten­ti­ve­ness in a sta­te of rela­xa­ti­on.” Stand­by duty is con­side­red working time.

Exam­p­le:

An employee in a call cen­ter who has no cus­to­mer cont­act for three minu­tes is not on stand­by duty but is working becau­se the­re is no oppor­tu­ni­ty for rela­xa­ti­on. On the other hand, a velo­ta­xi dri­ver who only occa­sio­nal­ly trans­ports a cus­to­mer is on stand­by duty. The same appli­es to a taxi dri­ver with lon­ger “down­ti­mes” bet­ween cus­to­mer trans­ports or a fire­figh­ter.

Howe­ver, stand­by duty is not asses­sed as full working time. If stand­by duty regu­lar­ly occurs during working hours and to a signi­fi­cant ext­ent, a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment may extend the dai­ly working time bey­ond ten hours. This is alre­a­dy assu­med to be the case with around 30 per­cent stand­by duty.

On-Call Duty: On-call duty invol­ves an employee being available at a spe­ci­fied loca­ti­on with the obli­ga­ti­on to prompt­ly com­mence work when requi­red. An exam­p­le of this is an on-call doc­tor. On-call duty is con­side­red working time (ECJ ruling of 09.09.2003 — C‑151/02) and thus counts towards cal­cu­la­ting the maxi­mum working time as per the Working Hours Act. Howe­ver, it can be com­pen­sa­ted dif­fer­ent­ly.

Stand­by: Stand­by is the obli­ga­ti­on for an employee to stay at a loca­ti­on spe­ci­fied by the employ­er and to start work imme­dia­te­ly when cal­led upon. The noti­fi­ca­ti­on of loca­ti­on may be omit­ted if the employee can be rea­ched via a mobi­le pho­ne, and their loca­ti­on does not lead to a delay in com­men­cing work. Stand­by is not con­side­red working time accor­ding to the Working Hours Act and is trea­ted as rest time in terms of working time law. The time spent on stand­by (inclu­ding tra­vel times) during stand­by duty is included when cal­cu­la­ting working time limits and inter­rupts rest time. Regar­ding com­pen­sa­ti­on, time spent on stand­by that leads to work is con­side­red over­ti­me.

Night Time: Night time, as defi­ned by the Working Hours Act, is from 23:00 to 6:00, and in bake­ries and con­fec­tione­ries, it is from 22:00 to 5:00 (§ 2 Abs. 3 ArbZG).

Night Work: Accor­ding to this law, night work is any work that spans more than two hours during the night time (§ 2 Abs. 4 ArbZG).

Night Workers: Night workers under this law are employees who, due to their work sche­du­le, regu­lar­ly per­form night work in rota­ting shifts or work at night on at least 48 days per calen­dar year (§ 2 Abs. 5 ArbZG).

Sun­day Work: Sun­day work is defi­ned as work bet­ween 0:00 and 24:00 on Sun­days. Two Sun­days should typi­cal­ly be work-free within a month. If employees are requi­red to work on a Sun­day, they must be gran­ted a sub­sti­tu­te rest day within a peri­od of two weeks that includes the working day. The sub­sti­tu­te rest day must not fall on a public holi­day.

Public Holi­day Work: Public holi­day work is work bet­ween 0:00 and 24:00 on sta­tu­to­ry public holi­days.

Over­ti­me: Over­ti­me refers to the hours work­ed that tem­po­r­a­ri­ly exceed the agreed-upon working hours. It is suf­fi­ci­ent if the super­vi­sor is awa­re of and tole­ra­tes the­se hours (con­sis­tent juris­pru­dence of the Fede­ral Labor Court). Accor­ding to the ECJ, the obli­ga­ti­on to pay over­ti­me sup­ple­ments exists only if the employ­ment con­tract or a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment sti­pu­la­tes this.

Addi­tio­nal Work: Addi­tio­nal work refers to working hours that exceed the regu­lar legal working hours.

Short-Time Work: (SGB III §§ 169 ff) Short-time work invol­ves tem­po­r­a­ri­ly redu­cing the working hours sti­pu­la­ted in the coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment or employ­ment con­tract to bridge a tem­po­ra­ry lack of orders. Short-time work should be an unavo­ida­ble, tem­po­ra­ry occur­rence resul­ting from eco­no­mic reasons or an ine­vi­ta­ble event. Struc­tu­ral chan­ges due to eco­no­mic reasons can also jus­ti­fy short-time work. Short-time work is not per­mis­si­ble for sea­so­nal­ly or regu­lar­ly fluc­tua­ting ope­ra­tio­nal capa­ci­ties.

Working Days: Working days are calen­dar days on which work is requi­red as per the employ­ment con­tract.

Busi­ness Days: Busi­ness days are all calen­dar days that are not Sun­days or sta­tu­to­ry holi­days (§ 3 Abs. 2 BUrlG).

Despi­te the gene­ral rule that work should not exceed 8 hours per day, excep­ti­ons can be made in legal­ly regu­la­ted cases. Accor­ding to § 3 sen­tence 2 ArbZG, an exten­si­on of the dai­ly working time to 10 hours on busi­ness days is always per­mit­ted. Howe­ver, this requi­res that an avera­ge of 8 hours per busi­ness day is achie­ved within a com­pen­sa­ti­on peri­od of six months or 24 weeks.

Exam­p­le:

Sup­po­se an employ­er faces a sud­den increase in workload. They can extend the dai­ly working hours to 10 hours for a peri­od, e.g., for four weeks if, within the next six months, the employees work only 6 hours per busi­ness day for four weeks. In this case, you can only speak of an avera­ge 8‑hour work­day.

§ 7 Abs. 1 no. 1 ArbZG opens up the pos­si­bi­li­ty of achie­ving even grea­ter fle­xi­bi­li­ty through a coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment. If stand­by duty occurs regu­lar­ly and to a signi­fi­cant ext­ent within the working time, the 10-hour limit can be excee­ded. The coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ment can also estab­lish a lon­ger com­pen­sa­ti­on peri­od. Fur­ther­mo­re, the­re is the opti­on to com­ple­te­ly fore­go com­pen­sa­ti­on, pro­vi­ded that, in a year, ten hours are work­ed on a maxi­mum of 60 days.

Accor­ding to § 14 Abs. 1 ArbZG, in emer­gen­ci­es and extra­or­di­na­ry situa­tions that occur inde­pendent­ly of the will of tho­se affec­ted and can­not be resol­ved in any other way, devia­ti­ons from the regu­la­ti­ons of § 3 ArbZG are per­mit­ted. In the­se cases, the­re are no upper limits.

§ 15 Abs. 1 no. 1 ArbZG sta­tes that the com­pe­tent super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ty can appro­ve devia­ti­ons from the time frame­work set by § 3 ArbZG under cer­tain con­di­ti­ons.

Accor­ding to § 15 Abs. 2 ArbZG, fur­ther excep­ti­ons are pos­si­ble if they are urgen­tly neces­sa­ry in the public inte­rest.

11.3 The Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act

11.3.1 Intro­duc­tion

Mate­r­ni­ty pro­tec­tion is the legal safe­guard for pregnant women and young mothers in the work­place. Its pur­po­se is to ensu­re that pregnant women and young mothers are not trea­ted unf­air­ly at work and are gran­ted spe­ci­fic rights and bene­fits.

Mate­r­ni­ty pro­tec­tion in Ger­ma­ny is based on the prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment. This means that pregnant women and young mothers must be trea­ted the same as other employees regar­ding pay, working hours, and job secu­ri­ty. They also have the right to paid lea­ve and to return to their pre­vious posi­ti­on after mate­r­ni­ty lea­ve.

Sin­ce Janu­ary 1, 2018, the new Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act (MuSchG) has been in force, brin­ging about signi­fi­cant chan­ges. The regu­la­ti­on for the pro­tec­tion of mothers in the work­place has been inte­gra­ted into the exis­ting law to make the pro­vi­si­ons of the Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act more com­pre­hen­si­ble and trans­pa­rent. In addi­ti­on to seve­ral sub­stan­ti­ve chan­ges, the revi­sed law also affects fema­le stu­dents and trai­nees, for exam­p­le, in terms of the man­da­to­ry loca­ti­on, time, and con­duct of trai­ning ses­si­ons.

11.3.2 Scope of the Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act

 The Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act appli­es to the fol­lo­wing:

  • When the place of employ­ment is within the natio­nal ter­ri­to­ry, regard­less of the natio­na­li­ty of the par­ties to the employ­ment con­tract.
  • In all types of busi­nesses and admi­nis­tra­ti­ons, as well as for employees in fami­ly house­holds and in agri­cul­tu­re.
  • For fema­le employees, regard­less of whe­ther they work full-time or part-time, on a tri­al basis, as tem­po­ra­ry staff, as their main or secon­da­ry occu­pa­ti­on; for home­wor­kers and tho­se dee­med equi­va­lent, as well as for women in trai­ning or par­ti­ci­pa­ting in fur­ther edu­ca­ti­on or retrai­ning mea­su­res. The pro­vi­si­ons of the Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act can­not be wai­ved to the detri­ment of tho­se affec­ted.

Self-employ­ed indi­vi­du­als and free­lan­cers, on the other hand, have no legal entit­le­ment to mate­r­ni­ty pro­tec­tion and mate­r­ni­ty bene­fits. Howe­ver, they can also app­ly for mate­r­ni­ty bene­fits under cer­tain cir­cum­s­tances.

11.3.3 Noti­fi­ca­ti­on and Infor­ma­ti­on Obli­ga­ti­ons

Pregnant women should inform their employ­er about their pregnan­cy and the expec­ted date of deli­very as soon as they beco­me awa­re of their pregnan­cy, in accordance with § 15 MuSchG.

It is suf­fi­ci­ent to inform the employ­er that a pregnan­cy is likely. Howe­ver, the employ­er may request the pregnant woman to pro­vi­de a rele­vant cer­ti­fi­ca­te from a doc­tor, mid­wi­fe, or deli­very nur­se.

The MuSchG does not estab­lish an obli­ga­ti­on for the pregnant woman to pro­vi­de this noti­fi­ca­ti­on. Such an obli­ga­ti­on may ari­se from her gene­ral con­trac­tu­al duty of loyal­ty if the employ­er has a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest in being infor­med.

This is par­ti­cu­lar­ly the case when the employ­er needs to make arran­ge­ments in advan­ce (e.g., for a woman in a lea­der­ship posi­ti­on who requi­res an exten­ded trai­ning peri­od for her suc­ces­sor). In indi­vi­du­al cases, a cul­pa­b­ly delay­ed or enti­re­ly omit­ted noti­fi­ca­ti­on may lead to claims for dama­ges.

11.3.4 Report­ing Obli­ga­ti­ons of the Employ­er

After the woman has noti­fied that she is pregnant or breast­fee­ding (if the pregnan­cy was not pre­vious­ly com­mu­ni­ca­ted), the employ­er must imme­dia­te­ly inform the com­pe­tent super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ty respon­si­ble for moni­to­ring com­pli­ance with mate­r­ni­ty pro­tec­tion pro­vi­si­ons.

In North Rhi­ne-West­pha­lia, this is the respec­ti­ve dis­trict govern­ment. The employ­er is obli­ga­ted to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on to this aut­ho­ri­ty. If the infor­ma­ti­on is inten­tio­nal­ly or negli­gent­ly omit­ted, the employ­er may be fined up to €5,000.

11.3.5 Pro­tec­tion Peri­ods Befo­re and After Child­birth

The Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act pri­ma­ri­ly safe­guards women in the peri­od imme­dia­te­ly befo­re and after child­birth. This pro­tec­tion peri­od beg­ins six weeks befo­re child­birth and ends eight weeks after child­birth.

In cases of medi­cal­ly indu­ced pre­ma­tu­re births, mul­ti­ple births, and upon request, also in the case of the birth of a child with a disa­bi­li­ty, the pro­tec­tion peri­od ends twel­ve weeks after child­birth.

During this time, it is gene­ral­ly assu­med that the woman can­not con­ti­nue her occu­pa­tio­nal acti­vi­ties.

Howe­ver, the fema­le employee can vol­un­t­a­ri­ly agree to con­ti­nue working during the pro­tec­tion peri­od befo­re child­birth, thus remai­ning employ­ed.

The pregnant woman can revo­ke her con­sent to work during the pro­tec­tion peri­od befo­re child­birth, allo­wing her to ter­mi­na­te her work at any time.

11.3.6 Health Pro­tec­tion

In addi­ti­on to noti­fy­ing the employ­er of her pregnan­cy, this noti­fi­ca­ti­on has far-rea­ching impli­ca­ti­ons for the health pro­tec­tion that the employ­er must ensu­re in the pregnant woman’s work­place. This con­cerns both per­mis­si­ble working hours and the mate­r­ni­ty pro­tec­tion-com­pli­ant arran­ge­ment of spe­ci­fic working con­di­ti­ons.

In prin­ci­ple, the MuSchG is desi­gned to allow a pregnant or nur­sing woman to con­ti­nue working at her exis­ting work­place.

A pro­hi­bi­ti­on on employ­ment for ope­ra­tio­nal reasons is only con­ceiva­ble in excep­tio­nal cases, when it is incom­pa­ti­ble with health pro­tec­tion and no mil­der mea­su­res are pos­si­ble. The work­place and work pro­ces­ses must be desi­gned in such a way that risks to the health and life of the pregnant (and nur­sing) woman are avo­ided, and irre­spon­si­ble risks are eli­mi­na­ted.

The con­cept of “unac­cep­ta­ble risk” is a cen­tral term in occu­pa­tio­nal safe­ty law. Such a risk is assu­med when the pro­ba­bi­li­ty of harm to a woman or her child, in rela­ti­on to the expec­ted seve­ri­ty of the dama­ge, is not accep­ta­ble. It is, the­r­e­fo­re, neces­sa­ry to balan­ce pro­ba­bi­li­ty and impen­ding harm, so that in cases of par­ti­cu­lar­ly seve­re impen­ding harm, the requi­re­ments for the likeli­hood of such harm are signi­fi­cant­ly redu­ced.

For exam­p­le, if the­re is a risk of poi­so­ning the unborn child due to hazar­dous sub­s­tances at a work­place, given the serious­ness of the poten­ti­al harm (death of the child), the requi­re­ments for the likeli­hood of such poi­so­ning in this case would not be very high.

The employ­er must take the fol­lo­wing mea­su­res in par­ti­cu­lar to pro­tect the health of pregnant or nur­sing women in the work­place:

  • The employ­er must first con­duct a so-cal­led risk assess­ment for each work­place in his com­pa­ny, in which he asses­ses whe­ther the work­place poses a risk to a pregnant or nur­sing woman or her child. This obli­ga­ti­on exists regard­less of whe­ther a pregnant or nur­sing woman is employ­ed.
  • Sub­se­quent­ly, based on the assess­ment, it must be deter­mi­ned whe­ther pro­tec­ti­ve mea­su­res are neces­sa­ry for a pregnant or nur­sing woman, what spe­ci­fic pro­tec­ti­ve mea­su­res may need to be taken, or whe­ther the woman in ques­ti­on, in excep­tio­nal cases, can­not work at the work­place.
  • As soon as a woman has infor­med the employ­er that she is pregnant or nur­sing, the employ­er must prompt­ly estab­lish the neces­sa­ry pro­tec­ti­ve mea­su­res based on their risk assess­ment. Fur­ther­mo­re, he must offer the woman a dis­cus­sion about fur­ther adjus­t­ments and review the effec­ti­ve­ness of the pro­tec­ti­ve mea­su­res.

If it is a work­place whe­re the eli­mi­na­ti­on of an irre­spon­si­ble risk is not pos­si­ble or would requi­re a dis­pro­por­tio­na­te effort for the employ­er, the employ­er can trans­fer the pregnant or nur­sing woman to ano­ther sui­ta­ble work­place within his com­pa­ny, if this is reasonable for the woman.

If no other sui­ta­ble work­place is available, and all pos­si­bi­li­ties to avo­id an irre­spon­si­ble risk have been exhaus­ted, in excep­tio­nal cases, a so-cal­led com­pa­ny employ­ment ban can be impo­sed as a last resort.

It is essen­ti­al that the­se steps are taken befo­re a pregnant or nur­sing woman is (fur­ther) employ­ed at the respec­ti­ve work­place. Mate­r­ni­ty pro­tec­tion-com­pli­ant working con­di­ti­ons also include the woman having the oppor­tu­ni­ty to brief­ly inter­rupt her work and to lie down, sit, and rest during the­se inter­rup­ti­ons, as well as during her regu­lar breaks.

The MuSchG lists a ran­ge of acti­vi­ties and working con­di­ti­ons that pose an irre­spon­si­ble risk to pregnant women. This is assu­med when the pregnant woman could be expo­sed to the sub­s­tances descri­bed in the law, as spe­ci­fied in § 11 MuSchG:

  • Hazar­dous sub­s­tances,
  • Bio­lo­gi­cal agents,
  • Phy­si­cal impacts,
  • Stressful working envi­ron­ment, or
  • Phy­si­cal strains or mecha­ni­cal impacts

Simi­lar pro­vi­si­ons can be found for nur­sing women in the MuSchG (§ 12).

11.3.7 Other Employ­ment Pro­hi­bi­ti­ons

In addi­ti­on to the pre­vious­ly men­tio­ned com­pa­ny-spe­ci­fic employ­ment ban, the­re are also expli­cit­ly named sta­tu­to­ry employ­ment pro­hi­bi­ti­ons con­cer­ning working con­di­ti­ons:

For ins­tance, a pregnant or nur­sing woman should not be requi­red to do pie­ce­work or other work whe­re she would earn more by incre­asing her work pace. The same appli­es to assem­bly line work or timed work with a pre­scri­bed work pace when the natu­re of the work or the work pace poses an irre­spon­si­ble risk to the pregnant or nur­sing woman or her child. Pie­ce­work or assem­bly line work is only pos­si­ble with the issu­an­ce of an excep­tio­nal per­mit by the super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ty.

Moreo­ver, a pregnant or nur­sing woman is not allo­wed to enga­ge in over­ti­me, night, or Sun­day work. Howe­ver, excep­ti­ons to the­se employ­ment pro­hi­bi­ti­ons can be made, with the con­sent of the woman, and are regu­la­ted in §§ 3 ff. of the Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act (MuSchG).

11.3.8 Medi­cal Employ­ment Ban

 Fur­ther­mo­re, a medi­cal employ­ment ban can also be issued befo­re the start of the legal­ly pre­scri­bed pro­tec­tion peri­od (six weeks befo­re child­birth).

For this, a medi­cal cer­ti­fi­ca­te must attest that the health of the pregnant woman or her child is end­an­ge­red if employ­ment con­ti­nues. This can per­tain to spe­ci­fic tasks or app­ly gene­ral­ly.

A medi­cal cer­ti­fi­ca­te must always be pre­sen­ted. Wages must be paid until the end of the employ­ment ban. Regard­less of the num­ber of employees, com­pa­nies can demand full reim­bur­se­ment of the absen­ces of the mate­r­ni­ty pro­tec­tion-eli­gi­ble woman due to an employ­ment ban out­side the pro­tec­tion peri­ods from the woman’s health insu­rance.

11.3.9 Spe­cial Pro­tec­tion Against Ter­mi­na­ti­on

Sec­tion 17 of the Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act (MuSchG) regu­la­tes spe­cial pro­tec­tion against ter­mi­na­ti­on for pregnant or nur­sing women. From the start of pregnan­cy to four months after child­birth, a gene­ral pro­hi­bi­ti­on on ter­mi­na­ti­on exists. A ter­mi­na­ti­on recei­ved during this peri­od is inva­lid, irre­spec­ti­ve of the inten­ded ter­mi­na­ti­on date. This appli­es even if the employ­er was una­wa­re of the pregnan­cy at the time of the ter­mi­na­ti­on but is infor­med about it within two weeks of recei­ving the ter­mi­na­ti­on noti­ce.

Only in excep­tio­nal cases can the Indus­tri­al Safe­ty Office allow the ter­mi­na­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship during pregnan­cy. The con­di­ti­on for this is that the­re is a cir­cum­s­tance inde­pen­dent of the pregnan­cy that makes the con­ti­nua­tion of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship unre­asonable for the employ­er. Such a cir­cum­s­tance may exist if the employee is ter­mi­na­ted for beha­vi­oral reasons due to seve­re mis­con­duct or cri­mi­nal actions against the employ­er.

Other grounds for ter­mi­na­ti­on, such as fixed-term con­tracts, ter­mi­na­ti­on agree­ments, or self-ter­mi­na­ti­on by the employee, are also pos­si­ble during pregnan­cy and nur­sing.

11.3.10 Finan­cial Bene­fits

 Mate­r­ni­ty bene­fit is desi­gned to par­ti­al­ly off­set the inco­me loss during pregnan­cy and imme­dia­te­ly after child­birth. The bene­fit is paid for a maxi­mum of 14 weeks (6 weeks befo­re and 8 weeks after child­birth). In the case of mul­ti­ple births, the bene­fit is paid for a maxi­mum of 16 weeks.

Mate­r­ni­ty bene­fit is pro­vi­ded by the health insu­rance com­pa­ny. To recei­ve the bene­fit, the woman must app­ly to the health insu­rance com­pa­ny.

The amount of the bene­fit is based on the net inco­me for the last three calen­dar months. Mate­r­ni­ty bene­fit is a maxi­mum of 13 euros for each calen­dar day. If the avera­ge dai­ly net inco­me exceeds 13 euros, the employ­er is obli­ga­ted to pay the dif­fe­rence as a sub­s­idy to the mate­r­ni­ty bene­fit.

For this sub­s­idy, the employ­er can app­ly for 100% reim­bur­se­ment from the health insu­rance com­pa­ny under the pro­vi­si­ons of the Cost Com­pen­sa­ti­on Act from the so-cal­led U2 levy, paid by all com­pa­nies for each employee.

11.4 Disa­bi­li­ty Law

11.4.1 Intro­duc­tion

The Basic Law (GG) of the Fede­ral Repu­blic of Ger­ma­ny grants dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als the right to self-deter­mi­ned and com­pre­hen­si­ve par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on and equa­li­ty in all are­as of socie­ty. The pro­hi­bi­ti­on of dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on in favor of dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als is con­tai­ned in Artic­le 3 of the Basic Law.

This pro­vi­si­on is based on the prin­ci­ple of equal tre­at­ment and the pro­hi­bi­ti­on of dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on. It is meant to ensu­re that dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als are not dis­ad­van­ta­ged com­pared to others.

The Basic Law gua­ran­tees that dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als are not trea­ted worse than other peo­p­le and that they have the same rights and oppor­tu­ni­ties as ever­yo­ne else. This includes the right to par­ti­ci­pa­te in all are­as of public life, to have access to edu­ca­ti­on and employ­ment, and to recei­ve the neces­sa­ry sup­port to ful­ly par­ti­ci­pa­te in socie­ty.

11.4.2 Inno­va­tions Intro­du­ced by the Fede­ral Par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on Law (BTHG)

On Decem­ber 16, 2016, the Bun­des­tag, with the appr­oval of the Bun­des­rat, pas­sed the Fede­ral Par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on Law (BTHG), which aims to streng­then the par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on and self-deter­mi­na­ti­on of peo­p­le with disa­bi­li­ties.

The BTHG is the most signi­fi­cant reform of the Social Code IX (SGB IX) to date. It seeks to impro­ve the living situa­ti­on of peo­p­le with disa­bi­li­ties by pro­mo­ting more self-deter­mi­na­ti­on and increased par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on.

The law came into force at the end of 2016 and is being imple­men­ted gra­du­al­ly in four stages, with most of the chan­ges having alre­a­dy come into effect in 2017, 2018, and 2020.

Ulti­m­ate­ly, the reform will lead to a revi­sed SGB IX with new con­tent and a new struc­tu­re.

11.4.3 The Four Stages of Reform in the BTHG

The Fede­ral Par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on Law (BTHG) is divi­ded into four stages, with the first three alre­a­dy in effect.

The pha­sed imple­men­ta­ti­on is desi­gned to ease the tran­si­ti­on into prac­ti­ce, as the chan­ges are quite exten­si­ve. The full imple­men­ta­ti­on of the law will be com­ple­ted by 2023.

The first stage of reform came into effect on Janu­ary 1, 2017, and includes chan­ges to disa­bi­li­ty law and impro­ve­ments in inco­me and asset con­side­ra­ti­on.

On Janu­ary 1, 2018, Parts 1 and 3 of the new SGB IX were intro­du­ced. The­se include pro­ce­du­ral law (Part 1) and disa­bi­li­ty law (Part 3).

In 2020, a sepa­ra­ti­on bet­ween inte­gra­ti­on assis­tance and sub­sis­tence bene­fits was intro­du­ced. The law on inte­gra­ti­on assis­tance beca­me Part 2 of the new SGB IX and was com­ple­te­ly remo­ved from SGB XII (Social Assis­tance).

The fourth and final stage of the BTHG is expec­ted to come into effect on Janu­ary 1, 2023, and will rede­fi­ne the group of peo­p­le eli­gi­ble for inte­gra­ti­on assis­tance.

The social reform intro­du­ced by the BTHG is a signi­fi­cant step toward impro­ving the living situa­ti­on of peo­p­le with seve­re disa­bi­li­ties in Ger­ma­ny.

The web­site https://umsetzungsbegleitung-bthg.de pro­vi­des infor­ma­ti­on on the pro­gress of the Fede­ral Par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on Law’s imple­men­ta­ti­on. In addi­ti­on to ans­wers to cur­rent ques­ti­ons, the site offers infor­ma­ti­on on the imple­men­ta­ti­on sta­tus in indi­vi­du­al fede­ral sta­tes and reviews of events rela­ted to the BTHG.

The pro­ject is fun­ded by the Fede­ral Minis­try of Labor and Social Affairs and is likely to remain a valuable source of infor­ma­ti­on on this topic in the future.

11.4.4 Who Falls Under the Pro­tec­ted Group?

Indi­vi­du­als with seve­re disa­bi­li­ties and tho­se dee­med equi­va­lent are gran­ted spe­cial pro­tec­tion under labor law. This is regu­la­ted in §§ 151 ff. of the Social Code IX (SGB IX). Sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als are tho­se with a degree of disa­bi­li­ty (GdB) of at least 50. The deter­mi­na­ti­on of seve­re disa­bi­li­ty is made by the inde­pen­dent cities and muni­ci­pa­li­ties, which are also respon­si­ble for issuing the seve­re disa­bi­li­ty ID.

The offi­ci­al deter­mi­na­ti­on of disa­bi­li­ty is important for indi­vi­du­als who need to pro­ve their seve­re disa­bi­li­ty sta­tus, as this pro­of can typi­cal­ly only be pro­vi­ded through the deter­mi­na­ti­on noti­ce or the seve­re disa­bi­li­ty ID. The Fede­ral Employ­ment Agen­cy can grant equi­va­len­cy sta­tus to indi­vi­du­als with a GdB of at least 30 but less than 50 upon request, desi­gna­ting them as sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als.

The con­di­ti­on for such equi­va­len­cy is that the affec­ted per­son, due to their disa­bi­li­ty, can­not obtain or retain a sui­ta­ble job wit­hout the equi­va­len­cy sta­tus. The decis­i­on is at the dis­cre­ti­on of the Fede­ral Employ­ment Agen­cy. With the excep­ti­on of addi­tio­nal lea­ve, tho­se gran­ted equi­va­len­cy sta­tus are trea­ted the same as the sever­ely dis­ab­led under labor law.

It should be noted that young peo­p­le with disa­bi­li­ties during their voca­tio­nal trai­ning or care­er ori­en­ta­ti­on are legal­ly con­side­red equi­va­lent to sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als, even if their degree of disa­bi­li­ty is less than 30 or not deter­mi­ned at all. This is demons­tra­ted through a cer­ti­fi­ca­te from the Fede­ral Employ­ment Agen­cy. While the spe­cial pro­tec­ti­ve pro­vi­si­ons for sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als do not app­ly to this group, employ­ers can still recei­ve bene­fits for them.

11.4.5 SGB IX: When is The­re an Obli­ga­ti­on to Employ?

The num­ber of sever­ely dis­ab­led peo­p­le that a com­pa­ny must employ depends on the size of the com­pa­ny. A com­pa­ny with at least 20 but fewer than 40 employees must employ one sever­ely dis­ab­led per­son. Com­pa­nies with 40 to fewer than 60 employees must employ two sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als, and lar­ger com­pa­nies must fill at least 5% of their jobs with sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als (§ 154 SGB IX).

Mul­ti­ple estab­lish­ments of the same employ­er are con­side­red a sin­gle unit in this con­text. Trai­ning posi­ti­ons are not coun­ted as jobs. In cases of frac­tion­al posi­ti­ons when cal­cu­la­ting the requi­red posi­ti­ons, for com­pa­nies with fewer than 60 employees on an annu­al avera­ge, roun­ding to 0.5 or more is appli­ed (§ 157 Abs. 2 SGB IX). The obli­ga­ti­on quo­ta appli­es even when, due to the company’s struc­tu­re, dis­ab­led peo­p­le can­not be employ­ed. For dis­ab­led peo­p­le in trai­ning, at the dis­cre­ti­on of the Fede­ral Employ­ment Agen­cy, two to a maxi­mum of three man­da­to­ry posi­ti­ons are con­side­red.

11.4.6 How Much Is the Com­pen­sa­ti­on Pay­ment?

Employ­ers are obli­ga­ted to fill vacant posi­ti­ons with sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als accor­ding to the prin­ci­ples men­tio­ned abo­ve. Fai­ling to do so results in a com­pen­sa­ti­on pay­ment. The amount of the com­pen­sa­ti­on pay­ment varies depen­ding on the size of the com­pa­ny and is regu­la­ted by § 160 SGB IX.

For each unfil­led man­da­to­ry posi­ti­on, the employ­er must make a month­ly com­pen­sa­ti­on pay­ment ran­ging from €140.00 to €360.00. The spe­ci­fic com­pen­sa­ti­on pay­ment amount is cal­cu­la­ted based on the annu­al avera­ge employ­ment rate of sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als for com­pa­nies with 60 or more employees:

  • Employ­ers with an annu­al avera­ge of fewer than 40 employees must pay a com­pen­sa­ti­on pay­ment of €140.00. This appli­es only if, on avera­ge, they employ fewer than one sever­ely dis­ab­led per­son.
  • Employ­ers must cal­cu­la­te the com­pen­sa­ti­on pay­ment them­sel­ves and remit it annu­al­ly, no later than March 31 of the fol­lo­wing year, to the inte­gra­ti­on office respon­si­ble for their estab­lish­ment. Also, by March 31 of the fol­lo­wing year, employ­ers must report to the Fede­ral Employ­ment Agen­cy, which is respon­si­ble for their loca­ti­on, the num­ber of posi­ti­ons fil­led in the pre­vious year and the num­ber of sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als employ­ed. Late pay­ments are typi­cal­ly pena­li­zed with default inte­rest.

11.4.7 What Does the Duty of Care Ent­ail?

Within the frame­work of what is reasonable for the company’s ope­ra­ti­ons and eco­no­mic via­bi­li­ty, the employ­er is obli­ged to set up the busi­ness in a way that allows the employ­ment of as many sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als as pos­si­ble. This can also lead to claims by the employees. The­r­e­fo­re, the employ­er is obli­ga­ted to estab­lish a work­place sui­ta­ble for dis­ab­led employees and pro­vi­de them with the neces­sa­ry tech­ni­cal aids; sub­si­dies can be appli­ed for from the inte­gra­ti­on office.

11.4.8 Do Sever­ely Dis­ab­led Peo­p­le Get Extra Lea­ve?

Sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als are entit­led to five paid addi­tio­nal lea­ve days in the vaca­ti­on year accor­ding to § 208 Abs. 1 SGB IX. If a part-time sever­ely dis­ab­led employee is entit­led to only a por­ti­on of the basic lea­ve during the vaca­ti­on year, the addi­tio­nal lea­ve is gran­ted pro­por­tio­nal­ly. If the sta­tus of seve­re disa­bi­li­ty does not exist throug­hout the enti­re calen­dar year, a pro­por­tio­nal entit­le­ment to addi­tio­nal lea­ve exists (one twelfth for each full month of seve­re disa­bi­li­ty sta­tus; frac­tions of lea­ve days that amount to at least half a day are roun­ded up).

In cases whe­re coll­ec­ti­ve, com­pa­ny, or other vaca­ti­on regu­la­ti­ons pro­vi­de for a lon­ger addi­tio­nal lea­ve for sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als, the­se regu­la­ti­ons take pre­ce­dence. Equi­va­lent per­sons are not entit­led to sta­tu­to­ry addi­tio­nal lea­ve.

11.4.9 Spe­cial Job Pro­tec­tion

n Ger­ma­ny, sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als are pro­vi­ded with spe­cial job pro­tec­tion under §§ 168 ff. SGB IX. This law takes pre­ce­dence over gene­ral job pro­tec­tion regu­la­ti­ons and aims to pro­vi­de extra pro­tec­tion for peo­p­le with seve­re disa­bi­li­ties.

The­r­e­fo­re, the employ­ment of a sever­ely dis­ab­led per­son can only be ter­mi­na­ted if the Inte­gra­ti­on Office has given its appr­oval. The employ­er must app­ly for appr­oval in wri­ting (in dupli­ca­te) with the Inte­gra­ti­on Office respon­si­ble for the company’s loca­ti­on. The appli­ca­ti­on must be tho­rough­ly jus­ti­fied and must include an expl­ana­ti­on of the reasons for ter­mi­na­ti­on and sup­port­ing evi­dence. The Inte­gra­ti­on Office must make its decis­i­on within two weeks of recei­ving the appli­ca­ti­on. If the aut­ho­ri­ty does not meet this dead­line, the appr­oval is con­side­red gran­ted.

Befo­re making a decis­i­on, the Inte­gra­ti­on Office con­sults the works coun­cil and hears from the sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­al. The workplace’s dis­ab­led employee repre­sen­ta­ti­on must be invol­ved; other­wi­se, the ter­mi­na­ti­on is inva­lid.

Even with a regu­lar ter­mi­na­ti­on, the employ­er must adhe­re to a noti­ce peri­od of at least four weeks. Lon­ger legal, coll­ec­ti­ve, or indi­vi­du­al con­tract noti­ce peri­ods remain unaf­fec­ted.

If a com­pa­ny is facing clo­sure or dis­so­lu­ti­on or if an insol­ven­cy pro­ce­du­re has been initia­ted, appr­oval from the Inte­gra­ti­on Office must be sought within one month.

The spe­cial job pro­tec­tion for sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als does not app­ly if the employee’s sta­tus of seve­re disa­bi­li­ty had not been estab­lished at the time of the ter­mi­na­ti­on and the employee had not filed an appro­pria­te request. The pro­tec­tion also does not app­ly during the first six months of employ­ment. Howe­ver, accor­ding to a decis­i­on by the Euro­pean Court of Jus­ti­ce (Judgment of 10.02.2022; Case C 485/20), the­re might be an obli­ga­ti­on to con­sider whe­ther alter­na­ti­ve employ­ment oppor­tu­ni­ties are pos­si­ble even after reasonable retrai­ning or fur­ther edu­ca­ti­on, even if they might be under worse con­di­ti­ons (res­truc­tu­ring befo­re the noti­ce peri­od), or if the employee’s tem­po­ra­ry absence can be bridged by other mea­su­res, such as hiring tem­po­ra­ry staff. It remains to be seen how the judgment of the Euro­pean Court of Jus­ti­ce will be imple­men­ted by Ger­man labor courts.

11.4.10 Regu­la­ti­ons Regar­ding Working Hours

Accor­ding to § 207 SGB IX, sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als can be exempt­ed from addi­tio­nal work at their request. The same appli­es to indi­vi­du­als who are equi­va­lent to sever­ely dis­ab­led per­sons, § 151 Abs. 1 and 3 SGB IX.

Howe­ver, over­ti­me in the con­text of this pro­vi­si­on only refers to work excee­ding 8 hours per day. If the indi­vi­du­al working hours of a sever­ely dis­ab­led employee are less, over­ti­me can be assi­gned up to the 8‑hour limit.

11.4.11 The Employer’s Right to Inqui­re During Hiring

When fil­ling posi­ti­ons, employ­ers must assess whe­ther dis­ab­led peo­p­le can be employ­ed.

Inqui­ring about exis­ting seve­re disa­bi­li­ty is gene­ral­ly pro­hi­bi­ted. The­r­e­fo­re, an appli­cant is no lon­ger requi­red to truthful­ly ans­wer ques­ti­ons regar­ding seve­re disa­bi­li­ty. They may remain silent or exer­cise their “right to lie” lawful­ly. If the employ­er none­thel­ess asks the ques­ti­on and recei­ves an untrue ans­wer from the appli­cant, they can­not void the employ­ment con­tract accor­ding to § 123 BGB due to frau­du­lent decep­ti­on.

Dif­fe­rent tre­at­ment (and thus the right to inqui­re) of dis­ab­led appli­cants com­pared to non-dis­ab­led appli­cants is only accep­ta­ble when dif­fe­ren­tia­ti­on is per­mis­si­ble due to the spe­ci­fic requi­re­ments of the par­ti­cu­lar job.

This is the case, for exam­p­le, when ques­ti­ons are asked regar­ding disa­bi­li­ties that spe­ci­fi­cal­ly affect the company’s work­flow or result in the appli­cant not being able to per­form the desi­gna­ted job tasks ful­ly or only with limi­ta­ti­ons.

If a sever­ely dis­ab­led per­son appli­es for a posi­ti­on in the com­pa­ny, the employ­er is obli­ga­ted to dis­cuss this appli­ca­ti­on with the dis­ab­led employee repre­sen­ta­ti­on and for­ward it to the works coun­cil along with the dis­ab­led employee representation’s state­ment.

11.4.12 The Dis­ab­led Employee Repre­sen­ta­ti­on

In com­pa­nies whe­re five or more sever­ely dis­ab­led peo­p­le are employ­ed on a non-tem­po­ra­ry basis, a repre­sen­ta­ti­ve and a depu­ty are elec­ted by the sever­ely dis­ab­led employees every four years, as spe­ci­fied in § 177 Abs. 1 SGB IX.

In all mat­ters affec­ting an indi­vi­du­al sever­ely dis­ab­led per­son or sever­ely dis­ab­led peo­p­le as a group, the dis­ab­led employee repre­sen­ta­ti­on, as sta­ted in § 178 Abs. 2 SGB IX, must be infor­med in a time­ly and com­pre­hen­si­ve man­ner and heard befo­re a decis­i­on is made.

It is par­ti­cu­lar­ly important to note that a ter­mi­na­ti­on of a sever­ely dis­ab­led per­son by the employ­er wit­hout such par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on is void, accor­ding to § 178 Abs. 2 SGB IX.

The dis­ab­led employee repre­sen­ta­ti­on can attend all works coun­cil mee­tings in an advi­so­ry capa­ci­ty. The legal sta­tus of the repre­sen­ta­ti­ve is equi­va­lent to that of a works coun­cil mem­ber; they are to be gran­ted lea­ve from work to per­form their duties and enjoy abso­lu­te pro­tec­tion from regu­lar ter­mi­na­ti­on. The dis­ab­led employee repre­sen­ta­ti­on has the right to access job appli­ca­ti­on mate­ri­als and par­ti­ci­pa­te in job inter­views.

The inte­gra­ti­on of sever­ely dis­ab­led peo­p­le is an important task for every employ­er. To ensu­re the equal par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on of sever­ely dis­ab­led peo­p­le in the work­force, the employ­er and the dis­ab­led employee repre­sen­ta­ti­on enter into an inclu­si­on agree­ment.

11.4.13 What Is an Inclu­si­on Agree­ment?

The inclu­si­on agree­ment is an instru­ment aimed at fur­ther sup­port­ing the par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on of sever­ely dis­ab­led peo­p­le in the work­force by stee­ring the inte­gra­ti­on efforts within a com­pa­ny through goal agree­ments. The­se agree­ments should be made at the com­pa­ny level and should be effec­ti­ve in signi­fi­cant­ly impro­ving the employ­ment situa­ti­on.

An inclu­si­on agree­ment is a con­tract made bet­ween the lea­ding repre­sen­ta­ti­ve of dis­ab­led employees, in coope­ra­ti­on with the works coun­cil, the employ­er, and the employer’s inclu­si­on repre­sen­ta­ti­ve. The goal of this agree­ment is to faci­li­ta­te the par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on of sever­ely dis­ab­led peo­p­le in the work­force, impro­ve their employ­ment situa­ti­on, and for­mu­la­te and imple­ment spe­ci­fic goals for work­place inte­gra­ti­on.

This can include pro­vi­si­ons regar­ding per­son­nel plan­ning, work­place design, the work envi­ron­ment, working hours, and work orga­niza­ti­on, among others.

§ 166 of the Social Code IX (SGB IX) obli­ges all pri­va­te and public employ­ers to enter into a bin­ding inclu­si­on agree­ment with the repre­sen­ta­ti­ve of dis­ab­led employees, the works coun­cil, or staff coun­cil, and in coope­ra­ti­on with the employer’s inclu­si­on repre­sen­ta­ti­ve (§ 166 SGB IX).

11.4.14 Employer’s Inclu­si­on Repre­sen­ta­ti­ve

The employ­er appoints an inclu­si­on repre­sen­ta­ti­ve, who repres­ents the employ­er in mat­ters con­cer­ning sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als. It is pre­fera­ble for the inclu­si­on repre­sen­ta­ti­ve to be a sever­ely dis­ab­led per­son them­sel­ves.

The duties of the inclu­si­on repre­sen­ta­ti­ve include pro­mo­ting the inte­gra­ti­on of sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als into the com­pa­ny and ensu­ring the pro­tec­tion of their rights. The inclu­si­on repre­sen­ta­ti­ve also repres­ents the employ­er to aut­ho­ri­ties and other orga­niza­ti­ons that pro­vi­de ser­vices for sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als.

11.4.15 Obli­ga­ti­ons of the Employ­er Towards Aut­ho­ri­ties

Employ­ers in Ger­ma­ny are legal­ly requi­red, accor­ding to § 163 Abs. 1 in con­nec­tion with Abs. 6 SGB IX, to main­tain a sepa­ra­te list of sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als employ­ed in each com­pa­ny and depart­ment. This list must be pro­vi­ded to the Fede­ral Employ­ment Agen­cy or the Inte­gra­ti­on Office upon request. If no posi­ti­ons are offe­red for sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als, the data must only be repor­ted to the Fede­ral Employ­ment Agen­cy upon request.

This pro­vi­si­on ensu­res that indi­vi­du­als with seve­re disa­bi­li­ties have equal access to employ­ment oppor­tu­ni­ties. It also allows the govern­ment to moni­tor com­pli­ance with the law and sup­port employ­ers who are stri­ving to employ sever­ely dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als.

11.4.16 Penal­ty Pro­vi­si­ons

An employ­er can be fined up to 10,000 euros under § 238 SGB IX if they inten­tio­nal­ly or negli­gent­ly vio­la­te cer­tain obli­ga­ti­ons out­lined in the SGB IX. The­se penal­ty pro­vi­si­ons pri­ma­ri­ly rela­te to sta­tu­to­ry report­ing requi­re­ments and the obli­ga­ti­on to invol­ve the repre­sen­ta­ti­ve of dis­ab­led employees.

11.5 Gene­ral and Spe­ci­fic Ter­mi­na­ti­on Pro­tec­tion

Ter­mi­na­ti­on pro­tec­tion in Ger­man labor law makes it more dif­fi­cult for employ­ers to ter­mi­na­te employ­ment con­tracts. The­re are two main types of ter­mi­na­ti­on pro­tec­tion: gene­ral and spe­ci­fic.

11.5.1 Gene­ral Ter­mi­na­ti­on Pro­tec­tion

Gene­ral ter­mi­na­ti­on pro­tec­tion invol­ves spe­ci­fic legal regu­la­ti­ons that only per­mit cer­tain grounds for ter­mi­na­ti­on. Accor­ding to § 1(2) sen­tence 2 of the Pro­tec­tion Against Unfair Dis­mis­sal Act (Kün­di­gungs­schutz­ge­setz or KSchG), only per­so­nal, beha­vi­oral, or ope­ra­tio­nal reasons can jus­ti­fy a dis­mis­sal. Any other reason for ter­mi­na­ti­on leads to the inva­li­di­ty of the dis­mis­sal within the scope of the Pro­tec­tion Against Unfair Dis­mis­sal Act.

Fur­ther­mo­re, for ope­ra­tio­nal dis­mis­sals, a spe­cial sel­ec­tion pro­cess has been defi­ned, requi­ring the employ­er to sel­ect among seve­ral employees who may be ter­mi­na­ted for ope­ra­tio­nal reasons, tho­se who will be least affec­ted by the dis­mis­sal based on their social situa­ti­on (known as the social sel­ec­tion). The cri­te­ria for sel­ec­tion set by the legis­la­tu­re include the length of ser­vice, age, main­ten­an­ce obli­ga­ti­ons, and the degree of disa­bi­li­ty of the employees, as per § 1(3) of the KSchG.

Addi­tio­nal­ly, dif­fe­rent legal requi­re­ments have been deve­lo­ped by the courts depen­ding on the type of ter­mi­na­ti­on. For dis­mis­sals due to employee mis­con­duct – whe­ther regu­lar or imme­dia­te – it is gene­ral­ly requi­red that the employee has recei­ved a pri­or writ­ten war­ning for simi­lar con­tract-vio­la­ting beha­vi­or. The Fede­ral Labor Court assu­mes that a beha­vi­oral dis­mis­sal is not a sanc­tion by the employ­er but rather a means of pro­tec­ting against fur­ther mis­con­duct. Whe­ther fur­ther mis­con­duct is expec­ted can only be deter­mi­ned if the employee, despi­te a pre­vious war­ning, enga­ges in such beha­vi­or once again. For per­so­nal-rela­ted ter­mi­na­ti­ons, espe­ci­al­ly tho­se due to ill­ness, the employ­er is gene­ral­ly requi­red to demons­tra­te signi­fi­cant peri­ods of absence due to the same ill­ness and pro­vi­de a reasonable and sub­stan­tia­ted pro­gno­sis of the future cour­se of ill­ness.

For ope­ra­tio­nal dis­mis­sals, the employ­er must pre­sent a com­pre­hen­si­ble busi­ness decis­i­on lea­ding to job reduc­tions. Howe­ver, the courts only review the exis­tence of this decis­i­on, not its sen­si­bi­li­ty. Bes­i­des the ter­mi­na­ti­on pro­tec­tion stem­ming from the KSchG, the­re are other gene­ral regu­la­ti­ons that exclude cer­tain ter­mi­na­ti­ons. For ins­tance, the­re is a “pro­hi­bi­ti­on of dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on” under § 612a of the Civil Code (BGB), which ren­ders a dis­mis­sal inva­lid if it is based on the employee’s legi­ti­ma­te inte­rests, such as uni­on acti­vi­ties within the com­pa­ny. A spe­cial regu­la­ti­on in this con­text is the pro­hi­bi­ti­on of ter­mi­na­ti­on due to a busi­ness trans­fer or a trans­fer of part of a busi­ness under § 613a (4) BGB, which is simi­lar to the legal prin­ci­ple in rent law that “sale does not break the lea­se” (§ 566 BGB).

Last­ly, the­re are sta­tu­to­ry regu­la­ti­ons that indi­rect­ly con­tri­bu­te to ter­mi­na­ti­on pro­tec­tion, such as the writ­ten form requi­re­ment for ter­mi­na­ti­ons under § 623 BGB, the limi­ta­ti­on peri­od of two weeks after beco­ming awa­re of the ter­mi­na­ti­on grounds for imme­dia­te dis­mis­sal as sta­ted in § 626 (2) BGB, and the requi­re­ment for works coun­cil invol­vement, the dis­re­gard of which would ren­der a dis­mis­sal inva­lid under § 102(1) of the Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act (BetrVG).

As (ter­mi­na­ti­on) pro­tec­tion pro­vi­si­ons in favor of the employ­er, we can con­sider judge-made claims for dama­ges upon ter­mi­na­ti­on by the employee befo­re the noti­ce peri­od expi­res, or the requi­re­ment of a pri­or war­ning in the case of an imme­dia­te ter­mi­na­ti­on by the employee (for exam­p­le, due to non-pay­ment of wages). Howe­ver, the­se claims pri­ma­ri­ly fol­low gene­ral prin­ci­ples of con­tract law and are less aimed at the gene­ral pro­tec­tion of the employ­er from unju­s­ti­fied ter­mi­na­ti­ons by employees.

11.5.2 Spe­ci­fic Ter­mi­na­ti­on Pro­tec­tion

In addi­ti­on to gene­ral ter­mi­na­ti­on pro­tec­tion, the legis­la­tor has excluded or made ter­mi­na­ti­ons more dif­fi­cult for cer­tain groups of indi­vi­du­als who are con­side­red par­ti­cu­lar­ly vul­nerable. The fol­lo­wing regu­la­ti­ons, among others, can be men­tio­ned:

Indi­vi­du­als in Spe­cial Situa­tions:

  • Pro­hi­bi­ti­on of ter­mi­na­ting pregnant women until four months after child­birth, as per § 9 of the Mate­r­ni­ty Pro­tec­tion Act (Mut­ter­schutz­ge­setzMuSchG).
  • Ter­mi­na­ti­on of sever­ely dis­ab­led employees only with the appr­oval of the Inte­gra­ti­on Office, accor­ding to § 85 of the Social Code IX (Sozi­al­ge­setz­buch IX — SGB IX).
  • Pro­hi­bi­ti­on of ordi­na­ry ter­mi­na­ti­on of trai­nees after the pro­ba­tio­na­ry peri­od, as per § 22 of the Voca­tio­nal Trai­ning Act (Berufs­bil­dungs­ge­setzBBiG).
  • Pro­hi­bi­ti­on of ordi­na­ry ter­mi­na­ti­on during paren­tal lea­ve, as per § 18 of the Fede­ral Paren­tal Allo­wan­ce and Paren­tal Lea­ve Act (Bun­des­el­tern­geld- und Eltern­zeit­ge­setzBEEG), as well as during care lea­ve, as per § 5 of the Care Lea­ve Act (Pfle­ge­zeit­ge­setz).

Indi­vi­du­als in Spe­cial Func­tions:

  • Pro­hi­bi­ti­on of ordi­na­ry ter­mi­na­ti­on of works coun­cil mem­bers and can­di­da­tes, as per § 15 of the Pro­tec­tion Against Unfair Dis­mis­sal Act (Kün­di­gungs­schutz­ge­setzKSchG).
  • Extra­or­di­na­ry ter­mi­na­ti­on of works coun­cil mem­bers only with the con­sent of the works coun­cil, as per § 103 of the Works Con­sti­tu­ti­on Act (Betriebs­ver­fas­sungs­ge­setzBetrVG).
  • Pro­hi­bi­ti­on of ordi­na­ry ter­mi­na­ti­on of staff coun­cil mem­bers, elec­tion board mem­bers, and can­di­da­tes for the­se posi­ti­ons (respec­ti­ve sta­te per­son­nel repre­sen­ta­ti­on laws).
  • Pro­hi­bi­ti­on of ordi­na­ry ter­mi­na­ti­on of mem­bers of youth and app­ren­ti­ce repre­sen­ta­ti­on coun­cils (accor­ding to works con­sti­tu­ti­on or per­son­nel repre­sen­ta­ti­on law).
  • Pro­hi­bi­ti­on of ordi­na­ry ter­mi­na­ti­on of sever­ely dis­ab­led repre­sen­ta­ti­ves, as per § 96 of the Social Code IX.
  • Pro­hi­bi­ti­on of ordi­na­ry ter­mi­na­ti­on of data pro­tec­tion offi­cers, as per § 4f(3) of the Fede­ral Data Pro­tec­tion Act (Bun­des­da­ten­schutz­ge­setzBDSG).

11.6 The Fede­ral Holi­day Act (Bun­des­ur­laubs­ge­setz)

Vaca­ti­on is paid time off inten­ded for rest and rela­xa­ti­on. The Fede­ral Holi­day Act (Bun­des­ur­laubs­ge­setzBUrlG) regu­la­tes not only the dura­ti­on of the vaca­ti­on but also its car­ry­o­ver to the fol­lo­wing year and vaca­ti­on pay upon ter­mi­na­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship. The bene­fi­ci­a­ries of the law include “employees,” which encom­pas­ses app­ren­ti­ces and even per­sons who are simi­lar to employees, mea­ning indi­vi­du­als who are self-employ­ed but, due to their eco­no­mic depen­dence on their prin­ci­pal, should have paid vaca­ti­on just like regu­lar employees. The Fede­ral Holi­day Act expli­cit­ly grants vaca­ti­on rights to a par­ti­cu­lar group of the­se employee-like indi­vi­du­als, home-based workers (Heim­ar­bei­ter), as per § 12 of the BUrlG.

The Fede­ral Holi­day Act man­da­tes a mini­mum paid vaca­ti­on of 24 working days per year for each employee. “Working days” are the six days from Mon­day to Satur­day. The­r­e­fo­re, every employee, regard­less of the num­ber of their indi­vi­du­al weekly working days, has a legal mini­mum vaca­ti­on of four weeks per year. For employees who work fewer than six days a week, the legal entit­le­ment of 24 working days should be con­ver­ted to work­days. For exam­p­le, an employee working five days a week has a vaca­ti­on entit­le­ment of 20 working days accor­ding to the fol­lo­wing con­ver­si­on:

  • 24 working days : 6 working days = 4 weeks of vaca­ti­on
  • 4 weeks x 5 working days = 20 working days of vaca­ti­on

Con­se­quent­ly, an employee who works four days a week has an entit­le­ment of 16 working days of vaca­ti­on:

  • 24 working days : 6 working days = 4 weeks of vaca­ti­on
  • 4 weeks x 4 working days = 16 working days of vaca­ti­on

With three working days a week, an employee has 12 working days of vaca­ti­on per year, with two working days, eight working days of vaca­ti­on per year, and with one working day a week, four working days of vaca­ti­on per year.

The entit­le­ment beco­mes due for the first time after six months of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship (§ 4 BUrlG). The per­mis­si­bi­li­ty of con­trac­tu­al devia­ti­ons from the sta­tu­to­ry holi­day pro­vi­si­ons is regu­la­ted by § 13 BUrlG. The prin­ci­ple of non-nego­tia­bi­li­ty appli­es, mea­ning that devia­ti­ons from the pro­vi­si­ons of the BUrlG that are unfa­vorable to employees are not allo­wed (§ 13 Abs. 1 S. 3 BUrlG). Only in coll­ec­ti­ve agree­ments can rules that are less favorable to employees, with the excep­ti­on of §§ 1, 2, 3 BUrlG, be estab­lished (so-cal­led coll­ec­tively modi­fia­ble sta­tu­to­ry law).

It is not per­mis­si­ble to pay out a vaca­ti­on entit­le­ment within an exis­ting employ­ment rela­ti­onship. The so-cal­led vaca­ti­on com­pen­sa­ti­on entit­le­ment is auto­ma­ti­cal­ly trig­ge­red when an employee is still entit­led to out­stan­ding vaca­ti­on upon the ter­mi­na­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship, which they could have taken if the employ­ment rela­ti­onship had con­tin­ued (§ 7 Abs. 4 BUrlG). The amount of the vaca­ti­on com­pen­sa­ti­on entit­le­ment is cal­cu­la­ted accor­ding to § 11 BurlG, i.e., in the same way as the entit­le­ment to vaca­ti­on pay.

Minors have an increased mini­mum vaca­ti­on entit­le­ment under the Youth Employ­ment Pro­tec­tion Act (JArbSchG), and dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als have a simi­lar entit­le­ment under the Ninth Book of the Social Code (SGB IX). Minors who are under 16 years old at the begin­ning of the calen­dar year are entit­led to a mini­mum of 30 working days of vaca­ti­on per year. If the minor is under 17 (or 18) years old at the begin­ning of the calen­dar year, their mini­mum vaca­ti­on entit­le­ment is 27 (or 25) working days per year. This is spe­ci­fied in § 19(2) JArbSchG.

Dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als have an addi­tio­nal entit­le­ment to five paid working days of vaca­ti­on within the vaca­ti­on year. If the regu­lar working time of the dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­al is spread across more or fewer than five working days in a calen­dar week, the addi­tio­nal vaca­ti­on is adjus­ted accor­din­gly. Any lon­ger addi­tio­nal vaca­ti­on peri­ods spe­ci­fied by coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ments, com­pa­ny rules, or other vaca­ti­on regu­la­ti­ons for dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als remain unaf­fec­ted.

The addi­tio­nal vaca­ti­on for dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­als as per § 125(1) SGB IX extends the vaca­ti­on spe­ci­fied in coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ments or indi­vi­du­al employ­ment con­tracts and does not mere­ly sup­ple­ment the sta­tu­to­ry mini­mum vaca­ti­on. This addi­tio­nal vaca­ti­on can­not be effec­tively redu­ced in a coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment sin­ce it is the sta­tu­to­ry mini­mum vaca­ti­on. If the disa­bi­li­ty does not exist throug­hout the enti­re year, the dis­ab­led indi­vi­du­al is entit­led to a pro­por­tio­nal addi­tio­nal vaca­ti­on as per § 125(2) SGB IX. When deter­mi­ning the trans­fer of the addi­tio­nal vaca­ti­on to the next year due to the retro­s­pec­ti­ve reco­gni­ti­on of disa­bi­li­ty, the regu­la­ti­ons of § 7(3) BUrlG app­ly accor­din­gly.

Accor­ding to § 4 BUrlG, the full vaca­ti­on entit­le­ment of four weeks is ear­ned with a new employ­er after a wai­ting peri­od of six months. Befo­re the wai­ting peri­od expi­res, the employee can­not demand the full vaca­ti­on of four weeks but, ins­tead, frac­tion­al vaca­ti­on as per § 5(1) BUrlG, equi­va­lent to one-twelfth of the annu­al vaca­ti­on for each full month of employ­ment. If the employee lea­ves the employ­ment befo­re the wai­ting peri­od is ful­fil­led, they are also entit­led to one-twelfth of the annu­al vaca­ti­on for each full month of employ­ment, as per § 5(1)(b) BUrlG. The frac­tion­al vaca­ti­on entit­le­ment should not depend on a mini­mum employ­ment dura­ti­on, espe­ci­al­ly in the ent­ry year. A pro­vi­si­on often over­loo­ked in prac­ti­ce in the BUrlG sti­pu­la­tes that even after the wai­ting peri­od has been ful­fil­led, the employee can only request frac­tion­al vaca­ti­on entit­le­ment equi­va­lent to one-twelfth of the annu­al vaca­ti­on for each full month of employ­ment when the employ­ment ends in the first half of a calen­dar year (§ 5(1)© BUrlG).

This means that if the last day of employ­ment falls on Janu­ary 1st or June 30th or any day bet­ween the­se two dates, frac­tion­al vaca­ti­on is appli­ca­ble. Howe­ver, the frac­tion­al allo­ca­ti­on of vaca­ti­on entit­le­ment in the ent­ry and exit year does not app­ly in all cases. If the employee lea­ves the employ­ment in the first half of the calen­dar year and has alre­a­dy taken all of the vaca­ti­on in Febru­ary, they do not need to repay the recei­ved vaca­ti­on pay, even par­ti­al­ly (BAG NZA 2001, 663).

Accor­ding to § 7(1) BUrlG, the employee’s vaca­ti­on pre­fe­ren­ces are to be “con­side­red” when deter­mi­ning the timing of their vaca­ti­on unless urgent ope­ra­tio­nal con­cerns or other employees’ vaca­ti­on pre­fe­ren­ces, which deser­ve prio­ri­ty for social reasons, con­flict with them. The phra­sing of the law that the employee’s pre­fe­ren­ces are only to be “con­side­red” might sug­gest that the­se pre­fe­ren­ces play a sub­or­di­na­te role in vaca­ti­on sche­du­ling. Howe­ver, accor­ding to case law, the employee’s vaca­ti­on pre­fe­ren­ces gene­ral­ly take pre­ce­dence over ope­ra­tio­nal inte­rests. The employ­er can excep­tio­nal­ly refu­se the employee’s timing request only when urgent ope­ra­tio­nal con­cerns or the vaca­ti­on pre­fe­ren­ces of other more soci­al­ly pro­tec­ted employees oppo­se it.

The deter­mi­na­ti­on or gran­ting of vaca­ti­on is exclu­si­ve­ly done by the employ­er, not the employee. Self-gran­ted lea­ve wit­hout pri­or agree­ment with the employ­er can be grounds for beha­vi­oral ter­mi­na­ti­on, which can be issued as an extra­or­di­na­ry or imme­dia­te ter­mi­na­ti­on, depen­ding on the situa­ti­on. If a dis­pu­te ari­ses bet­ween the employee and employ­er regar­ding vaca­ti­on that the employee has alre­a­dy plan­ned and is about to take, they can app­ly to the labor court for an inte­rim injunc­tion requi­ring the employ­er to grant the vaca­ti­on.

Such expe­di­ted pro­cee­dings live up to their name – in extre­me cases, it’s even pos­si­ble to have a hea­ring in the labor court and recei­ve a decis­i­on on the same day. In gene­ral, the employ­er can­not revo­ke once-gran­ted vaca­ti­on. Revo­ca­ti­on of gran­ted vaca­ti­on by the employ­er is only per­mis­si­ble in extre­me­ly excep­tio­nal cir­cum­s­tances. Con­se­quent­ly, revo­ca­ti­on of gran­ted vaca­ti­on by the employ­er is gene­ral­ly not per­mis­si­ble, mea­ning the vaca­ti­on, once gran­ted, is legal­ly bin­ding and must be hono­red.

Howe­ver, even an unlawful revo­ca­ti­on of pre­vious­ly appro­ved lea­ve by the employ­er befo­re the employee’s vaca­ti­on com­men­ces means that the employee is initi­al­ly not allo­wed to take the (initi­al­ly appro­ved but later revo­ked) vaca­ti­on. In such a case, the employee must seek the assis­tance of the labor court. Going on lea­ve wit­hout pro­per aut­ho­riza­ti­on con­sti­tu­tes self-aut­ho­riza­ti­on, which has the seve­re legal con­se­quen­ces men­tio­ned abo­ve.

The situa­ti­on is dif­fe­rent when the employ­er revo­kes appro­ved lea­ve after the vaca­ti­on has star­ted. Such a decla­ra­ti­on does not requi­re the employee to inter­rupt the vaca­ti­on or take legal action.

In gene­ral, the entit­le­ment to vaca­ti­on time is irre­vo­ca­bly lost if the employee does not use it within the cur­rent calen­dar year (until Decem­ber 31). The trans­fer of lea­ve to the first three months of the fol­lo­wing year (the “car­ry­o­ver peri­od”) is an excep­ti­on that is only allo­wed under spe­ci­fic legal con­di­ti­ons.

Accor­ding to § 7(3) of the Fede­ral Lea­ve Act (BUrlG), it sta­tes:

“§ 7 Timing, Trans­fera­bi­li­ty, and Com­pen­sa­ti­on for Lea­ve.

Lea­ve must be gran­ted and taken within the cur­rent calen­dar year. The trans­fer of lea­ve to the next calen­dar year is only per­mis­si­ble if com­pel­ling ope­ra­tio­nal or per­so­nal reasons jus­ti­fy it.”

If such com­pel­ling ope­ra­tio­nal or per­so­nal reasons for trans­fer­ring lea­ve do not exist, the employee, from a legal per­spec­ti­ve, no lon­ger has any remai­ning lea­ve the fol­lo­wing year or during the car­ry­o­ver peri­od. An excep­ti­on to this rule may ari­se from a com­pa­ny prac­ti­ce if the employ­er has con­sis­t­ent­ly agreed to trans­fer lea­ve to the fol­lo­wing year for all employees wit­hout excep­ti­on.

If an employee falls ill short­ly befo­re the end of the year and, the­r­e­fo­re, can­not take their enti­re vaca­ti­on by Decem­ber 31, the employee should request to resche­du­le their lea­ve for a time after retur­ning to work. This is becau­se, accor­ding to legal pre­ce­dent, the vaca­ti­on par­ti­al­ly expi­res, name­ly for the dura­ti­on of the unu­sed vaca­ti­on days until the end of the year. The reason is that the employee’s ill­ness con­sti­tu­tes a “per­so­nal reason” for trans­fer­ring the lea­ve to the fol­lo­wing year only if the vaca­ti­on in the pre­vious year could­n’t be taken exclu­si­ve­ly due to the ill­ness. If an employee reco­vers befo­re the end of the year, they can take their lea­ve again.

If the lea­ve is effec­tively trans­fer­red to the first three months of the fol­lo­wing year, the employee must take it by March 31 of the fol­lo­wing year, as it will other­wi­se expi­re for good.

In § 7(3), sen­tence 3 of the Fede­ral Lea­ve Act (BUrlG), it sta­tes:

“§ 7 Timing, Trans­fera­bi­li­ty, and Com­pen­sa­ti­on for Lea­ve.

(3) (…) In the case of trans­fer, lea­ve must be gran­ted and taken during the first three months of the fol­lo­wing calen­dar year.”

If the employ­er unre­ason­ab­ly fails to grant the trans­fer­red lea­ve, which had been reques­ted on time, during the first three months of the fol­lo­wing year, even when it could have been gran­ted, the entit­le­ment to lea­ve under the BUrlG will expi­re. Howe­ver, in such cir­cum­s­tances, the employee has a cla­im for dama­ges against the employ­er, which is aimed at pro­vi­ding the unlawful­ly denied lea­ve. Under such con­di­ti­ons, the remai­ning lea­ve from the pre­vious year can still be reques­ted after March 31.

If an employee falls ill during their vaca­ti­on, the days of inca­pa­ci­ty for work, pro­ven by a medi­cal cer­ti­fi­ca­te, are not deduc­ted from the annu­al lea­ve, as sta­ted in § 9 of the BUrlG. This is becau­se the pur­po­se of rela­xa­ti­on during lea­ve can­not be achie­ved if the employee is ill. Reco­very is neces­sa­ry befo­re one can enjoy their time off. Howe­ver, this non-deduc­tion rule appli­es only to the legal­ly pre­scri­bed mini­mum lea­ve in accordance with §§ 1, 3 of the BUrlG, but not to lea­ve excee­ding this mini­mum as spe­ci­fied by a coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment or an employ­ment con­tract. The par­ties to such addi­tio­nal lea­ve bey­ond the legal mini­mum are free to make alter­na­ti­ve arran­ge­ments, so dif­fe­ring regu­la­ti­ons can be valid­ly agreed upon.

If an employee is abroad during their ill­ness, they are requi­red, accor­ding to § 5(2) of the Con­tin­ued Remu­ne­ra­ti­on Act (Ent­gelt­fort­zah­lungs­ge­setz, EFZG), to noti­fy the employ­er of their inca­pa­ci­ty for work, the expec­ted dura­ti­on of the ill­ness, and their address at the place of stay in the qui­ckest means of com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on. The cos­ts for this noti­fi­ca­ti­on must be cover­ed by the employ­er. Addi­tio­nal­ly, if the employee is a mem­ber of a sta­tu­to­ry health insu­rance, they must also inform the health insu­rance pro­vi­der about the inca­pa­ci­ty for work and its expec­ted dura­ti­on.

If an employee wis­hes to extend their lea­ve with the sick days, atta­ching the sick days direct­ly to their “vaca­ti­on days,” they must obtain the employer’s con­sent before­hand. From a legal per­spec­ti­ve, this con­sti­tu­tes a new request for lea­ve. The comm­ents abo­ve regar­ding “self-aut­ho­riza­ti­on” app­ly here.

Accor­ding to the con­sis­tent case law of the Fede­ral Labor Court (BAG) sin­ce 1982, the emer­gence of the lea­ve entit­le­ment does not depend on the employee having work­ed during the year in which they are entit­led to lea­ve (BAG, judgment of March 24, 2009 — 9 AZR 983/07). Even if the employee was con­ti­nuous­ly ill during the enti­re lea­ve year, they still have the right to recei­ve lea­ve. Howe­ver, they can­not cla­im their lea­ve due to ill­ness, mea­ning they are unable to use the lea­ve while sick. In such cases, the lea­ve is car­ri­ed over to the next calen­dar year.

The BAG had been of the opi­ni­on, in its con­stant case law sin­ce 1982, that the trans­fer pro­vi­si­on in § 7(3), sen­tence 2 of the BUrlG should also app­ly when the employee was pre­ven­ted from taking lea­ve within the lea­ve year due to a leng­thy ill­ness (BAG, judgment of May 13, 1982, 6 AZR 360/80). In other words, even a per­ma­nent ill­ness con­sti­tu­tes a com­pel­ling “per­so­nal reason” for not taking lea­ve within the lea­ve year.

The legal con­se­quence of this inter­pre­ta­ti­on was that the lea­ve not taken due to a leng­thy ill­ness was trans­fer­red to the next calen­dar year in accordance with the pro­vi­si­ons of § 7(3), sen­tence 2 of the BUrlG and ulti­m­ate­ly expi­red on March 31 of the fol­lo­wing year, accor­ding to § 7(3), sen­tence 3 of the BUrlG. In the event of the ter­mi­na­ti­on of the employ­ment rela­ti­onship, the employee could not cla­im com­pen­sa­ti­on for unu­sed lea­ve from the pre­vious year, even if they were not healt­hy at the time of ter­mi­na­ti­on, pro­vi­ded that ter­mi­na­ti­on occur­red no later than March 31. The jus­ti­fi­ca­ti­on pro­vi­ded by the BAG was that the cla­im for com­pen­sa­ti­on replaces the lea­ve entit­le­ment, mea­ning its “sur­ro­ga­te.” If the employee is not fit for work at the time of ter­mi­na­ti­on, the­re is no entit­le­ment to lea­ve in kind, and the­r­e­fo­re, no right to its sur­ro­ga­te or com­pen­sa­ti­on for lea­ve.

Howe­ver, this case law was over­tur­ned by the Euro­pean Court of Jus­ti­ce (ECJ) in Janu­ary 2009, decla­ring it incon­sis­tent with Euro­pean law (ECJ, judgment of Janu­ary 22, 2009 — C‑350/06). The reason is that Artic­le 7 of Direc­ti­ve 2003/88/EC on cer­tain aspects of the orga­niza­ti­on of working time (Direc­ti­ve 2003/88/EC) pro­vi­des for a mini­mum lea­ve entit­le­ment of four weeks for all workers. Accor­ding to the ECJ, this legal­ly man­da­ted mini­mum lea­ve entit­le­ment would not be respec­ted or effec­tively imple­men­ted if employees who were con­ti­nuous­ly ill would lose their lea­ve entit­le­ment under natio­nal laws.

As a result of this judgment, employees who have been con­ti­nuous­ly ill for exten­ded peri­ods can now demand unu­sed lea­ve from pre­vious years as car­ry­o­ver lea­ve if they return to work or request finan­cial com­pen­sa­ti­on for their unu­sed lea­ve when their employ­ment ends. This employee-fri­end­ly decis­i­on, howe­ver, only appli­es to the sta­tu­to­ry lea­ve entit­le­ment under § 3 of the BUrlG and not to addi­tio­nal lea­ve bey­ond the sta­tu­to­ry mini­mum pro­vi­ded by a coll­ec­ti­ve bar­gai­ning agree­ment, works coun­cil agree­ment, or indi­vi­du­al con­tract. The amount of the­se claims can be sub­stan­ti­al, as the courts have not yet set a time limit on when lea­ve not taken due to ill­ness in the past can be clai­med.

This chan­ge in labor law will have impli­ca­ti­ons for employ­ment pro­tec­tion law. In the future, employ­ers will likely make more effort to ter­mi­na­te employ­ment rela­ti­onships with employees who have been absent from work for exten­ded peri­ods due to ill­ness. Ill­ness-rela­ted ter­mi­na­ti­ons are expec­ted to be more often con­side­red lawful or pro­por­tio­na­te by the courts, as employ­ers can argue the finan­cial con­se­quen­ces of the long-term sus­pen­ded employ­ment due to lea­ve rights under the chan­ged holi­day law.

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